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ANTI-SECULARIST LECTURES.

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A COURSE OF

SIX LECTURES

BY THE

REV. JAS. M'CANN, M.A., F.R.S.L., F.G.S.,

Author of "Prayer, Providence, and Science," &c.,

WITH AN APPENDIX CONTAINING

SECULARIST OBJECTIONS TO THE BIBLE,

NOTES, &c.

"Thy Word is true from the beginning: and every one of thy
righteous judgments endureth for ever."—Ps. cxix. 160.

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PREFACE.

AT my ordination I promised that I would be ready, with all faithful diligence, to banish and drive away all erroneous and strange doctrines contrary to God's word ; as need should require, and occasion should serve. When I delivered these Lectures I had no doubt whatever about the necessity of such a course ; and I had as little doubt about my own incompetency to treat the *subjects* as they should be treated. I believed, however, that I could answer the objections of the Secularist, because that requires little eloquence, and less learning. I had faith also in the God of truth, in whose cause I was about to speak, that he would aid my effort by the influences of his Spirit, And so I undertook the task, resolving to do what I considered my duty, as best I could, and leave the results with him. The duties of a town curacy claiming much of my time and attention, I had no leisure to spend on the polishing of my diction, the rounding of my sentences, or those graces of composition that add so much to the pleasure of the listener ; but was compelled to speak my thoughts in the words that first presented themselves. I gladly take this opportunity

of thanking my Incumbent, The Rev. G. G. Lawrence, M.A., for his unvarying kindness, counsel, and support. By his permission, cheerfully granted, he made the delivery of these lectures possible ; and by his ever ready sympathy, encouragement, and advice, he made it pleasant. I would also thank the Rev. John Moore, Wesleyan Minister, for his readiness in freely placing at my disposal, the stores of a mind richly furnished with philosophic lore.

I may perhaps be allowed to add, that I have already been far more than repaid for any labour they may have caused me, by the assurances I have received of doubts having been dispelled, and faith confirmed. And in this statement I would include the subsequent debate with Mr. Bradlaugh.

June, 1867.

CONTENTS.

LECTURES.

I. <u>SECULARISM</u> A FOLLY AND A FAILURE	1
II. THE SOUL: ITS EXISTENCE DEMONSTRABLE, ITS NATURE AND IMMORTALITY	41
III. <u>EVIL</u> : ITS NATURE, ORIGIN, AND CURE	79
IV. SCIENCE AND THE <u>BIBLE</u> NOT ANTAGONISTIC	118
V. <u>INSPIRATION</u> AND REVELATION	165
VI. THE SPIRIT OF THE AGE, AND THE DUTIES OF ITS TEACHERS	223

APPENDIX.

SECULARIST OBJECTIONS TO THE <u>BIBLE</u>	261
LITERARY OBJECTIONS	265
HISTORICAL OBJECTIONS.....	280
MORAL OBJECTIONS.....	295
PRACTICAL OBJECTIONS	309
TESTIMONY IN FAVOUR	318
NOTES	329

Lecture I.

SECULARISM : A FOLLY AND A FAILURE.

THE REV. G. G. LAWRENCE, M.A., INCUMBENT OF ST. PAUL'S,
HUDDERSFIELD, IN THE CHAIR.

IN undertaking this course of lectures I have but one object in view, and that is to aid inquiring minds in their search for truth. I stand not here as the advocate of creed or party, but simply as an individual lover of the most valuable gem man can possess—truth, eternal and unalterable. I come to those who wish to make this their aim, this their standard, this their goal ; and say to them, you may differ from me on many very important subjects, your views of God, the Soul, and Eternity, may be diametrically opposed to mine ; still I will give you credit for holding yours, on what you believe to be sufficient reasons, and I shall expect you to give me credit for the same. But that we may see how it is,

and why, we so widely differ, I shall lay my principles of belief plainly before you, contrast them with those you profess, and thus endeavour to show that mine, being the more rational, claim the allegiance of all who would have judgment rather than prejudice, truth rather than error. If I succeed in showing Christianity to be rational and successful, I shall have proved its antithesis,—Secularism to be both a folly and a failure. My plan will be, to begin at the very foundation, or the existence of God ; and proceed to erect a superstructure, whose highest point will terminate with the Cross of Christ. I do not pretend that I shall be able to advance any new or original arguments on these important topics, the discussion is an old one, and has been debated in its several departments by men who were giants in mind. The utmost that I can hope to accomplish will be, to gather flowers of thought wherever I find them growing, and join them in one united group for the benefit of those who may not have discovered them for themselves. And before entering more directly on my subject, I would request all who hear the arguments I lay before them, to weigh them calmly and dispassionately, that they may arrive at a knowledge of the truth.

As Mr. Holyoake is, I believe, the acknowledged leader of the party calling themselves Secularists, I shall confine my quotations, as much as possible, to his works ; not because he requires all

members to agree with him in all his belief, but because his opinions agree with those which differ most widely from my own.

And first, I would ask, what is Secularism? In Mr. Holyoake's discussion with Mr. Grant, page 221, he says, "We therefore resolved to choose a new name (Secularism), which should express the practical and moral element always concealed in the word Atheism." And again, in *The Reasoner*, "The Secularist is the larger and more comprehensive designation of the Atheist." "Freethinking is the Secular sphere; drawing its line of demarcation between time and eternity; it works for the welfare of men in this world." It has, consequently, a practical based on a theoretical element; the practical is its sole relation to time, the theoretical is its ignorance of anything beyond the life that we are now living, or of any being beyond the material world we see.

The question, therefore, that first demands an answer is this, whether has the Theist or the Non-theist the most rational creed? I say at once the Theist, and proceed to show you why.

The existence of a God is not *denied* by the Non-theist; he only does not accept him because there is not sufficient evidence to warrant him in doing so. "The universal cause of scepticism, and reason of its permanence, is the discovery of the

insufficient evidence offered on the side of Theism.”*
 “Denying implies infinite knowledge as the ground of disproof.”† “The Non-theist takes this ground. He affirms that natural reason has *not yet* attained to (evidence of) Supernatural Being. He does not deny it *may do so*, because the capacity of natural reason in the pursuits of evidence of Supernatural being is not, so far as he is aware, fixed.”‡ Consequently, a God *may* exist ; nay, I might almost say, there is a probability of it, because the capacity of natural reason not being fixed, it may yet progress to the discovery of one.

Now the bare possibility of a Deity invests every man with the responsibility of earnest, active examination, to prove whether he exists or not. “There is a certain duteous movement which the mind *ought* to take, on the bare supposition that a God may be.....The certainty of an actual God binds over to certain distinct and most undoubted proprieties. But so also may the imagination of a possible God ; in which case the very idea of a God, even in its most hypothetical form, might lay a *responsibility even upon Atheists*.....The very idea of a God will bring along with it an instant sense and recognition of the moralities and duties that would be owing to Him.....Should a possible God be imagined, there is a something not only which we

* “Trial of Theism,” p. 31. † “Reasoner,” XI., 232.

‡ “Reasoner,” New Series, p. 9.

feel that we *ought*, but there is a something which we actually ought to do or to be, in consequence of our being visited by such an imagination.....To this condition there attaches a most clear and incumbent morality. It is to go in quest of that unseen Benefactor, who, for aught I know, has ushered me into existence, and spread so glorious a panorama around me. It is to probe the secret of my being and my birth ; and, if possible, to make discovery whether it was indeed the hand of a Benefactor that brought me forth from nonentity, and gave me place and entertainment in the glowing territory which is lighted up with the hopes and happiness of living men. It is thus that the *very conception of a God throws a solemn responsibility after it.*"*

This duty we are now about to undertake, this secret to probe, this search to prosecute ; but in what spirit should we enter on the inquiry ? Mr. Holyoake shall answer " Suppose what we will, we shall still stand like children on the shores of Eternity, who must look forward with wistful and unsatisfied curiosity. But let the profound sense of our littleness, which here creeps over us, check the dogmatic spirit, and arrest the presumptuous word. We stand in the great presence of nature, whose inspiration should be that of modesty, humility, and love."† In this spirit I would ever speak, in this

* "Chalmer's Works," I., 64.

† Holyoake "Trial of Theism," p. 43.

spirit may I ask you to hear ; it is a spirit that will check rash and baseless argument, and smother bitter or unkind criticism. It seems to me, however, that the spirit of modesty is somewhat forgotten in the very quotation itself ; how can any man say what *shall* be in future time ? How can any man limit the possibilities of Eternity ? Would it not have been better had a profound sense of his own littleness arrested the presumptuous word ? He touches a tender chord when he refers to “ a wistful and unsatisfied curiosity.” Can any man, no matter what his creed, look upon the sun of morning, the stars of midnight, the snows of winter, or the bloom of summer, and not feel an interested curiosity burn within him—a longing to know the origin and the cause of all ? Mr. Holyoake acknowledges the existence of the yearning, but tells you that it must remain a yearning still, unsatisfied and ungratified, that he has no information to give you on the subject. “ I explain nothing—I do not explain how matter came to be, nor do I think any man can. Nature no man can fathom—we can only suppose, and all that is given to us is not to suppose contradiction.” * I ask, does this satisfy you ? Are you content to be told that you shall be told nothing ? You know full well that the mind *cannot* rest in such a negation as this ; it demands full and positive information on the *knowable*, or

* Grant and Holyoake “ Discussion.” p. 37.

else it demands to be shown why it cannot know. Two regions lie beyond our present information ; one, that of the unknown ; into this we may enter, and through it we may advance till no unknown fact lies beyond : but the other, that of the unknowable, is sealed to us for ever, by the circumstance that all lying within its boundary cannot, from its own nature, be known by our finite minds. Whenever we are shown that the answer to a question lies here, we are satisfied to remain in ignorance, but not otherwise ; and this question—what is the origin of nature ?—is confessed by Non-theists, not to be within this region, therefore discoverable ; and, as I hope to be able to show, is already discovered. Mr. Holyoake, however, cannot help explaining ; his instinct is stronger than his reason ; and so he gives us what he calls “ a conjecture,” “ a supposition.” Remembering that the explanation is only a *conjecture*, let us examine it that we may fairly estimate its value. It is as follows : “ My own impression is, that nature is self-existent, nature is eternal, nature is material.” “ If we reason about it, unless we take refuge in the idea of a creation which we cannot understand, we must come to the conclusion that nature is self-existent, and that attribute is so majestic—the power of being independent of any ruler, the power of being independent of the law of other beings, seems so majestic as fairly to be supposed to include all others, for that which has power to be has power to act ; for the power to be is the

most majestic of all forms of action." "We look at it and call it inanimate because it continues in a set form, and of a certain nature ; but there is nothing in the world, so far as we know, that is not subject to change, and does not seem by its own innate power to become at one time or other various beings, and present various phenomena of contrivance which we, refusing to allow it to be the work of any power of our own, ascribe to the work of a Being distinct from nature."* I must, in justice to Mr. Holyoake, state that he complains of the inaccuracies in the report of the Townley discussion, but I have abstained from quoting any sentiments which are not confirmed by his own writings. I find here a considerable amount of explanation, which, I must confess, is not wholly satisfactory. When I read the words "innate power of change," I fancied that it would be rather difficult to harmonize this with the recognized principle of inertia. According to this principle, matter will remain for ever in the position in which you place it, unless it be acted on by some external force. For example, if I hurl a stone from my hand, that stone will move in a straight line eternally, if not drawn out of the line, or stopped by some power *beyond* itself. It has no power what, ever within itself to arrest or change its course. Once admit the existence of "*innate power*" of change as a cause in nature, and physical science is

* "Holyoake and Townley "Discussion," pp. 24, 26.

at an end. If matter has this innate power of becoming a plant or an animal, it must move itself for the purpose; that means, that a particle of matter, without any new force acting on it, spontaneously alters its position and its relations to the remainder of the universe. Again, what means momentum if matter possess this power? I care not what the velocity with which a cannon ball be projected, if it have the innate power of accelerating or retarding that velocity, momentum cannot be calculated. But supposing matter has this power, should we not imagine that a considerable amount of intelligence was required to begin the production of the plant and animal just at the right time, and to arrange "the phenomena of contrivance" manifested by them? Well what says Mr. Holyoake on this point? "With Pantheists the term God signifies the aggregate of Nature—but nature as a being, intelligent and conscious. It is my inability to subscribe to either of the views [referring to the Theists before mentioned] which prevents me being ranked with Theists." "Nature seems adequate to produce man as she produces the flower and the star, which are as wonderful as man, at least more wonderful than the works man ever performs. But to say, therefore, that Nature is intelligent, as we are, would lead us beyond our knowledge. If we call Nature intelligent, we endow it with consciousness; and though Nature acts wonderfully, it does not appear to feel."* I had

* Holyoake "Trial of Theism," pp. 157, 42.

thought that Nature being "self-existent possessed an attribute so majestic as to include all others," but now it seems not to possess the attribute of consciousness, intelligence, or feeling, and what I should like to ask are all other attributes without these? What becomes of the *majesty* of self-existence, while there is no consciousness of it, nor intelligence in it? It exists, but it knows it not; and from all eternity, but it is heedless of its dignity. Surely it is better to have a derived existence with these noblest attributes than an underived without them. Try, if possible, just for a little to grasp the idea thus presented to our minds that we may realize all its manifold contradictions, not to use a harsher word. Matter has an innate power of becoming various beings, but has no consciousness of the fact, nor intelligence to direct its course. There are numberless exquisite adaptations on this earth of ours, which we are asked to believe are the result of what?—absolutely nothing. We are taught that all the particles forming the bones, the muscles, the nerves of my hand came together by an inherent power, without knowledge, purpose, or intelligence; and yet, strange to say, every part is adjusted to every other part with the most admirable exactness and unvarying regularity. What! am I to be seriously told that all the beauties of organism, all the adaptations to peculiarities of existence, all the regularities of function, that we find around us and within us, are due to the *unintelligent* action of unconscious matter? But there is another state-

ment in the quotation which requires a little scrutiny. We are informed that Nature is adequate to the production of more wonderful works than are ever produced by man. Now, you must remember the conditions under which the two carry on their operations. A man acts with a will, a purpose, and an intelligence. He knows exactly what he wants to accomplish ; he is familiar with the means which he must employ ; he understands the properties of the materials he is using, and calculates their effects on each other. All this, which seems very necessary, is wanting to matter ; apparently, however, it is of little consequence, for with all these advantages in his favour, man is beaten by that which is unconscious and unintelligent. Well may Nature be said to act “wonderfully,” but it is a wonder which, who will may believe, but which I cannot.

Is this a specimen of the “Rationalism” of which we hear so much ? If so, it is a rationalism whose progress is, like that of a crab, receding till it lowers itself below the irrational. Is this the superior intelligence boasted by the Non-theist ? If so it is an intelligence that must hide its diminished head before the feats of the absolutely unintelligent.

Such then are some of the reasons why I cannot accept Mr. Holyoake’s “conjecture ;” but there is a further one founded on the fact that his explanation is only a *conjecture*. The mind desires something

more than conjecture, if it can be had, and I believe it can. I take Theism to be a certainty; and a certainty I shall try to prove it; but suppose it were, like Non-theism, only a conjecture; still it would, from its vastly superior probability, be far preferable. It places mind above matter, consciousness above unconsciousness, intelligence above unintelligence. While it opens the volume of nature and demonstrates its countless and unfathomed beauties, it would tell you there exists a Writer whose words are wise, whose power is infinite, and whose feelings are love.

The certainty of Theism I base on Mr. Holyoake's own admission. "Guided by the principle of materialism, which we define as a search, not after primary but after calculable causes, it labours in the inexhaustible field of positive philosophy." "The Secular rule of speech is referable to the same principle of causation everywhere recognized." "Secularism is a recognition of causation in nature, in science, in mind, morals, and manners."* Here is an explicit avowal of belief in causation, the enquiry therefore arises, what is causation, and how does it bear on our argument for the existence of Deity? It does not mean simple uniformity of succession or co-existence. Night uniformly succeeds day, but no one would dream of saying that day was the cause of night. You may see two stars rise every night in

the same positions relatively to each other, but you do not imagine the one to be the cause of that position of the other, you could readily fancy that one might, after a time, be separated from its neighbour, and be found in a different part of the heavens.

Causation is the expression of the conviction that every change must be produced, and that which produces we call cause. You will see by this statement that causation does not refer to the mere circumstance of existence, as such. It does not mean that every being must have had some other being antecedent to it, as its producer. The mere fact of the existence of matter, chaotic, unformed, without organization, arrangement, or adaptation, would not have led us to infer that it must have had a producer or Creator. But when we examine the *form* of matter, we observe constant change, phenomena beginning and ending, motion everywhere, and it is this which keeps the idea before the mind; for it is simply impossible to see any one change in matter, and not believe that it had a cause. There may be the most absurd mistakes about the character or nature of the cause, but, that there must have been a cause of some kind, is a simple intuition of the mind, self-evident, irresistible, and universal.

I wish this distinction to be clearly understood, that the conviction arises, not upon the observation of being, but upon the observation of *change* in being. It is no explanation of course to say, that

the law of the change is the cause of it. The law is nothing more than the regularity with which a certain cause produces a certain effect. Law is a conception of the mind, gathered from an extended experience, and is not a quality in nature. I may invariably walk down a particular road at a stated hour ; and it may, in consequence, be said that such is the law of my walk ; but in point of fact, my uniformity of action is the cause of the law, and not the law the cause of my uniformity.

It also appears to me, as though Mr. Holyoake held two mutually destructive opinions, innate power of unconscious change, and causation.

The former opinion means chance, stated in its most positive form. If the change be wholly from within the body, without any knowledge of the fact on its own part, and consequently without any purpose in the fact, it is nothing else than chance. There was not any reason why the change should take place at this more than at any other time, there was not any end to be accomplished, nor design to be achieved ; nor was there action from without—else it were not innate—chance, and only chance, is the explanation. But if this be possible, universal causation must be false ; for you cannot hold that a phenomenon is at the same time, caused and uncaused. But if universal causation be true—and who shall say it is not—chance must be false, and innate power

of unconscious change, is, I think, proved to be a baseless fallacy.

The mind, however, does not rest contented in the assertion, that the special change now present to the senses must have a cause; it feels itself impelled to go back to the causality of the cause, and so on from cause to cause—how far? Some would tell us that we must, if we carry out our principle, recede infinitely; that no matter how far back we carry our investigation, we must believe in some still prior cause. This is a fallacy arising from confounding *object* with *change*; did cause mean the origin of substance, this argument were tenable, but, as it does not mean this the objection fails. What the mind does, and is compelled to do, if it would proceed rationally, is this, to go back step by step till it arrives at a cause which is not an effect, that is, to a Being who never began to be, who is self-existent, eternal, and in whose being there has been no change. Once the reason reposes on the Great First Cause, it feels satisfied, it has now attained the object of its desires, its restlessness has vanished, and peace reigns instead. We may indeed with the Non-theist crush its aspirations, curb its upward longings, bridle its almost irresistible desires for knowledge, but so surely as we give them free play and scope enough, they will lead us on and on, till they bend us in modesty, humility and love, before Him who has caused all the effects of universal nature; before

Him who is the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever.

It is a favourite objection of the Non-theist that we know nothing of cause. He says it is useless arguing in this manner because all we really have definite knowledge of, is the change itself, and not that which produces it. In answer to this, I reply that, supposing the cavil to be true, it does not in the least touch the reality of the fact that there must be a cause of some kind. I have not been contending about the nature of cause, but simply for the necessity of progression to, and belief in first cause. But so far from assenting to this statement as to our ignorance about cause, I would rather say that we know all about it, which we can conceive possible to be known. Do we know nothing about what we call force, the cause of motion? We can measure it more accurately than we can measure any material thing on earth. We can calculate with it so definitely, that the place of a planet in the heavens may be predicted for hundreds of years to come. We can explain phenomena by it so clearly that the mind is at once and fully satisfied. We know its existence, quality, quantity, relation, and function; if this be not clear and explicit knowledge, I should much like to know what more is demanded to make it such.

Seeing that we can discover by experiment the qualities of secondary causation, I now proceed to

examine whether we can determine, by reason, the necessary qualities that must belong to first cause, and comparing them with those believed by the Theist to belong to his Deity show that the first cause of the philosopher and the God of the Theist are one. I must necessarily, at present, omit all induction from the moral world, as it would be anticipating controversy that is to follow.

First cause must then be Eternal ; for if it be not it must have had a beginning, which was a change, and points back to a cause of which this change is the effect, it is consequently not *first* cause. So says Philosophy, and what says Theism ? "The eternal God is thy refuge, and underneath are the everlasting arms."

Again, it must have sufficient power to be competent to the production of all the effects in the material universe. The cause must be at least as extensive as the effect, but how much more extensive is beyond our power to say. First cause is therefore a power to which we can assign no limit, either in space, or in quantity of power, or in constructive skill. Theism replies affirmatively in the assertion "The Lord God Omnipotent reigneth."

But "God cannot be a power," says Mr. Holyoake, "that is an attribute of matter and never impersonal." This seems very much like assuming the point to be proved. I shall show in my lecture

on the Soul, that power is an attribute of mind as well. And what is the meaning of saying "that it is never impersonal"? or in other words that it is always personal, or belongs to person, which signifies mode of being. Of course power belongs to, or rather is, a mode of being. It is personal to the Creator, and also personal to the creature.

The possession of consciousness and will are self-evident, as constructive skill without them would be an absurdity, or useless; absurd, as skill implies consciousness; and useless, as without will the skill could not be exercised. As they are axiomatic in first cause so they are in Deity. It must also be intelligent, in order to the designing of the adjustments, adaptations, and beautiful contrivances pervading every department of nature. So numerous, and so exquisite are the illustrations of this intelligence, that the life of man is all too short to discover more than the merest fragment of them, and the mind of man too powerless to do more than sound their shallowest depths. They lie beyond him countless as the grains of sand on the shores of ocean, fathomless as the depths of space. The quality and the quantity of intelligence, therefore necessary to design them all, before one of them yet had being, must for ever remain incomprehensible to created minds. Well may the Theist exclaim "O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God." "O Lord, how manifold are thy

works! in wisdom hast thou made them all: the earth is full of thy riches."

But I read in "The Trial of Theism." It (God) cannot be intelligence, that grows and has conditions of development." * This is true of human intelligence, but does it follow that what is true of one form of intelligence, is true of all forms? Does it follow that what is true of one form of matter, for illustration, is true of all forms of matter? If so, where does the materialist get intelligence at all? The Divine intelligence does not grow, nor has it conditions of development,—for "known unto Him are all his works from the beginning of the world." Again, "it cannot be a Spirit, that is the negation of matter, the negation of all we know." * Supposing matter to be all we *know*, how can we say that we know all that is? May there not be something beyond our knowledge which we may learn in coming time? No man can say God *cannot* be a Spirit, the most he can affirm will be, that he does not *know* him to be a Spirit, as Mr. Holyoake himself elsewhere allows, indeed assumes in the adoption of the name Non-theist instead of Atheist. But matter is not all we know, as shall be hereafter shown, not even that which is most accurately known; we know force and mind much more truly than we do matter.

But again first cause must be Omnipotent, that is it must exist in every possible relation to

* Holyoake "Trial of Theism," p. 44.

space and duration, or in all relations which are either necessary or contingent, for if it did not exist in every relation which is contingent, it would be possible for it to be set aside by contingency, and therefore would evidently be dependent on contingency. But if so, it must exist in relation to *every part* of space and duration ; for suppose any part of space and duration in which it is not, it does not exist in relation to that, and hence does not exist in every possible relation to space and duration. Once more, Theism and Philosophy are in unison. Am I a God at hand, saith the Lord, and not a God afar off ? Can any hide himself in secret places that I shall not see him ? saith the Lord : do not I fill heaven and earth, saith the Lord." All these qualities necessitate first cause being spirit, and not matter, as it would be impossible for matter to exist in the relations and have the properties, I have proved First Cause must possess, and so God is a Spirit, eternal, omnipotent, omniscient, and omnipresent, the I am that I am.

The Non-theistic or theoretic basis of Secularism I think, I have shown to be mentally a failure, and philosophically a folly.

It prides itself, however, upon its vast practical advantages over Christianity, or indeed any other system that has reference to a Higher Being, or a future life. These pretensions and their foundations must be now examined. Its first principle is, that

it gives precedence to the affairs of this life, because it, at least, is certain ; but not to the *entire* exclusion of all regards about a future state, lest there should happen to be such after death. " We do not say that every man ought to give an *exclusive* attention to this world, because that would be to commit the old sin of dogmatism, and exclude the possibility of another world, and of walking by different light from that by which alone we are able to walk. But as our *knowledge* is confined to this life, and testimony, and conjecture, and probability are all that can be set forth with respect to another life, we think we are justified in giving *precedence* to the duties of this state, and of attaching primary importance to the morality of man to man."* These words *exclusive*, *precedence*, and *primary* would naturally lead us to suppose that there were some duties referring to that possible future, as distinct from this certain present, which had a place, although a secondary one, in the Secularist scheme. But there are none such. What is the use of talking about *primary* importance, and giving *precedence* to the duties of this state, when they are the sole and *exclusive* duties recognized by the Secularist? Is there one solitary obligation that refers to the future life as distinct from this? Why, we are told in the very next sentence of this same discussion that, if we attend to the duties of this life, "we cannot fail to stand well in the eyes of that Judge, who will reward

every one according to his deeds." We may, therefore, dismiss from our consideration all thought of anything but the time that now is, and show that even for this, Secularism is, practically, both a folly and a failure.

The Secularist objects to make any specific preparation for the future on account of its assumed uncertainty; but is the future of the present life a certainty? He knows it is not. Health may bless him till he arrives at a ripe old age; disease may waste his system and lay him on a bed of long protracted sickness, or accident may snap asunder the thread of his life without a moment's warning. The vessel which he has freighted with his goods may be wafted by favouring winds to a speedy termination of her voyage, or she may be wrecked on a sunken reef before she has fairly started on her watery way. The house in which he dwells may stand uninjured for many a rolling year, or it may become the prey of devastating fire. These are all contingencies, but how does the prudent Secularist act in relation to them? Does he content himself by saying that the present only is his, and the future may take care of itself? Or does he not rather insure his life, his vessel, and his house, in case the possibility should become reality, and he be ruined by his negligence? He, then, does for a short time what the Christian does for all time. He, therefore, is the truest Secularist who provides

for the greatest number of possibilities. He is the surest who is insured against the greatest number of risks. There is, I know, a sense in which this life is more important than the future, it is as this is a preparation for the other ; in the same manner as a day is more important than the whole remainder of my life, because in that day I may lay the foundation of a misery and wretchedness that shall never leave me on earth while I have consciousness. I may in a minute be guilty of a crime that would banish me from home and kindred, and country. And the longer I may live so much more important does the day become. Were it known that I should die the day after my misdeed, it would be of far less importance, because the suffering would be so much shorter. So it is the very endlessness of eternity which gives its terrible importance to time. Were there no hereafter, the present would lose much of its great significance. But when we consider the future as the period in which we are to reap the fruits sown in the present ; when we consider that for ever, endlessly, that future is to advance, we shall recognise the fact that it is as much more important than the present, as eternity is longer in duration than time. "Supposing, however, this to be so," says the Secularist, "still we are sure, because, making for it the best preparation possible in the discharge of the duties of morality between man and man." But

wherein is this theory superior to the Christian? He will tell you that his duty is "to do justice, to love mercy, and to walk humbly with his God." And had this been done always perfectly, man had needed no other preparation for meeting his God; but it is not done perfectly by Christian or by Secularist. Every man has numberless shortcomings, of omission as well as of commission. Are these, I should like to ask, a preparation for standing before a Holy God? Are covetousness, injustice, anger, dissimulation, &c., preparations for another state; and who has not been, many a time and oft, one or all of these? One would think to hear some of our opponents talking, that Christians, to be consistent, should spend the whole of their time on their knees, saying prayers, or in singing psalms, or in confessing sins. That they should have no eye for the beauties of art, the harmonies of music and song, or the glories of the material world. That they should live so wrapt in meditation on the mysterious future as not to have any knowledge of, or caring for, the claims of society, or the calls of country. Never was there a greater mistake, or more gratuitous libel.

If any man on earth should be manly in feeling, in thought, and in action, it ought to be the Christian. He believes that the earth was given him to subdue, and he feels that he is fulfilling his Creator's will when he bends earnestly

his powers to master its many forces. He believes that all good things were given him "richly to enjoy," and so he can revel with grateful heart amid the perfumes of flowers, the songs of birds, the melodies of waves and woods; feast his eye on the contrasts of hill and dale, of foaming stream and quiet meadow; gratify his palate with the luscious fruit, and his every sense with its appropriate object. He believes that creation, which is the work of his Father God, is a volume incumbent on him to study; and so in wondering awe and admiring love, he pores over every new manifestation of the Almighty's wisdom, laws, combinations, organisms. Cosmos, in a word, is a precious inspired work which he delights to read.

In business, he believes that "whatever his hand finds to do he should do with all his might." That he is to be "diligent in business," not with covetousness, "for that is idolatry," not dishonestly, for "false weights are an abomination to the Lord," but "rendering to all their due," "doing to others as he would they should do unto him." There is not a single feeling or act calculated to raise the man which is forbidden by Christianity, nay, that is not enjoined by it; nor is there a single feeling, or act calculated to lower the man, that is not against its spirit and its precepts.

And I contend that Christianity alone is entitled to urge the performance of moral actions

as a *duty*. Secularists, I know, speak of duty also, but on what grounds? They deny, or rather ignore, all responsibility to a God. On what, then, do they rest the conception of duty? "Secularism," says Mr. Holyoake, "seeks the personal law of duty, the sphere of duty, and the power by which that duty may work independently. The law found is in natural, utilitarian, and artistic morals."* Now these so-called morals may give a rule of expediency, but I cannot comprehend their giving a "law of duty."

Duty is that which no man has power to shirk, however much he may wish. Once show a man that a certain course of action is his duty, and he must follow it, or be morally guilty; but not so with mere expediency. So long as a man considers himself responsible to no higher being than another man, he may or may not, just as he feels inclined, submit voluntarily to utilitarian rules. He may say that he does not care for the welfare of others, nor does he care for his own; and you may think him very foolish and his actions very inexpedient, but you cannot call him morally vicious. Morality, duty, virtue, and vice lie altogether beyond the sphere of a natural, useful, or artistic compact between man and man. It is simply impossible to "base morals on Secular considerations," while a man believes that he is

to act as a mere creature of time, without reference to any future, you cannot raise him to a higher motive than the gratification of his own wishes, and those wishes, no matter what their character, he may gratify, blameless, by Secular principles, if he be not forcibly prevented. You may tell him it is right to relieve the suffering ; but, he may ask you why is it right ? What is right ? It may be kind to do it, but he does not care for kindness. It may be prudent to do it, but he is not prudent, and that is his own business. It would help humanity to do it, you urge ; but he is callous to all the calls of humanity, except those proceeding from himself. Right must be left on one side, as extraneous to the vocabulary of the Secularist. If such an one choose to act according to your principles, he may ; but if he choose the other way, you are powerless to make him feel that he is morally wrong.

Let us examine, however, the three great bases of Secular power. The first is "Nature." "First, we think that human nature is itself a guarantee of morality." Human nature a guarantee of morality ! Does such a statement require refutation ? Where or when has it ever been so ? In whom has it ever been so ? Will any Secularist tell me that he believes any man ever lived, whose nature guaranteed his complete morality all his life ? But Mr. Holyoake himself shows that it is *not* a guarantee,

for a guarantee must be complete or it is valueless. It would not do for me to guarantee the payment of a thousand pounds if I only possessed a hundred. "We do not assume human nature as being altogether a guide in that full sense." No, I should hope not. But the guarantee fails, because society is only half-nurtured, half-trained, and doubtfully conditioned." So it seems we are to wait for human nature to take up its guarantee till society be perfect, and its offices consequently unnecessary. I should prefer a power that would do the work itself, and not step in after it was accomplished. "What we say is, follow the honest impulse, &c." Nothing more easy to say, but suppose, that which unfortunately is a very common case, that a man has an honest impulse and does not feel inclined to follow it? What, then, is his nature a guarantee that he will follow it? I am afraid that an extensive experience will compel us to answer no. The mere fact that human nature is, and has been in all historic times, universally immoral, in greater or less degree, is sufficient evidence of the folly of the first Secular power. And it is confessed to be such by the introduction of a second power, which is "Intelligence." "There is an order less happily constituted, whom error mis-directs and conventional interest perverts. These are to be governed by knowledge—with them the appeal is to their intelligence; they require to be put under the dominion of ideas. Those only will be sceptical

of this order of results who do not know that ideas are a dominion, and who do not see what an inexorable empire that of intelligence is.”* No one will more freely acknowledge than I do that ideas are a dominion, and intelligence an empire; but at the same time I must flatly deny that the dominion is irresistible, or the empire inexorable. If the words have any meaning, it is, that those who are within the empire of Intelligence *must* do whatever their intelligence tells them is for the welfare of humanity. If this be not the meaning, if man may have intelligence and yet be very far removed from nobility of character or honesty of act, the second power is a second folly.

The empire of intelligence inexorable in the former sense is nonsense. We all know very well that our criminals are not “misdirected by error.” They perfectly comprehend the injury they do themselves and society at large when they commit a crime, they recognise the justice and wisdom of the laws that punish them, and seldom complain of their sentences, but bitterly upbraid their own awkwardness in being caught. They may be ignorant as regards literature or science, but they know very well the social wrong of theft. Is it want of intelligence that allows many of the best scholars of our land to lower themselves by drunkenness; that has permitted educated physicians to become murderers, and well-taught

directors to become thieves? Rather has not their intelligence enabled them to perpetrate their villanies with more consummate skill, and more ably elude detection. "The artist whose sense is cultivated is kingly, imperious, unconquerable." He may be; but I am afraid he *may* also be envious, jealous, a liar, a cheat, or a drunkard. Have we not all read of men whose artistic genius or whose mental powers we have admired, but whose lives we have loathed; whose thoughts were grand, but whose deeds were base; who, if the empire of intelligence had been inexorable, would have been as gods; but who, that empire not being by any means inexorable, were very much the reverse.

But the Secularist powers are not yet exhausted; there is one other for those who are not amiable enough to act amiably, or sharp enough to be, and know, what is moral! This last power is "Utility." "In these instances our appeal is to utility, to the sense of interest—an appeal which the rudest are prompt to own, and which a philosopher cannot wholly afford to disregard. If any one will not pursue right conduct for its own sake, it is still worth his while to do it for his interest's sake; if any one will not live uprightly because of the intellectual beauty and harmony of the thing, we say it is worth his while pursuing it as a matter of calculation."*

* Holyoake and Grant, "Discussion," p. 108.

Let us compare this with another quotation from the same discussion (p. 68). "We are told that the Christian has double motives for the performance of Secular duties. Is there no mistake here? The additional motive alluded to is the expectation of reward or the fear of punishment. This motive is both remote and vicious." What is the difference between utility as a motive and the expectation of reward or fear of punishment as motives? These are one and the same thing. Consequently on his own showing his third power is a vicious one. It is so in fact. Is the drunkard ignorant of the loss that his debasing habit entails on himself and his family? Does he not know by sad experience that he is losing health, home, manliness, respect, everything that a true man should hold most dear? And what is the result? "The intellectual beauty and harmony" of sobriety do not break his vice, nor does the "calculation" of its profitable nature. He lives a drunkard, with a full consciousness of all the secular loss entailed by it. It is the same with the professional criminals of our country, they well understand that the talents developed in their adroitness, if applied steadily to lawful occupations, would result in a more substantial and secure prosperity; but the other mode of life better suits their depraved tastes; and with the prison and loss of their pilfered wealth almost surely in view, they go on pilfering still. How many men will and do incur an almost certain

future of loss and retribution for the momentary gratification of some darling passion? Utility may be abundantly shown to be false in fact, as it is in theory. The instincts of man rebel against the thought, that right and wrong are to be made dependant on profit and loss. We cannot help believing that right is right, no matter what loss its discharge involves us in; that no amount of gain can justify me in an action which I think a wrong one. It is subversive of all the cementing influences of society, to tell a man that he is to do that which will bring him the most reward, that he is to make his rule of life a matter of calculation, rather than a matter of principle. But if a man will be neither amiable, nor intelligent, nor prudent, what is to be done with him individually? I know you can restrain him by force from doing that which may be considered injurious to society; but this does not affect the man himself, he is still the same evilly disposed being that he was before.

Secularism now must resign the task, it has tried its guarantee, which has been repudiated. It has subjected to its inexorable empire, which has proved most powerless. It has pleaded the dictates of thrift, selfishness, prudence; appeals which the rudest own 'tis true, but which, alas, it has found to be more or less disregarded, and set at defiance. The powers are all exhausted and found to be in the vast majority of cases

powerless. Still man is not to be given up as altogether hopeless, there is yet one other power that may be tried, and that is the power of his affections. The Christian comes and speaks to his heart, and shows him what God has done for him, how He has loved him, how He has tried every means in his power to save him from the present and eternal effects of his own ingratitude, of his own rebellion; and when once a man *feels* this, love begets love, and he in return gives his, not for the hope of heaven, for love may not be bought; but “we love him because he first loved us.” Now if a man love God he *must* wish to keep his commandments, there is no alternative. It would be simply absurd for me to say that I loved any one, and yet systematically disobey their injunctions. This is a power, which if it be present it must act on the whole life of a man, it will not only regulate his actions towards God, but also his actions towards his neighbour. It is one command to “love the Lord thy God” and “thy neighbour as thyself.” We are distinctly told that absence of love to man is a sign of absence of love to God. “If a man say, I love God, and hateth his brother, he is a liar: for he that loveth not his brother, whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he hath not seen?” It is then a *necessary* result of this love that a man do his best to keep God’s commandments, and these, one and all, bear on the

welfare of humanity. For example, take this one, "Finally, brethren, whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report; if there be any virtue, and if there be any praise, think on these things."* You may descant on the beauty of kindness, on the nobility of truth, on the dignity of intelligence; and leave the mass of men debased as ever, believing, as they do all the time, the reality of what you say. If you wish to reform a man you must appeal to his most powerful feelings. Now I contend that his affections are his most powerful, that when head and interest have failed, heart will succeed.

But the Secularist cannot appeal to this, the very tenets of his system prevent him. Were my lecture on Secularism as contrasted with Christianity, I would show the superiority of Secular principles themselves when acting under the guidance of Christianity, as it is not this, however, but Secularism in itself, I may now content myself by saying that I have shown Secularism to be,—in the utter failure of its motives of action for the guidance or reformation of mankind,—practically a folly.

I now proceed to state my reasons for calling it, in its actions on the world, "a failure" also; for it

* Philippians, c. iv., v. 8.

is no new thing, it has existed among men ever since selfishness held a place among them. Wherever and whenever men have lived and acted for time only, there has been Secularism in its essence. What were the effects of this school in polished, intellectual, selfish Athens? There was no Christianity then to curb its efforts, dwarf its energies, or steep men in a counteracting superstition! Here, if anywhere, should have been found that model society of purity and morality which such men as Mr. Holyoake, in their well intentioned enthusiasm, believe would be the result of a fully established Secularism. But what says Hume in his *Essays*, (vol. ii., p. 419), "And I think I have fairly made it appear, that an Athenian man of merit might be such an one as with us would pass for incestuous, a parricide, an assassin, an ungrateful perjured traitor, and something else too abominable to name; not to mention his rusticity and ill manners. And having lived in this way, his death might be entirely suitable: he might conclude the scene by a desperate act of self-murder, and die with the most absurd blasphemies in his mouth. And, notwithstanding all this, he shall have statues, if not altars, erected to his memory; poems and orations shall be composed in his praise; great sects shall be proud of calling themselves by his name," If this be the result of nature, intelligence, and utility, we had better far be without it. If this be the result of self-developed morals, I can only say they are of

little value, they are an ignoble failure. And what was true of Athens was true also of every country where the light of nature was the only one by which man had to walk. Have secular principles ever elevated, refined, or civilized a barbarous community? Where do we find a savage tribe that has, by its own intrinsic efforts, raised itself in the scale of being? What is it that takes the tomahawk and the scalping knife from the Indian? What is it that arrests the cannibal in his atrocious work? What is that has stayed the selfish slaughter of the sickly child, or the infirm old parent? Secularism has not, and could not do it, the work was one that could be done by the principles of Christianity only. "But," answers Mr. Holyoake, "do we live in an age when there are no vices current among us? You may have the beauties of your Scripture, but you have also the immorality of society, which you also deplore." Most true, we do deplore the immoralities of society; but we say also, that those immoralities are every one antagonistic to, are in direct violation of the dogmas of Christianity. That the reception of Christianity must sweep them all away, but that the reception of Secularism might not. That the true Christian *cannot* be an immoral man, but that the true Secularist *may* be. I do not say he is so, I believe many of them to be as moral, as honest, as sincere as Christians are; but, as I say, the question is, not what a man may be, and hold a certain belief, but what he must be?

I ask further, what has Secularism done for our own country? What political reform, what physical or intellectual advantages has it conferred upon us? Our schools, our colleges, our hospitals, are not its children. It was not Secularism that laid the foundation stone of the liberties of Englishmen. It was not Secularism that gave her pre-eminence in the council chamber of nations. It was not Secularism that caused her banner to be the flag of universal emancipation. It was not a "utilitarian or artistic sense," but the sense that "God hath made of one blood all nations of men to dwell on the face of the earth." It was the remembrance that all men, whether rich or poor, noble or peasant, learned or unlearned, were equally the children of the same Father, partakers of the same nature, inheritors of the same responsibilities, heirs of the same home. Could you drive this feeling forth, and teach all men that happiness for time may be their only care, you would quickly undo all that Christianity has done, and inevitably retrograde into *selfishness, anarchy, and violence*, for these are regular sequences downward. Therefore, I conclude that, in the education of the world, in the development of the good in humanity, and in the power to exterminate the evil, Secularism has been a failure.

And in "the battle of life" how is this system to aid and support a man? It may do very well so

long as his path is bright and sunny, but when the storms of adversity begin to blow around him, when the clouds of misfortune and failure darken his way, what is to cheer him on? To raise his drooping spirits, and give fresh energy to his failing courage? Indifference may lull to torpor, but that will not help him. Intelligence has been at fault, he is now defeated, and may be inclined to doubt its guidance. Utility,—alas! his calculations have been sadly miscalculated. He may begin again and perhaps with a second similar result; and toil, calculate, study, scheme, and fail, till he drop into the grave, where he expects to end all in an eternal darkness. Verily, the man who can be comforted by such thoughts as these, must be of different stuff from those of which I have had experience. Remember that you cannot tell him to console himself with the feeling, that he has done right and his duty, for right and duty, as I have proved, can find no place in a mere secular scheme.

The Christian may have such thoughts, but not his opponent. It would be almost impertinent, certainly useless, to talk to one whose heart was sore, about any abstract propositions as to the general welfare of humanity, &c. If you would soothe, you must say something personal, and all the Secularist can say is, that his expediency has been inexpedient. The Christian can tell him that, if he has done right, according to the best of his judgment

and his ability, he has the approval of his God, and that if he be not successful here, a time shall come, in which the nobility of character produced by right action will produce its full results. And so he is stimulated to continued effort, believing that the "end is not yet," and that in "due season he shall reap if he faint not."

And, finally, when at last a man lies down to solve the great mystery, as it is called,—to "make the last venture on untried existence," how will Secularism support him? The thought arises that after all there *may* be another world and a living God, and he *may* have to stand before him. Is he prepared to do it? Yes, says Mr. Holyoake, "if you have done unto others as you would they should do unto you." I am sadly afraid that this would give but a small degree of courage to most, for how few of us could feel, that we had always done this. How very few could lie upon their death-bed, and, reviewing their whole lives, say they had always acted kindly, intelligently, and prudently.

I cannot help thinking that in this last dread hour, Secularism will again prove "a failure," and that the Secularist (despite the reasoning in "The Logic of Death") would have been more peaceful, more happy had he possessed a higher, truer, nobler "logic of life" than that afforded him by teachings that taught for time only.

Make sure of truth,
And truth will make thee sure,
It will not shift, nor fade, nor die,
But like the heavens endure.

Hold fast the true !
For truth can never change ;
It grows not old,—'tis ever one,
However vast its range.

With God above,
Is truth, and joy, and light,
Walk thou with Him in peace and love,
Hold fast the good and right.



Lecture II.

THE SOUL:

ITS EXISTENCE DEMONSTRABLE, ITS NATURE
AND IMMORTALITY.

MAJOR GREENWOOD IN THE CHAIR.

WHATEVER may be our tenets, whatever our views regarding the existence of another world, the subject of this evening must be considered both an interesting and an important one. Knowledge of self should be the basis of all other knowledge. It surely is not wise that I should study the nature and laws of the material world around me, but leave the study of myself unknown and uncared for. It is no doubt profitable that I should understand the modes of chemical affinity, of electric action, of astronomic motion; but how much more engrossing in interest the questions: What am I? Am I only an organized lump of earth? Am I nothing but a breathing mass of matter? Or am I a spirit, distinct from the matter of my body in essence, property, and function? How long am I to be? Is my existence to cease

for ever when my eyes close in death? Or am I to live in a future sphere of being, an immortal soul? Can questions be proposed more absorbing than these? On the answers given to them depend our estimate of our present position in creation, and our eternal destiny.

I intend to treat the subject, not from a theological, but from a philosophical point of view; because, as you are already aware, there are certain philosophical schools on these questions—whether the world be all matter; whether it be all spirit; or whether it be a combination both of spirit and of matter. I wish you, therefore, to banish from your minds all thought of any theological issues that may be involved, and view it wholly and solely as a question of philosophy, and not of theology. I believe this to be the most rational, wisest, and most useful way in which I can take it, as I am addressing many who do not believe the Bible. I shall therefore put the Bible altogether to one side, and not touch upon revelation or inspiration until I have previously proved it.

There is first of all the materialistic school; one party in which assumes that all the earth and everything that is upon it consists only of matter—that there is nothing else but matter and motion. There is a second school of pure materialists, who say that within a man there resides something that is matter but of a very fine

kind, etherialised, spiritualised matter, as it were, not the common, coarse, vulgar matter which we can see. All this is pure materialism, and all who hold these ideas are materialists. Those who believe such views say they do so for certain reasons. These I shall endeavour to state as fairly and as clearly as I am able ; and if I succeed in showing their insufficiency, their illogical character, or their want of reason ; I shall have proved materialism to be insufficient, illogical, and irrational.

One favourite plea is the great simplicity of this doctrine, as compared with that which holds two distinct and separate essences. They say that spiritualists (when I use the word spiritualist I mean only the opposite school to the materialist) believe in two substances, one matter, and the other spirit. The materialists affirm, "We save ourselves trouble and complexity by believing simply that there is only one substance, that one being matter," and they adduce the maxim of Sir Isaac Newton, which is this, "That we are not to introduce more causes than are sufficient to explain appearances," a most valuable principle, and one with which I entirely agree ; but it is on this very account that I cannot accept the materiality of the soul. If I believed that the laws of matter were sufficient to explain all the appearances of thought, remembrance, conscience, and so forth ; why, of course, I should at once be philosophically, a materialist ; but, because I cannot conceive this, because I think they are utterly inade-

quate for such a purpose, because I am convinced that there is no harmony whatever between the phenomena presented by mind and those presented by matter ; I cannot rest in this extreme simplicity, but must pass on to a complexity that is more satisfactory, because a complexity that eventually gives me a truer simplicity than the materialist can ever attain. I know that the true aim of science is, to reduce all the varied phenomena around us to the fewest, simplest possible principles ; to take all the material world and resolve it into its original elements ; but we must not go further than we are warranted by our experiments.

I am justified in saying water is a compound, and not a simple substance, when I have decomposed it into the two elements named oxygen and hydrogen ; but I would not be considered very logical did I go on to say that these substances were compound also, if analysis had never proved them such. They may be so, but I cannot assert it of them yet. It is one great beauty of philosophy that it leads us to search for unity amid the many diversities around us, lures us ever onwards and upwards from one unity to another, till at the last it takes us to the great unity of all, the great First Cause.

Another reason the materialist assigns for his preference, is the difficulty of conceiving the nature of the union between two substances so different as spirit and matter are represented to be. He urges,

that he cannot tell, or imagine, how mind can act on matter, or matter on mind. He cannot tell how the extended can co-exist with the unextended—how the material and the immaterial can dwell together. I know he cannot. I at once freely acknowledge the mystery, for a mystery undoubtedly it is. But do you get clear of all mystery by remaining materialists? Will you explain to me the mystery how matter acts on *matter*? Explain that first, and then say that you will not accept the other on account of *its* mystery. Can you explain the mystery of how it is that, by putting a material stone in my material hand, I can hurl that stone away from my hand into space beyond me? You can tell me I do it; more than that no man on earth can tell. There is matter of the hand, there is also matter of the stone; how does the matter of my body act on the matter of the stone to send the stone away? Explain the mystery of the action of matter on matter, and then call upon me to explain the mystery of the action of matter on mind; but do not reject the one on account of its mystery, until you have swept away the other.

In point of fact there is something inexplicable, and inconceivable in every phenomenon, of whatever sort it be. The sceptic too frequently rejects a whole train of reasoning, upon the simple plea that he cannot conceive the result; which is a process most suicidal and illogical. For if we are to reject all whose mode of being or of acting we cannot conceive, we shall reject all modes of both; and a child might

as well refuse to believe that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, after you had finished your demonstration, because he could not conceive such a queer idea. We know there is a method of proving the fallacy of an argument by the process called "*reductio ad absurdum*," which is wholly a different mode of reasoning, and a legitimate one.

Our opponents also say, "There is manifested a great dependence of the mind on the matter of the body. There cannot be soul or mind in this body of ours, because we see it depends upon the growth, upon the state of health, or upon the normal condition of the body or the brain." Now, I will give you the strongest case I can think of on the materialistic side. It is that of a sailor who fell from the top of a mast on to the deck of his vessel. Being taken up insensible, he was conveyed to the hospital, where he remained in that condition for some time. The surgeon discovered that there was a depression of the skull, which caused it to press on the brain. This was about nine weeks after the accident occurred, and the man was insensible all the time. The bone was now raised off the brain, and this being done the patient in a short time rose up in bed, gradually recovered health and strength, assumed his former normal condition, and said he remembered nothing whatever of all that had occurred. During all the period he was lying in hospital, it was a complete blank to him. "Now," say material-

ists, "there was pressure on the brain, and while it lasted, consciousness was absent, memory was annihilated. As soon, however, as the pressure was removed, memory and consciousness returned. Therefore, consciousness and memory are functions of brain." I freely acknowledged at the very beginning that there is a very close inter-connection between mind and body ; but I am not compelled to say that, because mind depends on matter for its information, and the revelation of its thoughts to other minds, it is, therefore, in itself, matter. I know that a man cannot play on a musical instrument until he gets it, and that if the instrument were out of tune the music would not be particularly harmonious. This is not the fault of the player, but the result of that on which he plays being out of order at the time. The performer remains the same ; the instrument alone has varied. But, apart from this, does it follow that, because the sailor did not *remember* any thought or feeling during the period of his illness, there *were* none in his mind during that length of time? The theory is this—that which I do not now remember never had existence in my mind.—The sailor, we are told, had for a time no ideas, the proof being, he does not at present remember any. Let us apply this theory to our own daily experience to show its fallacy. When we awake in the morning, the previous night very frequently appears to have been a blank ; we cannot

remember having had any thoughts or dreams. But some incident during the day recalls to our memories most distinctly and vividly an entire dream, every word and act of which we now perfectly recollect. Is it not also a fact that the listless reveries of indolent vacuity, the shadowy day-dreams of dreamy thought, are often put to flight most effectually by some startling reality; scattered so effectually that, however much we wished it, we could never recall them? We are all aware that whole trains of thought pass through the mind so rapidly, and so lightly, that they are gone almost before we are conscious of having them; and to re-possession ourselves of them is often an impossibility. Could this sailor not have been in some such state? Shut in from the outer world and all that was occurring there; nothing to disturb or distract his thoughts in this sleep of sickness, what dreams may have been flitting over the placid surface of his soul; till he was aroused into contact with the noise and the sights beyond him, by the regained use of his bodily organs; we cannot say, nor can he. All he can affirm is, that he has had a longer sleep than usual, and one which appears to him, now in his waking hour, to have been dreamless. Such evidence is, therefore, at best only negative, and proves nothing about the materiality of soul.

But, according to Mr. Lawrence, F.R.S., in his "Lectures on Comparative Anatomy," &c., we evidence great stupidity by not at once becoming the grossest

materialists. In page 73, he writes :—"The same kind of facts, the same reasoning, the same sort of evidence altogether, which show digestion to be the function of the alimentary canal, motion of the muscles, the various secretions of their respective glands, prove that sensation, perception, memory, judgment, reasoning, thought, in a word, all the manifestations called mental or intellectual, are the animal functions of the appropriate organic apparatus, the central organ of the nervous system. No difficulty nor obscurity belongs to the latter case which does not equally affect all the former instances ; no kind of evidence connects the living process with the material instruments in the one, which does not apply just as clearly and forcibly to the other."

How any physiologist, not utterly blinded by championship of a theory, could pen such a passage is to me a mystery. "The same sort of evidence altogether!" What is the sort of evidence for the other matters? I cut open a stomach and find the results of digestion lying within, and the agent of digestion present also. I take the stomach from the animal, and find that it will still act on matter, as it did when in the body. The evidence here is that of eyesight. And so with the glands ; when I examine them, I find their respective secretions within, their secretions being in proportion to their size and healthiness. I also look at the muscles and see them move ; certainly the evidence in all these cases is clear enough. But what do I find in each case ?

Visible matter acting on visible matter, and moving, digesting, or secreting visible matter. Nothing but visible matter altogether. I should much like Mr. Lawrence to dissect for me a man's brain, and *show* me that thought is there secreted or produced ; show me the matter out of which it is produced, and the thoughts when produced, for we are to have the "same sort of evidence altogether." We have *not* the same sort of facts, nor any in the slightest degree resembling them. A gland that was largely cut away would not, I fancy, secrete very copiously or well ; but the brain, somehow, produces thought even in this condition. "Memory and other functions of the mind have been exercised, *without apparent impairment*, in persons who have had one hemisphere so destroyed by disease as to leave no portion of its substance in a natural state."* What gland is there in the body, the half of which will secrete as much as the whole ? But, again, how is it, if Mr. Lawrence be correct, that thought does not depend upon the *quantity* of brain either relative or absolute, the *quality* being the same. A canary has relatively twice as much brain as man, and an elephant absolutely much more ; but I am afraid this intellectual gland in these animals acts rather sluggishly. But we are further told by Mr. Lawrence that insanity is a symptom of diseased brain ; how, then, comes it to pass that this diseased organ produces healthy results, if thought be a function of brain ? We will

* George Moore, M.D., "Power of the Soul over the Body," p. 61.

not be told, I presume, that the brain becomes healthy just before death ; but Dr. Winslow, no mean authority, observes that the insane rarely die in a state of mental alienation.* It is a fact, a very beautiful one, and by no means an uncommon one, that just before the brain ceases to act altogether, sanity returns to man, and he is as rational and sensible as he was on the brightest day of his life. Just before he leaves his wife a widow, or his child an orphan, he holds rational converse with them, as of old ; he can counsel, guide, and cheer them ; leave them comforted by his blessing, soothed by his love, and directed by his counsel. This is not the same sort of evidence that we have with regard to the functions of the other portions of the body. It is mere folly to talk about the "same kind of facts, the same reasoning, and the same sort of evidence altogether." We have it not, and neither Mr. Lawrence nor any other physiologist can supply us with it. The moment they do so we shall believe with them, because we shall have no alternative.

It is also asserted that materialistic theories are held because the mind grows and decays with the body. That when the body gets to second childhood, the mind returns thither also. I ask you, have you never known an instance, where, before the body has arrived at maturity, before it has attained its full development, the mind has been brilliantly illumined with all the flashing coruscations of genius ;

* "Diseases of Body and Mind," p. 27.

where before the period of manhood in body, there was manhood in thought, in intellect, and in feeling. Where before the material structure was fully erected, the intensity of the mental activity had worn the tenant into an early grave. And again, on the other hand, have you not seen many a man, old and grey-headed, who could scarcely walk, whose body had given way, but whose mind was as strong, clear, powerful, and penetrating as ever it was ; and you may have sat before him and listened to words of piety, of wisdom, of counsel, when he was about to depart from the world of matter for all time. I have stood at the death-bed of such an one, when you could scarcely feel his pulse, when his extremities were cold and dead ; and I have seen the flashing of his eye as he spoke to the wife and child he was about to leave behind ; and I have heard that dying man talk when it seemed as though there were no vitality in the body—aye, as I have seldom heard men talk in health and strength ; and I thought, let a materialist stand by my side, and let him look at that decaying frame, at that poor, worn out material body ; and say, if he can, that the mind invariably becomes enfeebled as the body decays. I say invariably, because if this rule be not an invariable one, it is practically valueless.

Again, the materialist says he is such, because we have no experience of anything—we *know* nothing but matter. He alleges that we cannot help believing in matter. “I put

forth my hand and feel it in contact with my organism. I open my eyes and see a material world everywhere around me. By my senses I am informed of its existence ; whatever else I may doubt, this at least is certain ; all beyond is inference, conjecture, &c., which may be true, or may be false, but the existence of the material world I know beyond all controversy." Not so, all this seems plausible, but plausibility is not by any means the surest criterion of truth. On this very subject there has been a continuous controversy, able, argumentative, and calm.

That which seems a most palpable fact to the Materialist, has seemed a most palpable fallacy to the Idealist—or as I had better call him here the Spiritualist, for it is from that point of view I wish to regard him to-night. His view is, that there is no matter in existence, or if there be, you cannot demonstrate it ; you may *infer*, but not *prove* it. He will tell you that all the sensations by which you are supposed to learn its being, are states of mind, and of mind only. You may assert you see it ; yes but sight is a mental state, and all of which you are, or can be conscious is mind. Now, mental phenomena necessarily imply the existence of mind, but not the existence of matter ; true, they may render its existence probable, but not certain. All your sensations, reasonings, arguments, are only mental states, and demonstrate nothing more than the existence of the thinker. Looking fairly at all the arguments on both sides I cannot help feeling that, logically con-

sidered, there is more reason for denying the existence of matter, than for denying that of mind. And you must remember that some of these Spiritualists have been among our best and closest reasoners, such as Berkeley, Leibnitz, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, &c. So therefore, it is not quite so clear as many of you may have fancied, that all you know is matter, or indeed, that you *know* matter at all.

There is still a third school, that of Natural Realism, or Natural Dualism, to which I belong, and for the following reason. My consciousness tells me, that I am conscious of mind, and also of matter. Each of the former schools has consequently violated the truth of consciousness, the Materialist by rejecting the consciousness of mind, and the Spiritualist by rejecting that of matter. Now it is quite clear that as all philosophy is based on consciousness, we must accept it fully, or not at all. Whatever it tells me I must receive as true, or stop all reasoning as useless. The only way in which I know my own existence is by my consciousness, if then this be false in any one of all its utterances, it may be false in any other. If it be untrue in one point, it may be untrue in every point, and thus philosophy becomes suicidal. It is only by holding firmly the unalterable and unvarying truth of consciousness that we can prove our own being, and unless we can prove that, it matters little what school we belong to, or whether we belong to any. In the words of Sir William Hamilton, I may say,

“consciousness therefore, is to be presumed veracious; a philosophical theory which accepts one part of the harmonious data of consciousness, and rejects another, is manifestly a mere caprice, a chimera, not worthy of consideration, and far less of articulate disproof. It is *ab initio* null.” This therefore, will be a fundamental principle in all my future remarks so far as they bear on philosophy. Of course this makes it very important that we should ascertain precisely what are the facts of consciousness, for if this be not done, much mischievous error will be the result.

With regard to matter, I am conscious of the material organism of my own body, and of the matter in immediate contact with it, that which is beyond this I may *believe*, but I am not *conscious* of it; on this point, however, I will not now speak more fully, as we are all agreed, I believe, so far. But, we also believe in mind as distinct from matter, and for the same reason,—that we are conscious of it.

I will now come to the positive side of this question, and endeavour to show in detail that I have sufficient evidence; nay more, that I am compelled, by my reason, to believe in the existence of the soul also.

Here Mr. Holyoake, as usual, shows his philosophical instincts to be more trustworthy than his inferences; he does not absolutely deny its existence, but allows its possibility as will be seen in the fol-

lowing quotation. "One has said, I know not whether in the spirit of scorn or suffering, but I speak it in the spirit of truth—'What went before and what will follow me, I regard as two black impenetrable curtains, which hang down at the two extremities of human life, and which no living man has yet drawn aside.'" "The darkness and mystery of the future create a longing for unravelment. The enigma of life makes the poetry of death, and invests with a sublime interest the last venture on untried existence." *

I should have thought we might have had a nobler, purer, truer "poetry of death" than a "dark unsolved enigma of life." I certainly do confess I cannot see the poetry there. The "darkness and mystery of the future create a longing for unravelment." Oh! how true are these pregnant words. There is to the Non-theist a "darkness" deep, gloomy, and oppressive, shrouding all his future. A darkness where, if anywhere he would wish all to be bright and clear, the darkness of the darkest midnight when of all times in his life he would have it light as cloudless noon-day. And there is to him a "mystery" which does "create a longing for unravelment," a longing! aye, he well may long to know somewhat of that "untried existence" on which he is about to enter. God help the man, who, when about to leave all he has known, enjoyed and loved, has no thought to pierce the gloom, or draw aside

* "Trial of Theism," pp. 157, 160.

the curtain. I shall to-night, as well as I am able, try and give you a few thoughts towards this unravelment ; try to gratify, in however slight a degree, your most natural and laudable longing for knowledge.

Well then, I commence by asserting the existence of mind, for the same reason that I assert the existence of matter. I find resisting my hand something which is solid, extended, impenetrable ; that is, there is a substance beneath it possessing certain properties, and I call that substance, matter. I find another substance, having another set of properties—thought, reflection, memory, feeling—these latter being totally distinct from the former in every conceivable point of view. If I am justified in calling the substance, having certain peculiar properties, matter, I hold I am justified in calling the substance having the other set of properties—different properties—by a different name ; and I term that other substance, mind. Do not confound substance and matter together, for they are distinct. Matter means that which is extended, impenetrable, etc. ; substance means the underlying basis of anything, or simple existence. I say therefore, I have the same right to hold the existence of mind that you have to hold the existence of matter. You use the word matter, because you find certain properties. I find other properties, and I say that the existence possessing these is a different thing, and specify it by a different name—that other

name being mind, or soul. If you can shew me, that the properties of the one are like the properties of the other, then we shall designate the basis of both by one name ; but, you all know full well that the properties peculiar to matter are generically different from the properties peculiar to mind. There is no resemblance whatever between the two. Some may say, that there appears no similiarity between the dull, black, and formless carbon, and the brightly flashing, accurately cut diamond, but that still they are the same substance. True, but yet, there are many points of similarity besides their chemical composition. It is equally, in *both* cases, the power of matter to act on light ; one, the carbon, absorbs the light, and so appears lustreless and black ; the other, the diamond, refracts the ray, and so sparkles in all its varied hues. We have thus, in each case, an action of matter on light according to the laws of absorption, reflection, and refraction.

My next point is this ; if thought be matter, it must be the result either of the matter in its *essence* as matter, or of the *form* in which the matter is arranged. Thought can not be the result of matter, as such ; because, in point of fact, as you know, *all* matter cannot think—the platform on which I stand cannot think or feel. If, when the matter becomes brain it thinks, it is a quality superadded to the matter, and if it be superadded to it, as such, it belongs to every particle of it. Well, sup-

pose one thought only to be in the mind ; I now take away a particle of brain ; either, I take away a portion of the thought or I do not. If I do, then the one particle is thinking by itself and organisation is not necessary. If I do not—in that case I may subtract particle by particle, till only one cell be left, which will contain the entire thought, or be as useful as the complete brain.

That we may see this theory from another point of view, let me give an extract from Priestley's "Disquisitions" (pp. 37, 38.) "Whatever ideas are in themselves, they are evidently produced by external objects, and must therefore correspond to them ; and, since many of the objects or archetypes of ideas are divisible, it necessarily follows that the ideas themselves are divisible also.—If the archetypes of ideas have extension, the ideas which are expressive of them, and are actually produced by them according to certain mechanical laws, must have extension likewise."

Ideas extended and divisible ! And so we may talk about the half of a fancy, the north point of an imagination, or the top or bottom of a liking. This is no caricature of mine, it is the necessary result of Priestley's theory, and if it satisfies you, why I need say nothing more about it.

If thought be not matter as such ; it must be the result of the *form* in which matter is arranged

This is a more favourite theory than the other. Thought, it is said, is the result of organisation—that is, matter cannot think until it is organised, but when it is so, as in the brain and nervous tissues, it exercises this function. I say it *cannot*, and for this reason : that no quality can be in the whole which is not in the parts. If no portion of matter separately has any element of thought in it, put the whole of the matter in the universe together, and that sum total cannot think. The materialists say, “ You are wrong there. Take a rose, for example. Who shall say that any separate particle of the matter composing the rose has perfume ? Build them up into a rose, and the whole rose possesses it.” But, I ask, what is perfume ? It is, we are told, the *result* of particles of the rose floating in the air and coming in contact with certain nerves. Perfume itself is not in the rose ; it is not in the floating particle ; it is a sensation of the mind. What takes place, therefore ? A particle of matter—that is, a part of the rose—comes out of it, comes in contact with a nerve, and produces what ?—A sensation. Is that an analogous case ? We will take another favourite illustration by materialists—that of music. They say there is no music in one part of wire, but put all the parts together, then strike it and you have music. I ask any man, Is that a fair illustration ? What is music ? Take a number of particles of matter and arrange them as a chord of a piano. Now tell me what the chord when struck does ? It

vibrates several times, which is simply the result of elasticity. There is no power, therefore, in the whole string that was not in every part of it. The *sound* is not in that which vibrates ; it merely imparts a wave motion to the air, which passes on till it enters the ear, the final result being the *sensation* called sound. Well, what is there here in the whole that was not in the parts ? Nothing whatever. I say you cannot bring me forward a fair illustration from the whole material world, of any result produced by a combination of matter of which its elements were wholly destitute. All the supposed illustrations drawn from chemistry are futile. Therefore, if there be no power of thinking in the particles, it is simply impossible that arranging these particles in certain shapes should give them this capability. Thought, consequently, is not the result of matter as organised—it is not the result of matter as such—and thus, I show it to be, not a function of matter at all,

Again, it is a recognised principle of science, that there must be some congruity between a theory, and the fact it is put forth to explain. Were I to attempt the explanation of the phenomena of electricity by the principles of arithmetic ; or the motion of the hands of a watch, by the principles of music ; the inherent folly would be at once apparent, simply because there is not any *congruity* between them. You cannot by any means apply the one to the elucidation of the other, their unfitness being at

once apparent. Apply this test to Materialism and see whether the condition is fulfilled. I believe it is not; because I cannot see the slightest congruity between thought, emotion, reflection, love, hate, etc., and chemical affinity, cohesion, expansion, contraction, etc. These two sets of phenomena are as widely apart from each other, as we can well conceive. Just fancy, revenge explained by the laws of the combining equivalents of a certain number of chemical elements ! I know it may be called the result of the organization, but what is the organization the result of ? The Materialist may discover a congruity in these things, I confess I cannot, and if there be none, his system fails here also.

A very favourite point with scientific men at present, is the indestructibility of physical force ; which means, that you may change and modify its mode of manifestation, but you cannot destroy or annihilate it. Light as given from gas may strike the walls ; but the force is not *destroyed* ; it is turned into heat, and heat changes into motion, motion into electricity, and so on continuously. It is a very important principle, and one in which I quite believe ; that once you have a physical force of any kind you cannot drive it from being, you can only alter the manner of its action. Now, I suppose, none will deny that thought is force—is a power and a mighty one. Once that power has come into existence, if it be a physical one, you

cannot annihilate or destroy it. It ceases, however, to rest in that particular form, as thought. What becomes of it? Is it given out into space as light, as heat, or as electricity? Yes, so says, Mr. Herbert Spencer! "Those modes of the unknowable which we call motion,—heat, light, chemical affinity, are transformable into each other—[so far good]—and light, heat, chemical affinity, are alike transformable into each other, and into those modes of the unknowable which we distinguish as sensation, emotion, thought; these in their turns being, directly or indirectly re-transformable into their original shapes." That is, in other words, all the thoughts, all the feelings, all the fancies that have ever floated through a human mind, are now floating somewhere, or acting somewhere, as light, as heat, as electricity, or as chemical affinity! The conceptions of Milton's "Paradise Lost," may now be hard at work in a druggist's shop holding together the elements of the pleasant draughts, which they are noted for preparing. Hamlet's soliloquy, may be doing duty in melting some "too too solid flesh," as it turns before a kitchen fire. And Homer's fancies may, for aught we can tell, be blazing forth to illuminate a room; issuing from the gas jet, even more brilliantly than they did from his fertile genius. This is no exaggeration; it is the necessary result of saying that, the force named thought, may be transformed into the force named light, etc., and that this can be again re-transformed into its original condition. I am sure we should all

be most grateful to the Materialists if they would only re-transform some of the imponderables around them, into their former modes ; and thus give us the imaginings of many a brilliant imagination, which will be lost to us if they do not succeed in this noble task. Such men as Homer, Shakespear, Milton, have given to us their creations ; but no doubt many a “ mute inglorious Milton ” has had thoughts worthy of the world’s attention, but which have never been written for the use of posterity. Materialists—we ask of you to restore us some of these, or say you cannot ; so that your theory of the transformability of mental force into material is a farce ; and if this be so, either Materialism, or the indestructibility of force must be false also.

I now come to the last positive argument which I shall use at present against this system ; it is the evidence of consciousness.

I have already shown that whatever this witness tells me *must* be true. What, then, is its evidence as to myself ? It tells me in the first place that, *I am* ; that I have being of some kind—that I exist. This is a fact which I cannot demonstrate or prove by argument. It lies beneath all reasoning ; it is a simple intuition ; and being such, is a belief universal, self-evident, and irresistible. It must not be forgotten, that my *only* valid reason for asserting my own existence is the testimony of my consciousness.

But further, if I examine calmly and dispassionately its other utterances, it will tell me that I am not my *body* ; that I am distinct from the organism I use ; that, I myself, am something apart from the house I dwell in. I feel that you may cut limb from limb, without touching ME. You may thus prevent me from acting by their *agency*, but in self, I remain the same. I know I am dependent on that material servant for communication with the outer world ; as I am on the organisation of society for the supply of my social wants ; but I know, also that I am no more the one than I am the other. This house of my body, moreover, which I inhabit does not remain the same for a series of years ; it is ever changing, and we are told that, in a period of about seven years it is completely renewed. Consequently, the body which I had seven years ago is not the one which I have now, and thus, in thirty-five years, I have changed my dwelling-place four times. But my consciousness tells me, most distinctly, that I am the very same being still. I can remember the scenes of early boyhood—I can live in “ the light of other days ”—I can recall many an incident of the morning of my life, while intervening ones have faded away. No reasoning could persuade *you* that you were not the very beings who lived in those bygone days. But your bodies are not the same ; how, then, can the unchanging self be the oft-changed body ? The thing is not possible. The materialist meets this by saying that, if a man receives a scar in youth, the mark remains

till age, because the atoms of fresh matter fall into the place and the conditions of the old. This is true as regards bodily functions and form, which are material, but it has no relation to memory. Take the familiar illustration of the old-new coat. For the moment—suppose a coat to have consciousness, and to remember having been in the tailor's shop; in process of time it becomes "worse for wear," and is frequently mended by the addition of fresh cloth, till at last not a fragment of the original garment is left. Now, it is quite clear that the form of the original may be accurately preserved, and also its function; but would the coat, as it is at last, have any recollection of its tailor experiences? I think not. Apply this very homely illustration to the scar, and nothing more need be said. The condensed argument based on continuity of consciousness, with change of body, is the following:—

I am conscious of a mental identity.

My body changes.

Therefore, *my mind is not my body.*

And, consequently, I once more say materialism is false, and the existence of the soul is *demonstrated*. Take the last argument alone, and it is as clear a syllogism as any that I know. Remember, as I said before, I have the soul in the centre citadel. Around this citadel I have thus dug a number of separate and *independent* trenches; these you have to take, one by one, before

you touch the flag in the citadel itself, for so long as *one* remains uncaptured, I remain unconquered.

The next point we have to consider is the *nature* of the soul. We are often asked, "What is the soul"? And we are told that we know what matter is, but do not know what the soul is. To this question I give exactly the same answer, as when asked, what matter is? That I do not know the essence of either the one or the other. Matter is defined as "that" which has certain properties. If I ask, what is the noun, which the pronoun, that, represents; I am told it is matter; which is only saying that matter is matter. For matter, substitute the word, soul; and you have my answer to the question, what is the soul? We know exactly as much of the one as of the other; that is, we know the *qualities, properties, and powers* of both, we know the *essence* of neither. If any tell me, they know matter; I tell them in return, that in the same kind, but in greater degree, I know soul; my knowledge of the latter being more accurate and extensive than their knowledge of the former.

Having proved that the soul is not matter, and knowing that it must be an existence, I say simply, that the soul is the immaterial entity which I call myself. As the science which examines into the properties and powers of matter is called physics, so that which searches into and classifies the faculties of the soul is called Psychology. Did time permit,

I might give a rapid outline of these faculties, but as it does not, I would refer those of you who wish to learn more on this most interesting subject to the "Lectures by Sir William Hamilton."

I pass now to the consideration of its Immortality, and will do my best to answer the queries; If I have such an entity, how long am I to have it? How long am I to be? Am I to sink into annihilation when my eyes close in death? Or am I rather to survive that wreck of matter and live on still? The questions are fair and natural, and must have risen at some time to the minds of all. As you stand by the side of the dead, and see the eyes once beaming with lustre, now closed and visionless—those lips that once poured forth gushing melody now hushed in silence—as you contrast the once living, moving, breathing man, with the dead form that lies before you, such thoughts will rise unbidden in the mind. Calmly, and impartially, as I may, I will try to answer them.

The question of the soul's *immortality*, is quite distinct from that of its *nature*. Having proved its immateriality, I have not thereby proved its continuity after death. It might be immaterial and yet be mortal, as it might be material and yet be immortal. The *nature* of any existence, and the extent of its *duration* in time, are two distinct enquiries, which must never be confounded. If the soul is to remain in continuous being, it is simply

by the will of its Creator. He could will its ending as he willed its beginning. It is exactly the same with the universe of matter ; if that lasts from day to day, it is not in virtue of its present being, but in virtue of the desire of its Author.

But, the immateriality of the soul proves this—that it is not *necessarily* destroyed by death. Were the soul identical with the matter of the body, that which destroys the body would, of course, destroy the soul ; but, if this be not so, death may act on the one without necessarily acting in a similar way on the other. Now, that we have the soul *before* death, is in itself a presumption that we shall have it *after*, if death do not necessarily 'destroy it ; and if no other power can be discovered adequate to this effect. No other such powers are yet known to us. And further, if the soul be destroyed in death, we reason that it cannot be *by* death ; because the soul, not being composed of parts, cannot be dissolved as the body is. If destroyed at all, therefore, it must be by annihilation. But this can be done by the Creator only. No power on earth can create a new essence, or destroy one. We may alter the mode of existence of any number of atoms, but we cannot destroy them.

The question now, consequently, is ; not *can*, but *will* God annihilate my soul, when my body sinks, " earth to earth ;" and to answer it we must examine the indications given by the soul itself, see

whether they point to a life for only a few fleeting years, or to a life for all time. I do not mean the indications, which are the result of education, or of religious belief, and which may vary in different ages, and in different countries; but rather those universal *instincts* of the soul, which are independent of teaching, which owe nothing to creed, but which are the same among all classes of men, and in all periods of history. Here the argument is cumulative. I do not say any one of the thoughts I am going to bring forward would by itself demonstrate the immortality of the soul; but I do say that when they are all added together, they form such a mass of evidence that no unprejudiced person can fairly reject it. Cumulative argument may be as convincing as demonstrative, the conviction depending on the nature and degree of power of the separate points. It is only by this method that I believe any letter to have come from the friend whose signature it bears. If in that one letter I could produce a great many separate reasons leading me to believe its authenticity—facts alluded to which were known only to my friend and myself, and so forth—I should be called mad to doubt it, without some very cogent reasons for my doing so. My argument, therefore, is none the less certain, because it is of the sort called “cumulative.”

My first witness is, the conviction I have of my own moral *responsibility* with the conse-

quent expectation of a day of account. I find a law supreme within my mind, whose dictates are commands. The law of right and wrong. I may study the true or false, and follow either or neither, and yet be comparatively guiltless. I may know as truths the laws of Kepler, but I need not study them unless I feel so inclined. But so soon as I believe a certain line of action to be *right*, I have no alternative but to follow that line, or feel myself to be morally *guilty* of the violation of a law which it was my *duty* to obey. The law of duty, however, while supreme within the mind, is not absolutely supreme ; it points to a Lawgiver above and beyond itself. For we feel that we have no power whatever to change right into wrong, or wrong into right. Were we our own lawgivers, we might do in this matter as we wished. But, if there be a supreme Lawgiver, he must take cognizance of the obedience or disobedience of his laws ; he must be the vindicator of the obligation of his own statutes. Now, we all know, that in numberless cases we have broken these, wilfully and deliberately broken them ; we may have received a certain measure of punishment in consequence of our errors or vices, and still we feel that this is not sufficient to vindicate our God as a righteous Legislator. We look around us and see many who have not been brought to trial for all their dark transgressions ; who, no doubt, had many an hour of misgiving or remorse, but who, nevertheless, have not been rewarded according to their works. And

when we consider the sinfulness of all mankind, we cannot help feeling that, in some future time we shall all be called to stand before our Judge, that we may receive according to that we have done, whether it be good or bad. This feeling is one we may strive to stifle, and for a time we may succeed; but eventually it starts into life, and with its slow, unmoving finger points us on to that dread tribunal which feeling would lead us to shrink from, but before which, conscience tells us we shall one day stand. Well would it be for each one of us did we listen to its still, small voice in time, and prepare for ourselves a good reward in eternity.

My next witness is our intuitive shrinking from the thought of *annihilation*. What man of you could look forward and say, "I am content that, when my death may come, I shall cease to be, *for ever*?" Oh! the soul recoils with instinctive horror from the thought, that through all eternity it will have neither feeling nor consciousness. Would you not rather have unhappiness itself than eternal insensibility? Who could have the hardihood, or rather the callousness, to stand calmly by the grave, and feel that there was to be the end of him for ever? Why we shudder at the conception as though we were being guilty of our own soul's murder.

"It must be so—Plato, thou reason'st well!—
Else, whence this pleasing hope, this fond desire,
This longing after immortality?
Or, whence this secret dread, and inward horror,

Of falling into nought ? why shrinks the soul
 Back on herself, and startles at destruction ?—
 'Tis the Divinity that stirs within us ;
 'Tis heaven itself that points out—an hereafter,
 And intimates—eternity to man.
 The soul, secured in her existence smiles,
 At the drawn dagger, and defies its point—
 The stars shall fade away, the sun himself
 Grow dim with age, and nature sink in years ;
 But thou shalt flourish in immortal youth,
 Unhurt amid the war of elements,
 The wreck of matter, and the crash of worlds.”

Supposing there be no hereafter, what a dilemma are we thus placed in ! On the one hand, our Creator has given us this longing for immortality—this shrinking from annihilation—this conviction I may say, that the longing shall be gratified ; and given us these feelings as essential parts of our original nature. But, for what purpose ? Only to deceive, delude, and cheat us ; for, if they have no corresponding reality, they are, they must be false—they must be as liars to us. Such a proceeding would be utterly at variance with the truth of God ; it would be leading us ; nay, compelling us to believe that which was untrue.

It would be inconsistent with His benevolence, to lead us to look forward to a time when we hope to pass from the present into the future ; and yet, at the last, to dash the cup from our hand, and plunge us into that state which we are constrained to believe is the most miserable that man can enter.

Holding then, as I do, that God is true, and loving, I trust the veracity of the desires he has given me ; and, therefore, I have adduced another reason for believing in the life of the world to come.

A further witness, on the same side, is the continuous progression of the mind in knowledge, as it passes on through this life. We are ever gathering new stores of information, and, as we learn, our appetite grows by that it feeds upon. The more we know, the greater becomes our thirst for added knowledge. Our minds are matured and strengthened by the mental food absorbed as thought ; and, by this means, they are enabled to take more daring flights through the fields of space, and sound more deeply the mysteries of nature. Can I believe that this progression is to proceed for a little time only, and then to stop for ever ; worse than this, that all the labour of a life is to be lost, and that at the very time when the mind had reached a noble height of intellectual attainment ? Am I to be told that, just as my eye is opening to the secrets, and the beauties of the world around me, it is to be closed, never to be opened again ? Am I to be depressed by the crushing thought—that, all the methods of the wondrous phenomena which I see ever occurring, and which my soul pants to know ; are to be hidden things, eternally ? Better, a thousand times better, with such a belief as this, never to have our curiosity aroused at all ; better to look upon the actings of

creation's drama with brutish gaze, than to study them with the intelligence of a man, and have thus aroused at the same time an irresistible curiosity, and the maddening feeling, that you are to cease to be, with it all still ungratified. How welcome the christian thought, "For now we see through a glass, darkly ; but then face to face ; now I know in part ; but then shall I know even as also I am known."

In the "Creed of Christendom," by W. R. Gregg, who is a Theist, I find a sentence containing what I hold to be a great fact, that the belief in immortality however strengthened by reasoning, and however surely it might be established even by reasoning only, is also an intuition of the soul itself. "The truth we believe to be, that a future existence is, and must be, a matter of *information*, not of *inference*. The intellect could never have discovered it, and can never prove it—[this I do not, of course, agree with.]—The soul must have revealed it ; must, and does perpetually reveal it. It is a matter which comes properly within the cognizance of the soul,—of that spiritual sense, to which on such topics we must look for information, as we look to our bodily senses for information touching the things of earth—things that lie within their province. We therefore, at once, cut the Gordian knot by conceding to the soul the privilege of instructing us as to the things of itself." I think most will acknowledge that upon looking calmly within, the *conviction* of our future

destiny springs up spontaneously, and is believed although there may not be argument ready to confirm it. I believe it also accounts for the fact that, it has been an article of almost universal belief in all ages of the world. And surely such testimony is not to be easily set aside. Shall the general voice of all time go for nothing? Shall the thoughts of such heathen men as Homer, as Zenophon, as Plato, as Socrates, or Cicero, be called thoughts of "fools" or "knaves," and be counted worthless? "How shall we bury you?" said the friends of Socrates to him before his death. "Just as you like," he answered, "if only you can catch me." Socrates' belief was, as he told them—his body he should leave behind him; they might burn it, or bury it as they liked, for it was only matter; but he (Socrates) would be away with the good, the noble of the past. Death might come as soon as it would, it was welcome; being a gate to converse, such as he never had on earth. And this was no solitary feeling of a solitary thinker. Go to the most savage tribes on earth, and however peculiar their thoughts about it may be, they have this one feeling ineradicable—that there is *some* separate existence away on the other side that narrow river of death. There have, I confess, been at different times men who have not taught this doctrine, but they have been comparatively few and unimportant. The overwhelming majority, of whom we have any account, have firmly held, under many a varied form, the Immortality of the Human Soul.

Without that feeling this world of ours is an enigma and a mystery. I look round, and see misery everywhere. I look within my own soul. What doubts, what harassing, what mental anguish! struggling as best I may to do my duty in the world; earning in return, disappointment, sorrow, heartache. Exhorting, entreating, imploring men to yield to the love of God; and tortured by finding coldness, apathy, or vice still remaining. Am I to go on toiling, working, suffering all my life, and sink at last into a clod of earth, without one bright beam of hope for the future to shine upon my path! What an intolerable curse would life be, with such a feeling brooding, like an incubus, on the soul? But, on the other hand, if I can take to my heart the conviction that this is but the vestibule, and the future the temple—that through the portals of the grave I shall pass from the dark exterior to undimmed glory within, what need I care for toil or distress? The night may be dark and stormy; what then? To-morrow morning will dawn illumined by a Sun that shall never set. Then I shall know perfectly, all that is now dark and mysterious.—then I shall be with my Master, who will explain all his own universe to me. Then I shall be like Him, for I shall see him as he is. Does it not give a man courage to bear every trouble, and to face every adversity in the way of right, of duty, when he thinks that, it will be only for a little while, and that he has all eternity—to rest and be happy in? I do not say one word about the consolation imparted to the mourner by the

thought that, the separation is only for a little time ; and that presently, after short death and darkness, there will be endless life and light, in a re-united companionship. It seems almost too sacred a subject for a public platform, and therefore, I pass it by with the slightest notice. But for my own part, independently of this consideration, I confess I dare not, and could not, calmly face death with the thought that, I should *never* think again ; that I should sink into nothingness ; that I should be, as though I had never been. I declare that, personally, I would prefer eternal misery to such a horrible result. But believing, as thank God I do, that though I die, yet shall I live, through the love of Christ my Saviour ; that death will but usher me into a life of peace, and bliss, and love ; I feel that when the hour of death draws near, I shall be able to use the Poet's words, and say,

Vital spark of heavenly flame !

Quit, oh quit, this mortal frame !

Hark, they whisper—angels say,

“ Sister spirit, come away ! ”

What is this absorbs me quite,

Steals my senses, shuts my sight,

Drowns my spirit, draws my breath ?

Tell me, my soul, can this be death ?

The world recedes—it disappears !

Heaven opens on my eyes !—my ears

With sounds seraphic ring !

Lend, lend your wings ? I mount ! I fly !

O grave where is thy victory ?

O death ! where is thy sting ?

Lecture III.

E V I L :

ITS NATURE, ORIGIN, AND CURE.

REV. G. G. LAWRENCE, M.A., IN THE CHAIR.

EVIL—what an unfathomable depth of mental degradation lies in that one word—what unutterable tortures of remorseful agonies—what untold crimes—what deep, dark villanies! Oh! who can ever know the infamy, the vice, the guilt, the misery that have sprung from hated evil!

Well may the mind shrink in instinctive loathing from the anatomy of such a subject as this. But the feeling of repugnance is one which, however natural, may not be indulged; for it is necessary to the surgeon of morality, that he should know its phases of disease as well as of health, that he should probe its sores in order, if possible, to check their

progress, eradicate their taint, and produce health instead. If I have forced an unwilling mind to the deliberate study of evil in its origin, and its nature, it was simply with the view of aiding in its cure. If I bring the subject before you this evening, it is not with any mere controversial object, but, to show you how you may shake it from you ; it is not in any desire to combat a foe, but to win him to friendship and companionship in arms, that we may, in united strength, beat back our common enemy, and help each other forward towards the noble, the good, the true. Before doing so, however, I had better clear myself, as a christian apologist, from the charge of folly, irreverence, and immodesty, that has been brought against us for attempting to explain such subjects. I read the following in "The Trial of Theism," (page 34.) "There is far more reason in Atheism which confesses, 'all this is not to be understood ;' and far more reverence in Atheism which refuses to ascribe suffering to God ; and far more modesty in Atheism, which prefers to maintain silence, when speech is a contradiction of itself, or an imputation upon Deity."

I deny the reason, the reverence, and the modesty in this statement. The Atheist confesses it is not to be understood, by *his* reason at least. Is it rational to say that he is the standard of all truth, and that what he cannot explain, *cannot* be explained by the reason of any one ? Is this assumption of

infallibility, *modest*? Is it reverent to refuse to ascribe suffering to God, by denying his *existence*? I am not guilty of the irreverence of ascribing suffering to him, while I at the same time acknowledge his being. I think it both rational, reverent, and modest to use the reason which God has given me, in the manner he has indicated by the laws he has imposed on it; and then, when I can no farther go on the pathway of *knowledge*, to let *faith* continue her journey into the land of the unknown, and the unseen. I find a specimen of Atheistic reason, reverence, and modesty, in the following extract, from "A Plea for Atheism." "God cannot be intelligent." "God can never perceive." "God cannot have memory or reason." "God cannot have the faculty of judgment." Of the reason of all this, I will say nothing, as I have not quoted it, and my judgment might be thought partial; but if it be either reverent or modest, I am content to plead the the absence of both.

I must now explain what I mean by evil, by saying a few words as to its *Nature*. I wish then to exclude from present consideration all reference to mere physical pain—that is pain of body—because, this has very often far more of good than of evil in it. Hunger, for example, is no doubt painful; but can any one deny that hunger is one means of preserving health? Why, if we never felt hungry, we should frequently, to save time and trouble, go so

long without food as to injure the body. But, the fear of the pain induces us to ward it off, and by this means to supply ourselves with the required nourishment. I also pass it unnoticed, because that of which I am about to speak is much more important than any amount of bodily pain could possibly be. As mind is higher than matter, as intelligence is nobler than non-intelligence, so that which influences the soul, must be of greater moment, than that which affects merely the material body. I shall, therefore, consider evil only as it acts on the immortal self, the soul, mind, or spirit.

The first point you should clearly apprehend is the distinction between *evil* and *sin*. Evil is that which injures, lowers, or vitiates the soul ; and which would have acted in this way, though God had never given a command. For any one to slander his neighbour is injurious to himself, and would have been so, though God had never said, "Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour." Sin, on the other hand, does not, as sin, relate to the effect on the soul, but is a breach of *law*. Consequently, there could not have been sin, had there not been law. If God had not said, "Thou shalt not steal," man would not have committed a *sin* by stealing ; he would necessarily have lowered himself and thus increased evil within him, but he would not have been guilty of an *illegal* act. I may illustrate my meaning by a reference to the

legislation of our country. It is quite clear that crime would be impossible, had no laws ever been made prohibiting certain actions. Theft is a *crime*,—not because it is injurious to society, or to the thief—but simply because it is against the criminal code. Therefore when a man breaks the law he is guilty of crime, in violating the laws of his country; he is also indulging evil, by confirming a pernicious tendency in his own character. Law is given by the Legislator for the good government of his subjects; it is, as we shall see presently, given by God for the same purpose.

I pass on now to consider the *Origin* of evil, and here I am met by many acknowledged difficulties. The following is their statement from the Secularist point of view;—"The existence of evil is a terrible stumbling-block to the Theist. Pain, misery, crime, poverty, confront the advocate of eternal goodness, and challenge with unanswerable potency his declaration of Deity as all-good, all-wise, and all-powerful. Evil is either caused by God, or exists independently; but it cannot be caused by God, as in that case he would not be all-good; nor can it exist independently, as in that case he would not be all-powerful."* The difficulty as seen from the christian stand point is thus stated by Mr. Birks, "The same deep instinct which reveals to us the contrast of moral good and evil, and compels our

* "A plea for Atheism," by "Iconoclast," p. 4.

reason to ascribe perfect goodness to the Supreme Source of all being, discloses also the mournful fact, that moral evil does exist and prevail widely through the universe. How, then, can we explain this fact, if there be a God of infinite power and goodness? Surely, either the power or the will to remove it must be wanting. If the power, then how can God be Almighty? If the will, then how can He be infinitely good?"*

It will be my object this evening to show you that evil in all its forms may co-exist with a God, all-wise, all-mighty, and all-perfect. Before doing this, I had better see what the Secularist has to say on its origin. Mr. Bradlaugh writes, in his "Plea for Atheism," "Evil must either have had a beginning, or it must be eternal; but, according to the Theist, it cannot be eternal. Nor can it have a beginning, for if it had it must either have originated in God, or outside God; but according to the Theist it cannot have originated in God, for He is all-good, and out of all-goodness evil cannot originate; nor can evil have originated outside God, for according to the Theist, God is infinite, and it is impossible to go outside of or beyond infinity." Now, in the whole range of the English language, I know few words that have proved more useful to the Sceptic than this word "infinite." The moment he finds that a simple statement of his opinion would be its own

* "Difficulties of Belief," by Rev. T. R. Birks, M.A., p. 13.

best refutation, he introduces this infinite, or perhaps it may be the "absolute," or the "unconditioned," and so in the haziness of the fog he has produced, he tries to elude his pursuer; like the cuttle-fish, that when hard pressed pours out a quantity of inky fluid into the surrounding waters, and escapes in the darkness from the vigilance of its foe. Mr. Bradlaugh knows, or ought to know, that, in his statement, he is guilty of a most palpable fallacy of confusion, in confounding the God of the Pantheist, with that of the Theist. Infinite, as I shall shew more fully presently, merely means the utmost *possible*; we are not in the habit of believing in impossibilities; we leave this for thinkers (?) who are "free" to pass that boundary. My thoughts originate outside God, as a Being; not outside his law, or outside his knowledge, but outside Him as an existence. I am outside God, the whole created universe is the same, it is not a part of God, and therefore must be beyond him; true, by his own will and act, but still beyond him; it is therefore, quite possible for evil to originate outside God, in his own creature. But the question is not left without explanation by Mr. Bradlaugh, who says, "To the Atheist this question of evil assumes an entirely different aspect. He declares that evil is a result, but, not a result from God or Devil." The christian says the same; but, may I ask the Atheist, what is it a result of? Nothing can be easier than to say it is a result, and stop there; but suppose we were to adopt this very

laconic style of explanation, what would our opponents say? They demand the most minute explanations from us on the most trivial points, but will not condescend to give any in return, on even the most vital subjects. One says with charming conciseness, "it is a result," but not of God or Devil; another says, that "Human nature is a substance, with a pure, spotless enamel." Now, as out of all-goodness evil cannot originate, it is clear that, according to this teaching it cannot be a result from man. If, then, it be not a result from God, devil, or man; from what, may I ask again, can it be a result? I think from this specimen of Atheistic illumination, we need not look to it for much light to be thrown on this problem; let us turn to christianity and see whether it will not inform us better. I need not stay to prove that, if we believe in a God at all, he must be all-loving. Love must be considered one of his attributes; I will therefore, at once proceed to the consideration of his *Omnipotence*, as on this I conceive hangs the whole question.

A great deal of the difficulty of this subject arises from a misconception of the meaning of this attribute.* If you ask what is meant by saying that God is All-mighty, All-powerful, or Omnipotent, the

* Those who wish to see this subject treated more freely and detailed than can be done in a single Lecture, should consult "The Difficulties of Belief," by Rev. T. R. Birks, M.A., and also "A Theodicy," by Dr. Bledsoe.

answer generally is that he can do everything. Now, this we know to be not strictly true. He cannot do *everything* ; He cannot construct a circle without diameter, circumference, or centre ; He cannot cause a thing to be, and not to be at the same time. Omnipotence, consequently, does not mean the power to do everything conceivable by us ; it does not mean the power to work *contradictions*. These are not the objects of power at all ; they have no relation to it ; they are beyond its sphere. It means simply the power to do everything possible in its *own nature* ; to do everything which is not inherently contradictory. It means, in other words, the power to act on everything in accordance with the nature God himself has given it, so long as that nature remains what it is. Thus, so long as a stone retains the unconsciousness of a stone, he can move it from any part of space to any other part ; he can act on it by physical force, or even annihilate it ; but he *cannot* move it by persuasion, or convince it by argument. The inherent impossibility is at once apparent, and the truth of my conception of Omnipotence is manifest. But, if it be true that God can act on *matter* only in accordance with the nature He has given it, the same must be equally true with regard to the *immaterial*, or the soul. It will be at once seen that, here, as elsewhere, any influence beyond the receptive capability of the nature, must be either inoperative, or alter the nature to meet it.

I find then, in looking at my own mind, that I have will, and that I have conscience—that is, I am conscious that I am *free* to chose any action presented to me, or to reject it. For if I am not thus free, will is a false name, and conscience is a fallacy. My conscience is to distinguish right from wrong, but if I be not free to choose the right and avoid the wrong, of what value is the information? Value! nay, I had much better be without it, as it only tells me that I am about to do that which I may hate, but which still I cannot avoid. I also feel that I am responsible to a Moral Governor for my conduct, but how can I be *responsible* unless I be perfectly free to choose my own course. If I be necessitated to right it is no virtue; if I be necessitated to wrong, it cannot be vice. All moral judgments take into account, as they needs must, the liberty of the will in any particular action; and they all proceed upon the doctrine, that in exactly the same *degree* as I am a *free* agent, am I a *responsible* agent. There is no alternative, that I can see, but to acknowledge my freedom of will, or deny my responsibility.

This being the nature given me by my Creator, he *must* act on it in accordance with this principle, if he act on it at all. He might, no doubt, change or crush it, but while it remains what it is, he is limited, by his own creation, to the possible. To act on the will, therefore, by external force; to *compel* it to a certain line of conduct, by any agency beyond

itself, and yet leave it will, is *inherently impossible*. Physical power cannot be exercised on it, nor can mental power compel it, without at the same time preventing its own action. If it is to be acted on, it must, as a necessary result of what I have said, be by persuasion, entreaty, motive, reason, or some method of *inducing* it to adopt one course, while leaving it the option of adopting the opposite course.

Physical beings are to be acted on by physical agency, and moral beings by moral agency. Consequently, to assert that God could *compel* virtue to exist in the heart of a moral agent, is to assert that He could work a contradiction. The production of *virtue* by any extraneous agency is one of those impossible conceits, those inherent absurdities, which lie quite beyond the sphere of light in which the Divine Omnipotence moves, and has no existence except in the outer darkness of a lawless imagination, or in the dim regions of error. It is contradicted by the universal reason and consciousness of mankind. Almighty power itself, we thus see, could not create a moral being, and place it beyond the possibility of sinning. If it *could* not sin there would be no merit, no virtue in its obedience. That is to say, it would not be a moral agent at all, but a machine merely. The power to do wrong, as well as to do right is included in the very idea of a moral and accountable agent, and no such being can possibly exist without being invested with this power. To suppose such an

agent to be created and placed beyond all liability to sin, is to suppose it to be what it is, and what it is not, at one and the same time ; it is to suppose a creature to be endowed with a power to do wrong, and yet destitute of such a power, which is a plain contradiction. It is too much lost sight of in this inquiry that the only way to prevent the possibility of sin was to prevent the possibility of holiness ; the only way to bar the entrance of evil, was to bar the entrance of good also. To demand, then, why God did not, if he was all-powerful, prevent the birth of evil into the family of man ; is tantamount to demanding why he did not produce a circle without the properties of a circle.

What I have now said will show the fallacy of an inquiry that has been often made, and replied to by many a varied answer—Why did God *permit* the entrance of evil ? He no more permitted it than he permitted two and two to be equal to four ; it was not a subject for permission ; permission is not the word to apply in the one case any more than in the other. I may say in the words of Mr. Birks—“Moral evil has neither been positively decreed nor negatively permitted, but simply foreseen, by the God of infinite holiness, who cannot behold it without an intense abhorrence ; its entrance is an inseparable result of the creation of free moral agents, and is the object of foresight to the omniscient wisdom, but not of prevention even by Almighty power ; but that,

having been foreseen, infinite power, wisdom, and love have conspired to provide a wonderful remedy ; so that where sin hath abounded, grace will much more abound, and death shall be at last swallowed up in a glorious victory." *

I have now shown that the existence of evil is not in any degree incompatible with the existence of an all-loving, and all-powerful Creator. I may, however, be asked—if God foresaw that this shadow would darken and blight so many of the sons of men, why did he create them ? Would it not have been better for them never to have existed, than to exist for ever in misery ? I reply that, in this case, the triumph of evil would have been infinitely greater than it is at present. What could have been a more complete victory, than that the mere *possibility* of evil should have tied, as it were, the hands of Deity. Evil now can only claim those who *voluntarily* remain its subjects ; power has been given to man to break its bonds, and come forth free from its galling slavery. Ten thousand times ten thousand, and thousands of thousands ; yea, a multitude that no man can number, will be delivered from its thralldom for ever. There will be a heaven peopled with bright and happy souls, who shall bask endlessly in the sunshine of their Saviour's presence ; and find unclouded happiness in the service of their master. But had evil, by its possibility, forbid creation, it

would have prevented all this unspeakable glory—it would have hindered all this unclouded joy—it would have punished the good for the sake of the bad—it would have claimed, not some only of mankind, but all. It would therefore have been the closer of the gate of heaven, and the conqueror of the Almighty. God, in his mercy, has not allowed it to have this triumph; he has created men, and offered them a full and free salvation, that whosoever will, may take of the water of life freely, without money and without price. He has provided a means by which all may, if they choose, defeat evil in its most enticing forms, and be hereafter crowned with the victor's crown. So that any one who eventually finds himself its slave, is the author of his own punishment; the creator of his own destiny.

It is, however, sometimes urged;—if God foresaw the fact that man would succumb to temptation, why did he not remove the source of it, so that no temptation being presented to the mind, there could not have been any danger of yielding to it. This assumes that temptation is the result of something without the mind, or external to it; whereas, in point of fact, its seat is in the mind itself. What would be very tempting to one man, would not be so to another man of a different disposition. Did you show a thief a good chance of safely stealing, it is probable he might avail himself of it; but did you

show the same to an honest man, it is probable he would consider it an insult. The mind can never be freed from the *possibility* of temptation so long as it remains finite. While there remains an untried line of conduct—the result of which is unknown—the possibility of a desire to try it must be present; and while this is so, there necessarily remains also the possibility of carrying the desire into effect. There are also many reasons why man *should* be liable to temptation; it is well for him to be tried, proved, and strengthened. It is only as he feels the desire for wrong and resists it, that he grows in moral power and in virtue. Had he never felt any inclination to sin, his preparation for heaven would have been but meagre, and his tenure of it but precarious.

The planting of “the tree of knowledge of good and evil” has long formed a favourite target for the arrow of the sceptic. It is said that “the whole world has been damned because the first woman took a longing for an apple.” The absurdity of this statement should render any further remark on it unnecessary, but unfortunately there can be nothing too absurd for belief by those who are determined to hold a certain doctrine, be it true or be it false. Suppose I take an analagous case. Would it be thought right for me to go to France and say, that our laws were so severe, that a man had been punished as a criminal, his

property confiscated, and his family dishonoured, simply because he had dirtied a little piece of paper ; omitting to add that the soiling of the paper was the forging of another man's name. Why was he a criminal ? Surely not because he had simply taken a longing for writing, but because he had broken the laws of his country. Eve could have eaten of the apples from any of the other trees without sin, because there was not any law forbidding her to do so. There was a law, however, against eating of this particular tree ; and therefore, in deliberately violating a plainly expressed command she became a sinner, and inflicted on herself the inevitable result. But further, God did not damn the world, the world did that most effectually for itself. It seems to be taken for granted, that any command of God may be transgressed, and yet the transgressor remain just as he was before, did God not interfere to punish him. Disobedience does not require any external chastisement ; as such, in its very nature, it is its own chastiser ; the simple act lowers the soul, and roots evil within it. A death blow to all that was true and holy in man, was the *unavoidable* consequence of his departing from truth and holiness, by voluntarily becoming a sinner. God's part in man's punishment was to warn him of it, and narrow its possibilities to the smallest compass, by contracting his probation to the keeping of one single law. It was moreover an obedience that would not have required any self-denial, or suffering ; nothing more

than to abstain from eating of one tree in the midst of plenty. If then, in spite of all God's warnings, and prediction of the consequences, man *would* not keep so slight a decree as this, who alone, I ask, must bear the blame ? There seems a strange misapprehension of the whole proceeding in the following quotation. "Did any such tree now exist producing fruit the eating of which would give a knowledge of good and evil, it would afford a short and pleasant way of acquiring knowledge ; but such trees only grow in children's stories, in Arabian Night's tales, or in the myths of ignorant nations. But supposing this tree to be a literal tree, did Adam from eating its fruit, acquire a knowledge of good and evil ? If yes, then he had previously no such knowledge." "Besides which it has been rightly observed that if Adam was ignorant of the nature of evil, he ought not to have been condemned for a transgression he did not rightly understand."* Now, I should like to know why it is to be assumed that it was some peculiar quality of the tree which was to impart the knowledge ? If a man be caught stealing a coin, he will—not by anything particular about the coin, but by his act—gain a knowledge of the legal effects of theft. This tree, no doubt, was in itself similar to all the others, but it was made a test for obedience ; or the submission of the will of the creature to the will of the Creator. Adam,

* "Genesis," by Mr. Bradlaugh, p. 44.

doubtless found it a very *short* way of gaining knowledge, but I am afraid far from a *pleasant* one. Mr. Bradlaugh might make any tree in his garden a tree of knowledge to his children (if he possesses these blessings) by simply pointing to it, and telling them his will was, that they should not eat of its fruit. So long as they obeyed his injunction they would have the knowledge of good in the approval of their conscience, and the development of a moral quality ; but the moment they eat of it, they would—most unpleasantly—gain the knowledge of evil, by the condemning of that same conscience, and the deterioration of their natures. Thus was it with Adam and Eve, they had knowledge of good while they abstained from eating—while they lived sinless,—but they gained a sad knowledge of evil by their sinful disobedience. Adam, consequently, *before* he eat knew only good ; but *afterwards* he knew past good, and present evil. But, although, he was before this “ignorant of the nature of evil,” he was not ignorant of the nature of transgression. He understood full well that it was his duty to do as he was told by his God ; to submit his will to the will of that higher and nobler Being who formed him, and gave him his garden home. He could not know indeed all the terrible results of his act, nor was it necessary for him to know them ; his motive for obedience should have been, not the fear of the results of disobedience,—but a desire to do the will of God.

It is further objected that God should not have allowed the Tempter to exercise his evil influence on our first parents, by urging them to eat of the tree. That if they had not been thus persuaded, they would have remained unfallen. This is an assumption for which there is not any authority. There was no *necessary* connection between this Satanic influence and the fall of man; as I said before, the real seat of the temptation was in self, and the fall might therefore have occurred, even though no lying suggestions had ever fallen on the ear of Eve. The first creature who fell must have been self-tempted, and what was possible to the first was possible to any succeeding creature. All that the Tempter could do, was to alter the *mode* in which man might be tempted; the probability of a temptation of some kind was independent of him. But this very fact, that man was powerfully urged to sin by so subtle an adversary as the Devil, was rather a benefit to him than the reverse. It in a great degree mitigated the sin of which he had been guilty. Had he fallen, prompted *only* by the desires of his own nature, the enormity of his guilt would have been increased a thousand fold. It would have shown such a determined antagonism to God, as would have made any probability of his recovery almost hopeless. It would, by the very absence of all extenuating pleas, have inflicted such a wound on his spirit, as to have rendered its cure almost impossible to the Physician's skill. But in the same degree as the external temp-

tation was powerful, was the guilt less in yielding to it. In the same degree also as the guilt became less, did the probability of recovering from its effects become greater. We have frequent illustrations of this in our daily experience. Suppose a father tells a child to do something for him, and the child does it not; it is far more severely blamed for the breach of duty, when that breach is the result of its own self-will, than when it is produced by some cause acting powerfully on the child's motives. Consequently, the Satanic temptation may have been permitted by God in loving-kindness, and in mercy to the soul of man.

Such then is evil, as I conceive it, in its Nature, and its Origin; and such my ideas regarding the circumstances accompanying its birth on earth. I have now to speak of the means by which it may be lessened, if not wholly eradicated. There have been many schemes proposed for this end, but with two only am I now concerned—the Secularist and the Christian. Now, both of these systems have undoubtedly many good precepts, many good sayings; and if all Secularists acted up to the best injunctions of their teachers, they would be better than they are; and if all Christians acted up to the best injunctions of their Book, they also would be better than they are. The point, however, is not so much which has the best precepts, but which brings the greatest force to bear on the

mind so as to *compel* obedience to them. It is not of any use having good moral maxims, unless men can be induced to attend to, and to act them. "He [the Atheist] affirms that by conduct founded on knowledge of the laws of existence it is possible to ameliorate and avoid present evil, and, as our knowledge increases, prevent its future recurrence."* This may be all true, but at present the question is not, what sort of conduct is best for man, but how to *produce* the conduct believed to be best.

Did I believe Secularism most competent for this purpose ; did I believe it to be more adapted than Christianity to make men true, and honest, and moral, and good ; I should, in that case, at once become a Secularist, because I think that the creed which, when fairly acted up to, produces the best fruits in time must be the true one. That cannot be from God which would lower his own creature even here. I do not, however, believe this of Secularism, and therefore, I am not one. But further, did I think that this system would, if fully carried out, produce *any* good results, I should think it right to help it forward ; because, if men will not adopt Christianity, then I would rather see them honest than dishonest, true than untrue, even for this life. But, believing, as I do, that *Secularism is an unmitigated evil* ; I oppose it to the utmost of my power.

* "A Plea for Atheism," by Mr. Bradlaugh, p. 4.

I now proceed to state my reasons for the assertion, that Christianity would, if received, cure evil; but that therefore, *Secularism would, if received, flood the world with it in its worst forms.* I will, as in Lecture I., examine the powers it brings to bear on humanity for the uprooting of this noxious weed.* The first of these is, as you will remember, Human Nature; which simply means that men will be good by the inherent goodness of their nature. Supposing this to be so however, it is not a *power*; it is nothing more than saying that no power is required, that evil will naturally die out; that men will be good if they be so disposed. But if they are not so disposed, what then? In that case, we are told, it is the fault of Christianity. "Orthodox Christianity is thus a blasphemous libel against man. It would, if possible, create the depravity it asserts." I think the best reply to this is another extract from the same pamphlet by Mr. John Watts, "Is natural depravity shown in female loveliness, when it foregoes the pleasures of cultivated society, and the ease of luxury, to enter some abode of misery, often in a dirty unhealthy ally, to relieve the sufferings of a distressed sister, and by kind words and generous deeds, induce her to retrieve in the future, the vice and follies of the past?" Go, I say, and ask those ladies who are engaged in such works, whether or

* May I ask the reader to refer back to pp. 26 to 34 for the completion of the argument in the text.

not they believe in Christianity ; and what think you would be their almost universal response ? An indignant rebuke for the implied insult. Go to some of the "Homes" of our land, where high born, delicately nurtured women spend their fortunes and their years in doing good, and, listening to the words most frequently on their lips, you will hear them to be Christ, and the cross. And if you ask them why they forsake home and friends for this life of self denial, they will tell you it is through love to their Saviour who has done so great things for them. If such be the kind of depravity produced by Christianity, I wish most heartily that we had more of it. We are further told that human nature is in itself so good, that it must, and would regenerate the world were it not interfered with, "Human nature," says Mr. John Watt, "is a substance, with a pure spotless enamel. It is bespattered—in different cases, more or less thickly—with dirt. But, the dirt is thrown on to it, it does not flow out of it." I should much like to know, if this be true, what it is which has thrown the dirt on to it. Is it Christianity ? If so, how came it to be so very dirty where Christianity has never been heard of ? How do you explain the fact, that no single specimen but one, has been ever seen of this "pure and spotless enamel ?" How comes it to pass that if the dirt does not grow out of it, there is dirt on it at all ? How, or when, or by whom was it *first* thrown ? I presume its eternity will not be contended for ; it must have had

a beginning ; if so, from what could this beginning originate ? Not from man for he was pure,—not from God for he is also pure—not from Dèvil for his existence is denied—from whom then, or from what ? Talk of the mysteries of Christianity ! Where can I find a greater mystery than this, that a man should know anything of the present and past history of his race, and yet pen such a sentence as that I have quoted ? But, according to the same writer, even with all the dirt that has been cast on humanity, there is yet hope, for “ thanks be to nature, every birth brings in a fresh stock of goodness, pure and unpolluted.” Parents you hear this, your children are by your agency or permission rendered impure or polluted. True, they very soon manifest evil dispositions, but yours is the fault ; had you only given them fair play, had you only preserved their nature in the *pure* state in which it came to you, that lie had never been heard, nor that anger seen. Secularist parents, if this be all the consolation your system gives you, when you see your children go astray, from my heart I pity you—for surely you require it. What can be more torturing to a father’s heart than to be told, that on the spotless enamel, on the purity of the child’s nature, he has cast the dirt which is to degrade its life ? But if this be believed in by Securalists, why do they not combine together, and place their children in some special home of their own, to be kept safely apart from all the depraving influences of Christianity ; and then

triumphantly show the world the beautiful sight of a number of human beings who have never thought or done the thing they ought not to do. The experiment is certainly worth the trial, if not for the sake of Rationalism, at least for the benefit and happiness of the children themselves. There are some Secularists however who, paying a little more respect to observation and experience, than Mr. John Watts apparently did, have, consequently, very different views as to the character of humanity. "We are all conscious of having a devil and an archangel within us ; " * writes Mr. W. Maccall. If one be right, the other must be wrong ; and, if human nature have this devil within it, it will prove a most effectual hindrance to the self-eradication, or self-cure of evil. But even on this lowest ground of natural disposition, Secularism has no advantage over Christianity ; for the latter also, most distinctly, tells its followers to foster, to develop all the better and nobler feelings of their nature—to encourage their more generous sympathies—and to nourish all that would tend to the welfare of themselves or of their fellows.

The next power is that of Knowledge, the "inexorable empire of intelligence." "Let a man resolve that he will seek the truth, speak the truth, and act the truth ; what an education lies in that resolve !" † Exactly, *let* a man resolve, and who,

* *National Reformer*, vol. viii. No. 26.

† "The Logic of Life," by Mr. G. J. Holyoake, p. 7.

may I ask, would wish to prevent him? "Let" has no place in our present enquiry; it is, how to *make* him resolve to speak the truth. If a man has already determined that he will speak the truth, nothing more is required; but what we have to consider is, how we are to cure the evil of speaking untruth? It is said by our opponents, "teach men the beauty, and dignity of truth, and they will love and practise it for its own sake." Will they? Admiration is one thing, and imitation is another. Men will often praise most sincerely the liberality of others, and really admire their munificence, while they themselves refuse to give a penny. Men often instinctively appreciate qualities in others, which they have not the slightest intention of developing in themselves. A poet may write very beautifully—aye, and feelingly too—in praise of sobriety; and spend the proceeds of his poem in getting drunk. Do not the vast majority of our business men yield homage to power of intellect, and cultivation of mind? But is this followed by strenuous efforts for a similar power or cultivation? Alas! I am afraid, that in numbers of cases their homage is that of admiration only. The banishment of Aristides should teach an important lesson on this point. But whatever power there is in knowledge belongs far more to *our* belief than to the other. We are taught that reason is a talent given us by God, for the right use of which we must hereafter give an account. It thus becomes, not a matter of mere liking, but a

positive *duty* to educate our intelligence as fully as our circumstances will permit. A duty, perhaps, that all Christians are not as fully alive to as they should be ; but in the same degree as they wilfully neglect their mental culture, do they violate their Creator's law. We are expressly told to "Prove all things ; hold fast that which is good." * And again, "Receive my instruction, and not silver ; and knowledge rather than choice gold, For wisdom is better than rubies ; and all the things that may be desired are not to be compared to it." † What has been the result of such teachings as is found in these and numberless other passages of similar import ? That Christian men have founded colleges and schools for the purpose of providing an intellectual training for those who would be too poor to provide it for themselves. And who can surpass, nay, equal the erudition, the mental grasp of many of our Christian scholars ? Whatever influence therefore is possessed by "artistic morals," for the cure of evil, is thus shown to be more the property of the Christian than of the Secularist.

Their third and last resort is to utility, or "utilitarian morals." This means a knowledge of what will be most profitable, of what will pay best. Now, suppose the case of one man having a very revengful feeling towards another ; how in

* 1 Thes. v. 21.

† Prov, viii. 10, 11.

such a case would this power act? It would prevent a revengful act so long as it was accompanied by *danger*. But, the *desire* is all the while burning within the man's soul, making it a very hell; and it is there the real evil lies. This very selfishness will only aggravate the evil in deepening the hate, by the simple fact that he cannot gratify that hate in the destruction of his victim. And the moment he can legally, he will surely pour out all his concentrated fury over the object of his passion. It will not be denied that the desire of revenge is an evil; but, how can utility act on it so long as it remains a feeling only, or can securely become action. By its very nature it cannot reach the *motives* in any case; it has no reference to anything but *acts*. It is wholly powerless to affect the springs of thought, and, I have already shown (p. 31.) that it is often equally powerless to purify the issuing streams of action.

But, here—as in the former case—Secularism can lay no claim to the exclusive right of even this principle. Christianity has it also, but with this difference; that in the former scheme it is distinctly a *motive*, while in the latter it is only an *aid*. We are not transcendental idealists, we are practical beings, and cannot help feeling the influence of utility in our conduct. That is, it helps us to do our duty—helps us to do that we still would do, though no benefit to ourselves followed on the deed. It is not

the chart by which we steer, it is not the rudder that shapes our path, it is not the current in which we float, it is only a gentle breeze that swells our sails and assists us onward in our course. Which, I would ask, is the true, and which the nobler place for "utilitarian morals"?

But what utter folly is it to tell a man to act nobly, to speak truthfully, and at the same time tell him, that he has no power to choose his actions or words—that he is the helpless creature of circumstances—that whatever he may do, he can no more help doing, than can the young sapling help bowing its head as it is swept by the passing blast. "Man cannot resist the circumstances that result in volition. As to this he has no freedom of selection. What are these circumstances? First, his organisation, then the education affecting that organisation to the moment of volition. I say, that no man is perfectly free to choose his education, or the organisation educated up to the moment of volition." * Rather a peculiar mode of curing evil, to tell men that they are no more guilty when committing the foulest crime, than when they are abstaining from it! What, in the name of common sense, would be the necessary result of men believing that they were no more responsible for their actions, than is a fruit-tree for the character of the fruit it yields? That the grandest act man can do

* "Discussion," Mr. Cooper, and Mr. Bradlaugh, p. 43.

deserves not praise ; that the vilest deed of infamy deserves not censure ; that, in point of fact, both are, so far as the man himself is concerned, upon *exactly the same level* ? That the murderer and the philanthropist—the thief and the honest man—the criminal and the patriot—are all to be regarded by us with the same absolute indifference ? Indifference, I say, for we cannot blame, nor can we praise, when the actors have no power of choice. Verily, such teaching would, ere long, turn our earth into a very hell ; and were there no other point than this, of false philosophy, and false morality in the views I am combatting, this alone should make it to be abhorred of all honest men. Christianity now steps forward, repudiating this last principle with all its power ; using the others in the manner I have indicated ; and adding fresh ones which are specially its own.

The first of these is Law, which says to man in the name of God, “Thou shalt,” “Thou shalt not.” The breach of this constitutes *Sin*. The fact of an explicit law is valuable in many ways, but particularly in this, that it warns man where danger lurks. The very command “Thou shalt not covet,” tells us of the *inherent* evil of covetousness ; and had we not been so told, we might, thoughtlessly and freely have, indulged the feeling, thus unconsciously injuring our own souls. Law, in this manner, becomes to us an ever-sounding bell, warning us off the dangerous banks ; where we might else have been stranded, as

shattered moral wrecks. It has also an additional value in the circumstance, that there is a *penalty* entailed by its violation. Now, although fear of punishment may not be a *worthy* motive for abstaining from sin, it may still be a very *powerful* one. And although its possession may not elevate the soul, it may be the means of preventing that soul from exerting an evil influence on others. It is impossible for a man to lower himself, without having a tendency to lower also that portion of society with which he comes in contact. Fear of imprisonment may not make the thief honestly disposed ; but it may prevent him from stealing my property. And so fear of the penalty of sin, may prevent a man doing that which, by its reflected influence, would injure others as well as himself. Law, therefore, as it warns, and as it directly commands, checks the growth of evil both in individual and in social life. But it does more than this ; it bases action on the principle of duty, instead of on expediency or interest, as Secularism does. It speaks of right and wrong ; tells us we *ought* to do this because it is *right*, and we ought not to do that because it is *wrong*—(see p. 27.) Is not this a far more real preventive of evil, than any abstract thoughts about the welfare of the human family, etc ? What check on stealing would the following be : “*Q.* What restraint has an Atheist from stealing a small sum from a wealthy master, if his own family be in want ? *A.* The cognizance that all actions which do not tend to the

general happiness of the human family are criminal." * This, I think, requires no comment.

Secularism would begin the regeneration of the world by discarding all such words, as "duty," "right," "wrong," "virtue," "vice," etc. It would reduce the endearments of the family circle, honesty between man and man, and every other quality of emotional or moral manhood, to the veriest selfishness. "I honour my wife, (says Mr. Bradlaugh,) I love my wife, and would do all I could to increase her happiness; because in making her happiness *I am adding to my own*. I admit it is selfish, but is there no selfishness in the Bible? I would be good, and do good to men, that being good to men, *they may be good to me* and those around me, reflecting the good which I give back upon myself."† If this be satisfactory to the wives of Secularists, then I have nothing more to say to them. I do not think it would be an agreeable thought for the wives of Christians, that when their husbands said they loved them, it only meant they loved themselves. What harmony and confidence would this impart to home, each one for self and for self alone? We shall also know how to appreciate the labours of Mr. Bradlaugh in the cause of Secularism; remembering that he, most consistently I allow, only acts for others that he may himself be benefited in return. Self first,

* "Discussion," Rev. Dr. Baylee and Mr. Bradlaugh, p. 16.

† "Debate," Mr. Bradlaugh, and Mr. Hutchings, p. 49.

self last, self everywhere, it is the pivot of the whole system, and is a most degrading one. "But is there no selfishness in the Bible?" Yes, there is selfishness in the Bible, that the reader looking on it may see it in its deformity, and learn to shun it as he would a viper's poisoned fang. The Bible *precept* with regard to selfishness is, "Love your enemies, do good to them which hate you," "do good and lend hoping for nothing again." *

The following will show that Secularism does *practically* disown anything higher than utility :— I read at p. 54, of the same debate, "It may be that murder is unjustifiable." It *may* be forsooth ! And this is the doctrine that is superior to that of the command, "Thou shalt do *no* murder" ! We must not confound murder with killing ; Mr. Bradlaugh distinguishes them in the very paragraph from which I have quoted. I agree with him in saying that "*killing* is not always unjustifiable," but with all my might I protest against the terrible doctrine, that *murder* can be justified by *any* circumstance. I might quote many passages having the same fearful tendency, one will suffice. "But if the policy of truth has difficulties, it has also advantages, which ambition itself might covet." † Truth a *policy* ! It is not so in the Christian's estimation ; he regards it as a simple *duty*, to be equally

* Luke vi. 27. 35.

† "Logic of Life," by Mr. G. J. Holyoake, p. 10.

performed under all possible circumstances. Suppose a man were to tell you that he spoke truth, only because it paid best—because it was prudent to do so—what would be your opinion of him? No very exalted one I fancy. Let men only think that truth is a policy which may be laid aside when it is political to do so; and I am afraid the evil of untruth would receive a most powerful impetus. Am I to believe that Mr. Holyoake speaks truth to me only because it is his *policy* to do so? Why, would he not consider the assertion almost an insult? I have no doubt whatever, that however he feels himself compelled to argue so as to be in consistence with his system, he is better than his teaching, and speaks truth because it is *right* to do it. I appeal to Secularists themselves and ask them, whether such doctrine as I have illustrated is not contrary to every feeling of their nature? If it is not false to their humanity? If it is not “a blasphemous libel against man?”

But Christianity has an additional power against evil in an appeal to Conscience. There are few men who do not covet its praise, or dread its censure. It is a potent agency within the mind for happiness, or for misery. The shrinking from the scorpion stings of an accusing conscience, has many a time arrested the hand, stayed the step, or hushed the word, when, but for this, some evil deed would have been done. The desire of its approving smile,

has many a time urged on the sluggish soul to acts of virtue, and to words of truth. This mighty, and undoubted force finds no place, can find no place, in Secularism. The Secularist *has* a conscience, somehow it is there ; but it is a mistake, he has no business with it ; it is a folly merely, and its voice need not be listened to. “To talk therefore, of a man sinning against his conscience—itself the result of education—is to tell you the grossest absurdity that could be put before you.”* If conscience be the result of education, I can only say it is a very extensive, and a very ancient system. Train a child so that it never shall have any such idea as right and wrong, and we shall believe you. But even supposing that this were possible ; it would not be a very good cure for evil, to eradicate the idea that there could be any such thing. And, in the meantime, men are to be instructed that, what little conscience they have is useless, as they *cannot sin against it*. I need not enlarge on this sublime idea, for where common sense does not rebel against it, argument would be useless.

Mr. Bradlaugh has a strange misconception of the nature of conscience when he argues that, because it requires education, there is no such thing. Conscience does require training, and does give different decisions according to country or creed. That which it here declares to be right, it may elsewhere declare

* “Cooper’s Discussion,” p. 43.

to be wrong. Its function is, not to lay down rules for conduct, but to give a verdict of guilty or not guilty, on any action that may be laid before it. This verdict is always founded on the evidence which we bring into the court of the mind. If I, for example, wish to perform some action, and represent that action as one beneficial to humanity and to myself, as altogether good—then, on *this evidence*, my conscience approves it. The evidence may be false throughout, and be the result of a perverse and corrupted will ; but with that the conscience has no concern. The jury in a court of justice must pronounce according to the evidence, whether it be true or false ; and also according to the law of the land in whose court they are sitting. Does it follow that because laws vary in different countries, and because witnesses often tell lies thus misleading a jury, that trial by jury is a useless institution ? There are two leading reasons why this false evidence is laid before conscience. One is, that we may have its approval in any act in which we wish to engage. That we may obtain this ; we, by the exercise of our will, dwell on those arguments that favour the view we desire to take ; and thus, withdrawing our attention from any adverse suggestions that may arise, our corrupt will, by its power over our train of thoughts—produces the verdict we want. The fault is not in our conscience, but in ourselves, if we be wrong. Another reason is that, in heathen lands for example, the evidence is tried by a

totally different set of moral laws, from those which we possess ; and necessarily therefore, on the same actions a different opinion is pronounced. On some points however among all men, and in all times, conscience has never wavered ; and these are—that there is, and must be, a right and a wrong—that these never can be changed, the one into the other—that once *right* is before the mind, it is our duty to follow it—and that if we follow it not, we are morally guilty. Conscience, thus far, is not the result of education, and requires none. These principles are prior to all training. They are present equally to the mind of the most untutored savage, as to that of the most cultivated member of civilised society.

I come now to a Christian force, that *must* succeed though all the rest should fail, and that is *Love to God*. When one *feels* all that God his Father has done for him. How he has loved him with an everlasting love ; how he has crowned his life with mercies, and will crown his eternity with glory : I say, when he feels all this in his heart ; when he experiences the expulsive power of a new affection, he *must* shake off the influence of evil. It is wholly impossible that love for God can co-exist in the same heart with love for evil. One or other must depart. “ If ye love me keep my commandments.” “ If we say that we have fellowship with him and walk in darkness, we lie, and do

not the truth." It consequently follows from all this, that once a man loves God he *cannot* remain willingly in any evil disposition. I assert, therefore, that this principle is, and from its nature must be, a cure for evil ; and that, in exactly the same degree as it is rooted in the affections.

It is asked in reply to this, "Do Theists ever steal? If yes, then in each such theft the belief in God, and his power to punish, has been inefficient as a preventive of the crime. Do Theists ever lie or murder? If yes, the same remark has further force—hell-fire failing against the lesser as against the greater crime." * All this manifests great ignorance of the nature of Christianity ; that it is not only an assent of the understanding, but a life-trust on a Person. All will allow, moreover, that if a Christian steals, lies, or murders, he does so in direct violation of the precepts of his Bible ; if so, in the same proportion as he commits these crimes does he depart from Christianity. He may be a Christian in name, but it is only the name he can claim as his own. But, on the other hand, an Atheist may steal, lie, or murder, and be still a consistent Atheist ; that is, he may do so in perfect *consistency* with his principles. Nay, his principles will tell him that he cannot sin against conscience—that he is not responsible to any being—that he cannot resist the

* Plea for Atheism, p. 4.

act, and is consequently perfectly *justified* in committing it. There is assuredly a vast difference here. If the Christian practise evil, his creed pronounces him guilty of sin ; but if the Atheist do the same, his creed pronounces him guiltless. What comparison is there, may I ask, between the two, save that of direct antagonism ?

I think I have now shown my justification for the assertion that Secularism, so far from being a cure for evil, would flood mankind with it, in its most poisonous forms. I have shown that Secularism, as explained by its own teachers, is in direct antagonism to all that is truest, and noblest in human nature. That it would proclaim conscience a lie, a mistake, a blunder ; and conscientiousness a folly and a farce. That it would obliterate virtue, truth, and duty, substituting in their place policy, expediency, or prudence. That it would drown my moral manhood in a sea of selfishness. That it would violate every utterance of my consciousness, and thus slay itself, in addition to all I hold most dear, and prize most fondly—unselfishness in my love—right in my motives—virtue in my acts—hope in my death—happiness in my eternity—and the peace of God in all.

Lecture IV.

SCIENCE AND THE BIBLE

NOT ANTAGONISTIC.

LIEUT-COL. BROOK, J.P., IN THE CHAIR.

I HAVE, at different times during my life, met many men, who, in speaking of the Bible, have told me with a sort of regretful sigh, and consequential air, that the Bible was all very well for our ignorant forefathers ; but that now, science having progressed so far, they—learned men—were, of course, compelled to resign its teachings as obsolete. This has been so often and so dogmatically repeated, that it has been almost assented to by many unlearned Christians ; who have felt, sometimes, a little sorry that their Bible was not more scientific ; and have allowed their professedly more philosophic neighbour to assume, unchallenged, his air of superiority. I shall this evening show that all this pretension is false,

that Science and the Bible are not antagonistic. But I shall do more than this,—I shall prove, before I conclude, that there is a teaching which is *utterly* and *irreconcilably* antagonistic to the first principles of Science; and that, not the teaching of Christianity, but of Secularism. Christians are too much in the habit of granting that Atheists, Materialists, Secularists may, at least, be scientific men—may be philosophical men—may be logical men. I shall show you this evening they cannot, consistently, be any of the three.

My first duty is to state the meaning of the terms I have chosen as the title of my lecture, then show how Science and the Bible *may* be antagonistic to each other; and finally apply the principles so obtained to the examination of the question,—*are* they thus antagonistic, or are they not?

What then is the Bible? It is, verbally, the sum total of the words as originally written in the different books beginning with Genesis and ending with Revelation. But is it far more than this, as every book that has been ever written is far more than the mere words printed in its pages. Into this point, however, I shall not at present enter, as it concerns more intimately my next lecture, when I shall be speaking of its superhuman Inspiration. To-night I shall treat the Bible as a merely human composition, not claiming for it any Divine authority; and try to show that, as it stands, it is not antagonistic to Science.

But what is Science ? Nothing more than the thoughts of man about the phenomena of existence. Plants are not the science of Botany ; stones of Geology ; nor stars of Astronomy. These *things* have always been the same, not so their respective *sciences*. Astronomy has passed through many a varied phase, founded on the intelligence and methods of observation of the men who studied it. It was not the same in the days of Copernicus, or of Ptolemy, as in those of Herschell. It is progressing now ; and will progress, so long as there are stars to be observed, and minds to observe them. Science has thus a fluctuating element, with which no book that professes to be written for all time can be in harmony, till at last, the fluctuations cease in the permanence of maturity. At present there is no such thing as a complete scientific system ; there is not, consequently, any separate system, which I can be called upon to prove in harmony with Scripture.

But, beneath all these progressive developments, there are certain fixed, unaltering ; scientific *principles*, which have remained the same, and will remain the same through all time. Principles which lie at the root of all science, without which it could not exist ; and to deny which, would render science an impossibility. Now any teaching, which is in antagonism to *these*, is, by this very circumstance, stamped at once as essentially, and as directly antagonistic to science as it is *possible* to be.

We shall see what these principles are as I speak of the sciences separately. Antagonism, moreover, does not mean that certain statements about scientific facts, are irreconcilable with the present discoveries of Science. Every single reference in the Bible to separate natural phenomena might be (I do not say *is*, I only say *might* be) utterly false ; diverse from what we now know to be true ; and yet, that would not show the Bible to be *antagonistic* to *Science*. In Sir Isaac Newton's works are found many statements which are not in accordance with the scientific teachings of the present day ; but no one would, on that account, say that his works were antagonistic to Science. A man may give a very powerful impetus to research and discovery, and, at the same time, teach many scientific fallacies. Did the Bible state as true, that which we have found to be false, it might tell against its *Inspiration* ; but that must be kept wholly distinct from the question of this evening. For the Bible to be antagonistic to Science, it must either discourage its *study* ; or it must contain, interwoven with its very texture, principles *incompatible* with those fixed principles which I have asserted to form the basis of all Science.

Does then the Bible, directly or indirectly, discourage the study of Science, to the true believer in its doctrines ? I answer, most decidedly, no.

So far from discouraging—it directly encourages it, by imparting motives which urge to it, and by placing it before the Christian as a duty. Is it not an efficient motive for the examination of the works and powers of nature, to believe that they are all the production of a loving Father? If a man truly love his own Creator, he cannot help, I should think, taking an interest in the other products of his skill. Were a work of mechanical ingenuity placed before the eye of one, who was told that it was the fruit of a beloved parent's thought; would he, think you, require other inducement to the closest scrutiny of its every part? Did I see him pass it with listless gaze, I should much doubt the depth or reality of his affection. The Christian has a further motive for examining the works of the Great Creator; in the thought that all are his, believing himself to be a fellow-heir with Christ, by whom all things exist. He observes all, not with the listless eye of a wandering stranger, but with the earnest contemplation of a future inheritor.

“ He looks abroad into the varied field
 Of nature, and, tho' poor perhaps compared
 With those whose mansions glitter in his sight,
 Calls the delightful scenery all his own.
 His are the mountains, and the valleys his,
 And the resplendent rivers. His t'enjoy
 With a propriety that none can feel,
 But who, with filial confidence inspired,
 Can lift to heaven an unpresumptuous eye,
 And smiling say,—“ My Father made them all ! ”

Are they not his by a peculiar right,
 And by an emphasis of int'rest his,
 Whose eye they fill with tears of holy joy,
 Whose heart with praise, and whose exalted mind
 With worthy thoughts of that unwearied love
 That plann'd, and built, and still upholds a world
 So clothed with beauty for rebellious man ?”

Never does he so fully realise the greatness of his God as when he reads it in the heavens. Never does he so fully realise the extent of his care for the minutest thing that lives, as when he reads it by the microscopic lens. Never does he so fully realise his exceeding skill in the construction of the universe, as when he reads it by the light of chemical and physical science. That his Christianity may be on a broader basis, the Christian reads of God wherever he can find the words. But in addition to all this, he is taught to value truth for its own sake; though its study may never bring him gain or name, though it may never add to his possessions, he will value it still, because it adds to *himself*. He knows that the more of it penetrates his mind, he becomes nobler, stronger; liker to his Divine Original. And as he would rather *be* rich, than *have* riches, his desire is to assimilate that which adds to his wealth in soul, rather than that which adds only to his wealth in property.

But he is also led to believe that his intellect is a talent intrusted to him for use; that it is his bounden duty to make the most of it for the welfare

of his fellow men ; that if he let it lie buried in the soil of neglect, he will incur the just anger of Him who gave it. The Christian, consequently, who does not make the most he can of the mental powers he possesses, is false to his system, untrue to himself, unjust to his fellows, and ungrateful to his Creator. The Scriptures, however, not only encourage study indirectly by motives, but directly also by such passages as the following : “ Lift up your eyes on high and behold who hath created these things, that bringeth out their host by number : he calleth them all by names, by the greatness of his might, for that he is strong in power ; not one faileth.” * “ Happy is the man that findeth wisdom, and the man *that* getteth understanding ; For the merchandise of it is better than the merchandise of silver, and the gain thereof than fine gold.” †

I hold, therefore, that so far as the encouragement of the study of Science is concerned, the Bible is not antagonistic to it, but is distinctly its aider and stimulator.

Not so with Secularism. It discourages Scientific investigation by telling a man, who says he has no caring for it, “ that it is no fault or concern of his, that he cannot help his dislike, that it is the result of his organisation.” And so believing, as no doubt he will most readily, his inability for the

* Isaiah xl. 26.

† Prov, iii. 13, 14.

study ; and not having any motive for the cultivation of his mind, as his worldly matters seem to prosper very well without it, he contentedly resigns himself to the degradation of ignorance for the remainder of his days. But suppose another man to have a liking for the study of mind or matter, what will Secularism say to him at the commencement of his studies ? “ You may, if you wish, study the facts that can be made available in the promotion of human *comfort*—that can be used up as food or pleasure ; but it is at your peril that you dive deeper than this. So long as you view Science as the Providence of life ; that is, as the means of so much pecuniary gain, you are all right ; but if you will view it, and study it, as the material for *thought* only—if you will search into the depths of your own soul—if you will persist in considering yourself otherwise than as an eating, drinking, sleeping animal—if you will care for enquiring into the how, the why, the wherefore, of anything—self included—you will suffer for it. Terribly suffer for it—in an agony of mind—in a torture of thought—compared with which that caused by the vilest devices of an inquisitorial dungeon were as nothing. Your most earnest enquiries will remain unanswered ; your intensest longings for information will return to you void ; you will have good cause to curse the day on which you ever passed the boundary of the gainful.” This, I assert, is the necessary utterance of the teachings of Atheism, Materialism, and Secu-

larism, and it is most assuredly antagonistic to the study of *Science*. It may indeed be favourable to the preservation of some branches, such as electricity, mechanics, chemistry, etc., because these can be made available in the commerce of the world. But it is opposed to the study of Science as a *whole*, and for its *own sake*, apart from all economic considerations.

I now come to the second part of our question, which is—Are the teachings of the Bible antagonistic to the *principles* which form the bases of the separate sciences? These sciences are—at least those which I shall refer to as sufficient for my present purpose—Physical, Mental, and Moral. What then, in the first place, are some of the basic Principles of Physical Science? *Causation* is one. This is the foundation of all discovery. Could men believe that something happened without any cause for the happening; search for cause would, of course, be at once dispensed with. When men saw the prismatic spectrum, they began searching into the laws of light, discovering the modes of action called refraction, reflection, etc. Had they not believed, however, in causation, they would have rested contented in the observation of the fact itself; and the science of Optics would have remained unknown. It is only as men grasp the thought that every change must have a cause, that they rise from empiric or historic knowledge—knowledge of the fact—into

philosophic knowledge, or knowledge of the *why* of the fact. But all this is so self-evident that I need not more fully speak of it. Closely associated with this, is a belief in the *Uniformity of Nature*. In other words that, *the same substances, in the same relations, will always produce the same effects*. That, for example, if I bring a spark into contact with dry gunpowder, and an explosion ensue ; the same result will always follow when the spark and gunpowder are in the same relations to each other. But if you alter either the substances, or the relations, then you will expect a different effect to be produced. Suppose I mix ground glass with the gunpowder, or damp it, and then apply the spark, it will not explode ; because, although the former substances are present, they are not in the former relations to each other. Now if the Bible be antagonistic to either of these fundamental points, then indeed it is antagonistic to Science ; but if it is not so, in that case, it is not antagonistic. It is in harmony with the first, that of causation, for nowhere is any phenomenon recorded to have occurred without some producing cause. So far well. But is it in harmony with the second—the uniformity of nature ? It is asserted by all free-thinkers, that it is not. They say that *Miracles* are diametrically opposed to this uniformity. If this be true, we must concede our point, and honestly acknowledge our defeat ; for that the Bible does teach the performance of miracles is beyond all fair question.

It might appear right for me to commence the examination of this objection by a definition of miracle, but it seems impossible to do this, without, at the same time, assuming some theory which I have not yet proved. The definition will crop out of the explanation. I would simply say at present, that I understand a miracle to be such an act as the raising of a dead man to life. I have now, consequently, to answer this one question ; is a miracle a violation of—or in antagonism to—the uniformity of nature ? Let us see what would constitute such a violation in ordinary phenomena. Were I to bring together an acid and an alkali, and they formed a salt ; and were I to bring together again the same substances, and in the same relations, *without* their producing the same result ; it would clearly be a violation of uniformity. Because the same substances being in the same relations as formerly, there is not any reason why they should not produce the same result. Man, however, has the power of altering the relations of substances in a great variety of ways. He can adjust the relations of oxygen and hydrogen to each other, so as to produce an explosive gas or a refreshing drink. He can so alter the relations between the substance mind, and the substance matter, as to call forth certain forces at will, or change one of them into another ; thus producing effects which never would have happened except by his interference. These new effects, being the

results of new relations, are in all cases in accordance with, and not in violation of, the principles of uniformity.

Man's power thus to act on the forces of of nature increases directly as his knowledge extends. Indeed one great object of scientific research, is to discover new modes of adjustment, so as to produce new and, hitherto, unknown issues. The great command possessed, at present, by scientific men over such forces as electricity, magnetism, etc., is simply a consequence of their increased knowledge of the relations into which substances may be brought to each other. As the sending of a telegraphic message, is nothing more than a new relation between the substances mind and matter ; so, in exactly the same way, the raising of a dead man, is nothing more than a new relation between the substances Deity, mind, and matter. If the former were not in antagonism to the uniformity of nature, how can the latter be ? The one, I grant, is human, and the other super-human, but this does not touch the point for which I am contending. I should have fancied that the recent exploits of science, would have taught men a little modesty about affirming what is credible and what incredible. Had one of our ancestors been told that a message would be carried to America, by nobody knows what, along a wire lying on the bed of the Atlantic, in an "*incredibly*" short space of time ; they would, I

think, have felt very much inclined to resent the supposed insult to their understanding. But yet, men, seeing and knowing all this, are not ashamed to say that, no amount of evidence could warrant belief in any action, although ascribed to God, which is incredible to their intellects ! The whole Physical point with regard to miracles is only this—is the cause assigned sufficient to produce the alleged effect ? If so, Physics has nothing further to say about it. Can anyone, believing in a God, deny that his will is an amply sufficient cause for any effect which has been ever attributed to him ? A miracle, consequently, differs from an action by man only in this one particular, that in the one case, the new relations are produced by the Creator ; while in the other, they are produced by the creature. The Bible, therefore, in recording the fact of miracles, does not record anything antagonistic to the principles of Causation, or of the Uniformity of Nature. It is thus shown *not* to be antagonistic to the fundamental principles of Physical Science.

But Secularism, on the other hand, is as explicitly and directly opposed to these, as it is *possible* for any teaching to be. Secularistic theories stand in the same relation to them that black does to white, at least as they are set forth by Messrs. Holyoake and Bradlaugh. I have already shown (p. 14) that Mr. Holyoake teaches the doctrine of *chance* in its

barest form, or that changes may occur *uncaused*. I suppose it will be granted that causation and non-causation are antagonistic. The teachings of Mr. Bradlaugh are precisely similar, as may be seen by the following extract: "And tell me—you who define matter as unintelligent, passive, inert, and motionless—who talk of the *vis inertiae* of matter—tell me what you mean when you give these definitions to it?*" I do not suppose that he means to assert the intelligence of matter in *all* its forms and states; that would be rather too much for the great faith of even an Atheist. But if it be intelligent only when organised, then he is consistent in objecting to *vis inertiae*. There can be no such thing with an inherent power of involuntary motion. And if we are to give up this, we must at the same time say farewell to momentum, to the *laws* of motion, and to all the remainder of the *laws* of physics. It is impossible that law can co-exist with chance; we may accept one or other, but both we cannot have. Why should a particle of matter go forward with a certain velocity, if it can change to any other speed, or stop altogether? How could matter expand under the influence of heat, if, by chance, it happened to be contracting at the same time? And why should it not, being not passive, but inherently active? The following sentence is another specimen of this sapient philosophy. "You who tell me of the vast forces of the universe; what do you mean by telling me

* "Has Man a Soul," by Mr. Bradlaugh, p. 9.

that it is motionless?" Really I am at a loss to know. Who ever did tell you, Mr. Bradlaugh, that the universe is *motionless*? I cannot imagine other than an insane man saying any such thing; but, indeed, the recent reading of Secularistic pamphlets, has made me very cautious about saying what men will or will not believe. Does it follow that, because matter will not move till acted on by external force, it, therefore, will never move at all? Does Mr. Bradlaugh, I wonder, confound *vis inertię* with motion? It must be a great relief to him when he has persuaded himself that the whole thing—matter and motion, and all the rest of it—is unreal and need not be argued about; as the following quotation from the same pamphlet would indicate that he has done. "The greatest difficulty is, that we have been trained to use certain words as 'God,' 'matter,' 'mind,' 'spirit,' 'soul,' 'intelligence,' and we have been further trained to take these words as representatives of realities, which, in fact, they do not represent. We have to unlearn much of our school lore." *Much* of it! Why we shall have to unlearn the *whole* of it. We may as well take every one of our books off the shelves, Mr. Bradlaugh's included, and cast them into the fire; for if there be no such reality as *intelligence*, of what use are they? It is certainly a rather startling confession for a writer to make, *that he has no intelligence*; for if there be no such thing, of course he cannot have any. I hope Secularists will remember that all his assertions, his

lectures, his arguments, he himself believes to be unintelligent, for there is no such *reality*, he says, as intelligence ! I hope they will remember also the compliment paid to themselves, that they are equally unintelligent with himself !

Oh ! had the Bible contained such palpable contradictions and absurdities, as are found in the few foregoing quotations, how would sceptics—nay, how would the common sense of all men—have laughed it to scorn. And now, Secularism having banished all causation and law from the domain of physics—substituting chance instead—having banished all intelligence from the sphere of observation ; and having banished all mind and matter from the reality of existence, where is physical science to come from ? How is it to be studied ? On what is it to operate ? If all this be not the directest antagonism to the principles of physics, it would be an interesting enquiry to find out, what antagonism is.

I now pass on to consider the principles of Mental Science, or Philosophy, and see the relation of the Bible to them. In every philosophical classification we find recognised, *Cognitive* faculties—or those by which we gain, recall, and retain knowledge. The *Emotions*—or feelings of pleasure, or pain—and the *Will*. “ In taking a comprehensive survey of the mental phenomena, these are seen to comprise one essential element, or to be possible only under one necessary condition. This element or

condition is consciousness, or the knowledge that I,—that the Ego—exists, in some determinate state.”* The Bible acknowledges, and appeals to, every one of these separate faculties. On the cognitive, such as sensation, memory, and imagination, I need not dwell; I would rather at once speak of the others, and firstly, of the Emotions. These are again subdivided for the convenience of examination and reference, but the subdivisions are different according to the object of the writer. Some are arrestive or instigative; that is, some hold man back from action, such is dread of evil; or urge him on to action, such is hope of good. Others are adhesive in their nature, drawing men together in social bonds, such is love, gratitude, or sympathy; while others are repelling, as hatred, indignation, or revenge. Yet others are remunerative, rewarding for good, as cheerfulness or content of conscience; while some are punitive, punishing for evil, as melancholy or remorse. Now all these are urged on man’s attention by his Scriptures, stimulating him onwards in his upward path, binding him in closest and noblest ties to his brother, and rewarding him for his manful struggle with temptation to evil. Or else he is warned of danger, by having continually before his eyes, the possibility of punitive emotions arising in their might, as stern avengers

* *Lectures on Metaphysics*,” by Sir. W. Hamilton, vol. i., p. 182.

of the violations of the law of his God. And, as regards the Will, from first to last, it is appealed to by the Bible ; which urges, entreats, persuades, reasons ; saying "Come unto me," "Come let us reason together" "Why will ye die ?" "Ask and ye shall receive," etc. And, as regards the truth of Consciousness, it is assumed throughout. The Bible and mental science are, therefore, not antagonistic, but in most complete harmony. Secularism, however, is as opposed to mental as it is to physical science. It cannot, consistently, appeal to any emotions that are remunerative, or punitive ; arrestive or instigative. For how can a man feel glad or sorry at doing that which he had no power to avoid doing ? How can he be instigated to exertion, when exertion at any time will be the inevitable result of his organisation at that time ? Secularism opposes itself also to the very essence of all philosophy, when it denies the existence of will, and this, I have already shown, it does most distinctly.*

But if anything more were wanting to complete the entirety of its antagonism, it is found in the fact, that it denies the veracity of consciousness. This would at once strike at the root of our *cognitive* faculties, for if we cannot depend perfectly on the truth of consciousness, we never can be sure that we know anything ; not even that we ourselves are in being, for we only know this as we are conscious of it. But if we may be conscious of that which is

* Lecture III. p. 107.

false, why may not this particular knowledge be false ? How can we be sure that *all* knowledge is not false ? We cannot. And if all knowledge *may* be false, there can be no such thing as *knowledge* possible to us. The term "cognitive" is, consequently, a fallacious one, if we cannot cognize or know. The Secularist may, therefore, be a man of faith, but to be a man of knowledge is beyond his power. Let me repeat a quotation I have already made from Sir W. Hamilton, "Consciousness, therefore, is to be presumed veracious ; a philosophical theory which accepts one part of the data of consciousness, and rejects another, is manifestly a mere caprice, a chimaera, not worthy of consideration, and far less of articulate disproof. It is *ab initio* null." This is the very thing done by Secularism ; it acknowledges some facts of consciousness, as that of our own existence ; but denies others, such as the freedom of the will in any case. It is, consequently, as a philosophical scheme, "unworthy of consideration ;" but more ; any Mental Science in accordance with its teaching is "*ab initio* null." It would thus perform for mental science, the same kind office that we have already seen it would perform for physical ; render it at once and for ever an utter impossibility ! Is this, may I ask, antagonism, or is it not ?

But we have also Regulative faculties, as Reason and Faith. The following is the mode in which these are treated by the Bible. It allows a

foundation of positive knowledge—consciousness—on this it erects a superstructure of inferential reasoning, which being carried steadily upwards, merges into faith; this faith is in due course to become knowledge. There are certain statements which we are asked to believe on authority, till the period arrives when they will be explained to us. “Jesus answered and said unto him, what I do thou knowest not now; but thou shalt know hereafter.”* “For now we see through a glass, darkly; but then face to face; now I know in part; but then shall I know even as also I am known.”†

So speaks Christianity, but what says Secularism? Hear it. “Belief is like a mountain weight, destroying faith, thought, and manliness—for manliness consists in thought and action founded on thought. The man who deprives himself of thought, destroys his noblest power and faculty; and if he say, ‘I believe in the unknown and unknowable,’ he simply says, I have never stopped to think for myself.”‡ It would be a difficult matter to crowd together a greater number of absurdities, in the same space, than we find in the foregoing quotation from an *argument* (?) by Mr. Bradlaugh. Belief, first of all, destroys “*faith*!” I presume he means, if he mean anything, that it commits

* John xiii. 7.

† 1 Cor. xiii. 12.

‡ Matthias Discussion, p. 82.

suicide ; for belief and faith I take to be very much the same thing. This terrible belief also destroys "*thought*." What a monster it must be. I suppose that the moment I believe in anything, I must at once cease thinking about it ; nay, I have not the *power* of thinking, for my belief has destroyed it ! Can absurdity become more absurd ? It seems so, for belief in the unknown also destroys "*manliness*." It is, of course, impossible for any man to be manly, who believes that there is no water on the surface of moon ! But why waste words on such transparent folly ? Its unutterable nonsense must be apparent to the meanest intellect. I can only say that, on his own showing, Mr. Bradlaugh has never stopped to think for himself ; for believe in something he *must*, whether he like it or not. But to what a pitiable condition would he reduce his disciples, for I have shown that he would deprive them of *knowledge*, and now, that he would deprive them of *belief* ; and so, without knowledge or belief, they must be content to exist as the objects of sympathy, or of pity, to all who know them.

It is pleasant to turn from the incoherent contradictions of Secularism, to the calm utterances of philosophy, and hear what is said by it on the subject of belief. "Properly speaking," says Hamilton, "we know only the actual and the present, and all real knowledge is an immediate knowledge. What is said to be immediately known is in truth not known to

be, but only believed to be." * "The belief" says Dr. M'Cosh, "has a basis of cognition, the cognition has a superstructure of beliefs, in a sense we know space, for it is present to us; certainly body occupying space, is ever before our senses, but when we look on space as having no bounds, we are beyond the territory of cognition, we are in the region of faith. The one conviction equally with the other, carries within itself its authority and validity. No man is entitled to restrict himself to cognitions, and refuse to attend to or to yield to the beliefs which he is also led to entertain by the very constitution of his mind. No man can do so, in fact." † Which, I ask once more is antagonistic to Mental Science, the Bible, or Secularism?

The next branch to which I will call your attention is Moral Science, or Ethics. Its aim is to discover and systematise the laws of moral good; and in doing this it has reference to three principles, the *motives*, *will*, and *conscience*. It decides an action to be right or wrong, which is to be determined by the *motive* that prompts the act. No matter how beneficial a deed may be, if the motive causing it be a selfish one, the deed is held to be selfish, so far as the doer of it is concerned. If, for example, I were kind to a poor man, because I knew that an influential friend would hear of it, and

* "Lectures on Metaphysics," vol. i. p. 220.

† "The Intuitions of the Mind," p. 199.

reward me accordingly ; the kindness, however useful to the man, would not have an approving verdict from moral science. The *will* must also be regarded in any judgment it may pronounce, for when the agent is not free, it holds that neither praise nor censure can possibly be deserved. It likewise looks to the *conscience*, as that which is to tell the will when it is to yield to motives, and when it is to resist them. Every one of these finds its appropriate place in Scripture. It appeals to the heart, the purpose, the motive. Man is told, not only that God knows the outward act, but also that he “searches and tries the heart.” Again, “as a man thinketh in his heart, so is he.” “Blessed are the pure in heart ; for they shall see God.” The fact of its constant appeal to the will I have already noticed. And, as regards conscience, the reference to it is equally clear, and its importance as definitely stated. “Now the end of the commandment is charity out of a pure heart, and *of* a good conscience, and *of* faith unfeigned.”* “We trust we have a good conscience, in all things willing to live honestly.”† Ethics and Scripture are, consequently, not antagonistic but harmonious.

Here also Secularism, however, places itself in a position of hostility ; in its disregard of motives, and denial of will, and conscience. Motives are nothing to it ; acts alone tell on the interests of men, and these are its only care. Will it ignores, thus

* 1 Tim. i. 5.

† Hebrews xiii. 18.

making man a machine. Conscience it sneers at, thus making man an irresponsible, capricious incarnation of selfish tyranny. Moral science, with such infatuated doctrine as this is a simple impossibility. What each man thinks to be right, is right, and there is no other possible standard.* This has been clearly seen, and openly avowed by the bolder and more consistent opponents of Christianity. Spinoza taught, that "every man had a right to do whatever he has the power to do, and that the right extends as far as the force. By natural right or law, (*jus et institutum naturæ*) he understands nothing else but the rules of the nature of each individual; according to which it is determined to exist, and act after a certain manner." Hobbes taught that "there is nothing good or evil in itself, nor any common laws constituting what is naturally just or unjust; that all things are measured by what every man judgeth fit, when there is no evil government." Upon the same principles Hume advocates the lawfulness of adultery and suicide. Indeed, Mr. Bradlaugh himself approaches dangerously near this very teaching, as will be seen by the following answers to questions put to him by Dr. Baylee, in his discussion, (page 47.) "Q. To whom is man responsible? A. I do not know that he is responsible to any one. Q. Then if a man commit adultery is he responsible to no one?"

* See "Boyle Lectures," for 1861, by Rev. E. Garbett, M.A., p. 318. Indeed the whole work should be well known by every theological student.

A. If by responsibility you mean does the commission of an immorality tend to misery, yes ; if you mean more than that, no. Q. Is he not responsible to the husband ? A. *One must have the whole of the circumstances to say yes or no.** Q. Then in your own sense of the word responsibility, is not man responsible to his fellow men ? A. My own sense shuts out responsibility ; therefore no." It really seems almost puerile to ask whether this is not antagonistic to the Science of Ethics ?

The result of our examination thus far, therefore, is, that Science,—Physical, Mental, Moral,—and the Bible are not antagonistic ; but that Science and Secularism are irretrievably opposed ; that both cannot logically be held at one and the same time. Belief in the Bible may be possessed by the most advanced student of physics, by the most expert logician, by the most acute philosopher, and by the most scrupulous moralist. But a belief in the theories of Secularism can be held only by those who know not the value of law, or the bases of experiment ; who care not for logic ; who are ignorant of philosophy ;† and who would plunge mankind

* The italics are mine.—J. M'C.

† A sentence in Mr. Bradlaugh's pamphlet, entitled " Has man a Soul ? " shows that he is ignorant of the most elementary principle of philosophy, or else forgot it when writing. The sentence is, " You are conscious of my existence." The merest tyro in metaphysics, will at once perceive the want of

into the debaucheries of a sensual carnality. The accusation is a strong one, but I have given my reasons for making it; and shall presently give some more that will strengthen it. If it be false, let who will show where the falseness lies. When I am convicted of error I shall retract; but till then I charge the Secularist with holding theories, that would make him the enemy of learning, of progress, of liberty, of integrity, of morality; of all that would elevate our nation, rectify our commerce, sanctify our homes, and purify our lives.

When, however, Secularists begin to criticise Christian doctrines; they awake up at once to a belief in conscience, and an excessively tender one it proves; they are horror stricken, perfectly aghast, at the immorality and injustice of certain acts, which Christian men have looked upon as exactly the reverse. They recoil instinctively from the Bible, on account of the very immoral doctrines it teaches! If its moral *science* be not at fault, that science, they would tell you, is violated by some of its cardinal points. Who—with such a keen sense of justice, and such tender sensibilities, as the Secularist is

information indicated here. One man *conscious* of another man, by sound. We may be conscious of the *sensation* called sound, and of the ear as a portion of the organism being affected in a particular manner; but all beyond that is matter of *belief*, not of consciousness. Consciousness is an immediate, not a mediate knowledge.

taught to have—could believe any doctrine so immoral,—because so unjust and cruel—as that, for example, of the Atonement ?

Before I enter upon the examination of this, and a few kindred objections, I wish it to be understood that I have finished the argument which forms the subject of this lecture ; and that I only enter on these other topics, to meet some doubts that are urged against Bible morality generally. It is objected that the atonement represents God as a sanguinary Being, waiting for some victim to bear the weight of his wrath ; and that he pours out his fury on the first that offers itself, no matter whether that victim be guilty or innocent. The thought naturally arises here, if God desired a victim for his vengeance, why not have taken as such, the being who had angered him ? He had the *power* to do so. Had he the *will* ? If you say yes, you are in a dilemma ; because he has not used the will. If you say no, how then can he be a sanguinary Being, without the *will* to injure ? If a monarch have the power of destroying a hundred men who have rebelled against him, but does not destroy one of them ; devising, instead, a means by which they may be saved ; would you call him sanguinary ? I fancy not. Why then apply the term to God under similar circumstances ? The objector may take either dilemma he likes, and get out of it as best he can.

But again, the very book which sets forth the atonement, tells us most unmistakably that it was not a scheme of anger, but of love. "For God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life. For God sent not his Son into the world to condemn the world; but that the world through him might be saved." "In this was manifested the love of God towards us, because that God sent his only begotten Son into the world, that we might live through him, Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that he loved us, and sent his Son *to be* the propitiation for our sins." † Those who say that no love was shown by the atonement must either be wrong in their assertion, or must know better than did the Son himself, or the writer of the account. Once more I leave the objector to his choice of dilemmas; and desire him to consider which he prefers, that convicting him of egregious error, or that convicting him of egregious egotism.

It is also maintained by many (Mr. Holyoake for example) that the atonement is unnecessary, because God either was, or was not, angry.‡ But he could not be angry, for if so he would be the most miserable of beings; and if he is not angry no atonement can be needed. "If not offended," he says, "then there can be no offence against God; if no offence

* John iii. 16, 17.

† 1 John iv. 9, 10.

‡ See "Grant's discussion," p. 153.

against God, there is no sin against God.” There seems to be a confusion here between anger and justice. God was separated from man, by the sin of man; that is, he was prevented from acting towards man in a purely loving spirit, because this would have encouraged rebellion to his authority, and have fostered the growth of sin. The element of law is also lost sight of in this objection. Sin is an offence against God, because it is a violation of his command; in the same manner as a breach of England’s law would be an offence against England’s Ruler, as the chief magistrate of the country. The following is a simple statement of the subject, with reference to the foregoing charge of the want of necessity.

Our moral nature demands that God shall be morally *perfect*; not the slightest taint or flaw can be allowed in him. There must be absolute perfection, or he is not God. There must be absolute perfection, or there can be no law of *duty* binding on me; I might think it *prudent* to obey, but I could not have any feeling of moral *obligation* to obedience. Either, there is no moral law whatever, or else, there is a God infinitely and perfectly just and holy. Such a Lawgiver must, from his very nature, claim obedience to any law he may choose to promulgate; by the very fact that, being just and holy, such law will be just and holy also. Man, therefore, is bound to obey all his laws,—not from hope of

reward, or fear of punishment,—but because it is right for the finite creature to yield obedience to the holy and just Creator. This obedience, moreover, must be also perfect, if man is to stand innocent before his God ; and innocent he must stand, if he stand at all. But man, so far from having *obeyed* every precept of the law, has, I might almost say, *broken* every one. He has deliberately done that which he knows he ought not to have done. He is thus self-convicted of being a sinner. The necessary consequence of this is, that there is no other relation possible, between the law-maker and the law-breaker, than that of judge and criminal. If the judge is to become the Pardoner, and the criminal the pardoned, it can only be by some scheme of atonement ; or by some scheme in which the sword of justice may, judicially, be sheathed ; by some scheme in which mercy and truth may meet together, and righteousness and peace kiss each other. Such a scheme is found in the incarnation, and death, of the Lawgiver's own, and only, Son. The atonement is, consequently, the result of the love of the All-loving ; and the justice of the All-holy One.

“ But,” it is asked, “ when man repents for the wrong he has done, should he not then be forgiven ? ” The answer to this is very simple. In the first place, sorrow for transgression does not cancel the fact that there has been transgression. Repentance is a very proper frame of mind, and may have much in-

fluence, if it be genuine, in preventing for the future a recurrence of similar acts, The past remains irrevocable ; it is beyond our grasp, and for that we require pardon. Repentance is aside from this altogether ; for meaning, as it does, a change of mind, it looks more to the future, than to the past. But, in the next place, suppose men were told that they had only to express sorrow for all their misdeeds, to be at once forgiven ; would not this, I ask, be giving encouragement to evil ? What would be the result were a Father to tell his children that, no matter what they did against his express wish, they had only to say to him they repented of it, to be at once pardoned, to hear no more about it ? Such a result as no true father could wish to see in his family. If, then, this mode of government would not do in a single family, where the members are united by the closest bonds, what utter folly is it to talk of its being sufficient as a plan for the moral government of the whole human race ? Contrition is a necessary element in conversion ; for no man will seek for safety, till he believes he is in danger ; nor ask for guidance into the right path, till he believes he is in the wrong one ; nor sue for pardon, till he believes he has sinned and requires it. But while it is a feeling of terror that causes a drowning man to grasp the life-buoy which saves him from death ; that feeling is not the life buoy itself.

But it is pleaded here that, "allowing all this to be true, it is surely unjust to punish the innocent for the sake of the guilty." I must, in the first place, object to the word "punish." It is impossible to *punish* the *innocent*; you may cause them to *suffer*, but to punish them is beyond the power of any one. This can only be inflicted on the guilty. It is true that the innocent have, very frequently, to suffer for the guilty; but while suffering may be endured by the highest and holiest of creatures, punishment, being penal in its nature, is possible only to the criminal. Christ, consequently, being guiltless suffered for others, but he never was punished. The question properly resolves itself into this; is it unjust to allow the innocent to suffer for the guilty? Were I reasoning from the analogy of nature, I might argue that, the experience of life shows us how most men, when they suffer, do so as the result of acts in which they had no part. How many criminals are helped forward to prison by evil influence, evil example, or evil education. Children are often taught to steal from their earliest years. How comparatively innocent are these, as compared with their guilty parents; and yet the child suffers, while the parent escapes. Is it therefore unnatural to suppose that, as so much of our sin is the consequence of circumstances over which we have no control; so holiness might be also made possible to us, by similar circumstances? But, apart from this consideration, we may see that there is no injustice on the

part of God in allowing the innocent to suffer, when it is in accordance with the wish of the innocent.

For justice is of two kinds, *Retributive* and *Administrative*. Retributive justice causes the sinner to be the sufferer. It is personal to the offender, and would equally hold though one man only were in existence. It is administered by the nature of man, inasmuch as every thought or act produces some effect in the thinker or actor. It would be impossible for me to harbour a vicious conception, without having my moral nature lowered by the very act. I would become more viciously inclined than I was before. Thus sin as the seed, brings forth death as its appropriate fruit. For this kind of punishment there is no atonement. No being can prevent an act bearing its own special consequences, so far as the mental state of the individual is concerned. Every man's character is, at any moment, the result of all the states of mind which have preceded that moment. If those states have been, on the whole, true and good, they have their reward in the truth and goodness of the disposition they have produced. But if they have been false and bad, they create their own punishment in the falseness and badness of the disposition produced by them. It is in this sense we are told that men shall be judged according to their works. "But as he which hath called you is holy, so be ye holy in all manner of conversation; because it is written, Be ye holy; for I am holy. And if ye

call on the father, who without respect of persons judgeth according to every man's work, pass the time of your sojourning here in fear."*

When men stand before the judgment-seat of God, they will stand revealed in the characters which have been produced in time. As are their characters, so will be their eternity. The man who has here trained his mind in thought, and his soul in holiness; will thus be made capable of a loftier state in that other world. Consequently, every man is, by every thought or feeling which he now deliberately indulges, preparing his own heaven, or his own hell. Suppose, for example, two men to be converted to Christ at the eleventh hour of their lives, one of them having lived a most immoral life, and the other having lived most morally. These two men, although both equally saved, will not, cannot be, alike in their eternal home; their characters were not the same when they descended to the grave, nor will they be the same when they rise from it. A greater degree of glory will be possible to the mental and moral man, than will be *possible* to the man of undeveloped mind or morals; for the simple reason that, the former, in the very expanding of his powers, has increased their capacity. This is retributive justice. There is one way, however, in which the atonement acts even here. When a sinner accepts the Saviour, a hatred of sin springs up within him, and a corres-

* 1 Peter, i. 15, 16, 17.

ponding love of holiness ; this is the work of the Holy Spirit, in the sanctification of his soul. He now, yielding himself to the purifying influences of that Spirit, strives to counteract the effects produced by his former unholy state ; and the more vividly he realises the degradation of his previous condition, the more strenuous will be his efforts to elevate his present condition. Nothing, therefore, can be more natural than the marked changes which have given rise to the well known proverb, “the greater the sinner, the greater the saint.” Those who have been most severely bitten, will most dread the poison ; those to whom much has been forgiven, will love much.*

Administrative justice, on the other hand, refers more to society generally, than to the individual. Its object is to secure good government ; to prevent transgression, by showing the holiness and the justice of the governor. The sinner is morally vicious, and legally guilty ; by the power of the Holy Spirit, vice is eradicated ; by the death of the Saviour, the *guilt* may be *pardoned*. I say pardoned, because the transgressor is, *in himself*, just as guilty after he lays hold of the cross of Christ as he was before. But, in consequence of the King’s Son having borne the penalty of the subject’s sin, the subject can, if he will, accept the proffered pardon,

* The effect of retributive justice on society may be seen by referring to Lecture III. page 109.

and be treated by a holy God as though he were really innocent. While God "can be just, and yet the justifier of him which believeth in Jesus." * If then, the good moral government of the world can be secured, without each separate evil-doer suffering for ever the legal penalty of his transgression, why should it not be so secured ?

The sceptic raises here another difficulty, borrowed from the analogy of our criminal legislation. He says that, "no court of justice would have any right to allow an innocent person to suffer instead of the guilty." This is true, but the cases are not parallel. In the first place, no human government has a right to doom a virtuous man to bear the punishment due to the criminal ; and if he were willing to suffer in the place of the culprit, no government on earth has a right to accept of such a substitute. Because the life of a virtuous citizen is the gift of God, and no earthly power has the authority to take it for any such purpose. It would, therefore, be a violation of the will of God for any human government to admit of such a substitution. Christ, on the contrary, had the power to lay down his life ; and he did so, in perfect accordance with the appointment of God. In submitting to the death of the cross, he did not subvert, he fulfilled the end of his earthly existence. It would also overthrow the ends of public justice for any human government to permit a good

* Rom, iii. 26.

man, who is the ornament and blessing of society, to die in the room of the criminal, who is its scourge and plague. The sufferings of the good citizen, would, in such a case, be pure and unmitigated evil. While such a course would deprive society of his services, it would, at the same time, throw back upon it the burden of one who deserved to die. It would tend to render the punishment of crime uncertain; it would shock the moral sentiments of mankind, and cover with odium and disgrace the government that could tolerate such a proceeding. But not so in relation to the sufferings of Christ. He assumed his human nature for the express purpose of dying on the cross. He died, not to deliver an individual and turn him loose to commit further depredation upon society, but to effect the salvation of the world itself, and to deliver it from all the evil under which it groans and travails in pain. He died for sinners, not that they might continue in their sins, but in order to redeem unto himself a peculiar people zealous of good works.*

We have now seen that the atonement was not cruel, unjust, or immoral, on the part of God, but was in truth the clearest manifestation of his unswerving fidelity to his word; of his unchangeable love to his erring creatures; and of his infinite wisdom in devising a method by which man could

* See "A Theodicy" by Dr. Bledsoe, p. 277.

be prepared for, and, consistently with justice, allowed to enter "Paradise Regained."

It is also objected, as against the morality of the Bible, that it makes salvation depend on faith rather than on works. Mr. Holyoake says, "But a far more serious objection is, that our salvation is made to depend on special faith, and not upon works. Now faith or belief is not in itself a virtue, is not at our command; and on this account the scheme is inapplicable to human progress. It would have been more useful to have made salvation depend on works, upon services which are more or less at the command of all men."* Are not works the result of faith or belief, and if belief be not at our command how can works be? But it seems to be overlooked in the objection that, it is because works are *wanting* that salvation by faith is required. Had all men, in all time, done all that was right for them to do, no salvation would have been needed, for there would not have been anything to have been saved from. He who never breaks the law, needs no legal salvation. But, surely, doing some good works cannot be a reason for pardoning every evil work; those which were good, were, at best, but our duty; and if so, how can this cover our neglect of duty? Suppose a criminal, charged with murder, to urge as a reason for pardon, that he has never been guilty of forgery; would it be held a sufficient cause for allowing him to go

* Grant's Discussion, p. 135.

free? He is not being tried for what he did *not*, but for what he *did*. Salvation is deliverance for the *absence* of right works; and therefore to talk about salvation *by* right works is to talk contradictions. If the works be present, man requires no salvation; if they are absent, he must be saved by something that is not absent. That something is *faith*. But of what sort? Not, most assuredly, the sort as represented by the imagination of Mr. Bradlaugh, who says, "What, as I was saying when I sat down before, is the sum of all Christianity? Faith with or without works?"* He decides that it is without works. He might have corrected his statement by another had he chosen to remember it, "Thou believest that there is one God; thou doest well: the devils also believe and tremble." And yet the devils do not possess the "sum of all Christianity." There are also some other passages here which I would bring to the knowledge of Mr. Bradlaugh; for, had he known them already, he would surely be above the littleness of ignoring them. "But wilt thou know, O vain man, that faith without works is dead?" "For as the body without the spirit is dead, so faith without works is dead also."† "Holding the mystery of the faith in a pure conscience."‡ "In this the children of God are manifest and the children of the devil; whosoever doeth not

* Matthias Discussion, p. 166.

† James ii. 19, 20, 26.

‡ 1 Timothy iii. 9.

righteousness, is not of God, neither he that loveth not his brother." * I am sorry that Mr. Bradlaugh, in his critical reading of the New Testament, has never seen the above, and numberless other passages that would have shown him how falsely he spoke when he taught that faith without works was the sum of Christianity. Perhaps, however, his mental lens is of that kind that can discover only supposed flaws.

Faith, as the Christian understands it ; is life trust on a living person ; a loving trust, that shows its love by obeying his commands. An undoubting trust that shows its confidence, by risking its soul's salvation on the word of its Saviour ; and I hope, most sincerely, that Mr. Bradlaugh may yet understand, and feel it as the Christian does ; for however hard I may feel myself called upon to hit his arguments ; I would wish himself, " to prosper and be in health even as his soul prospereth."

Secularists also contend that it is against our sense of right, and therefore immoral, that a man should be condemned for his *opinion*, if he hold that opinion sincerely. That sincerity should of itself be sufficient to procure a man salvation. Mr. Holyoake says, "every sincere man is equally entitled to salvation, whatever may be his belief." † This is rather a peculiar objection to come from an Atheist, for

* 1 John. iii 10.

† Grant's Discussion, p. 135.

assuredly his god, which is nature, cares very little for sincerity. If a man swallow a piece of arsenic, believing it to be sugar, the sincerity of his belief will not prevent the arsenic producing its own special effects. If a sailor embark in a leaky ship, believing it to be sea-worthy, his belief will not stop the water from entering between her timbers ; or keep her floating, when she becomes too heavy. Every physical, mental, or moral act, produces its own appropriate result ; whatever be the belief of the actor. And we can no more say that God will hereafter condemn for a particular belief, than that he does so here. If it be correct to affirm that a man will be condemned by God in another world for his creed (supposing it to be a false one) with regard to the atonement ; it is equally correct to affirm that, a man is condemned by him in this world for a false creed with regard to the properties of matter. The truth is he has decided, in his infinite wisdom, to govern his creatures by certain laws, for their own welfare, and the violation of any one of these laws carries its due punishment. If he have determined that sin shall be forgiven as a result of trust in a Redeemer, by all who have heard of him ; then rejection of that trust, produces its own special consequence, which is, the absence of forgiveness, or condemnation. What right have we to ask that this shall be an exception to all other law ; and that sincerity, wrongly placed, shall be without effects, shall be here what it is in no other part of the

government of the Creator? If, therefore, a scheme of pardon be offered ; and that scheme be rejected, the rejector is self-condemned by his own act. Salvation is thus seen to be wholly from God ; condemnation wholly from man himself. But, Mr. Holyoake says again, " If I can deduce a law of life, which shall be as harmless as the Christian's—one, indeed, by which I can walk blamelessly before men why should I not be left free to do so ? Why should not my salvation lie in the direction of my freedom my development, my happiness, and the promotion of the public good ? Why should the Christian sit in orthodox inquisition over me ? Why should I be dragooned by religious criticism into one mode of faith, when, as I think, higher and purer faiths are open to me." * I think I have shown already that some method of pardon was needed for the *violation* of the "law of life." Were Christianity a system of mere human philosophy, or polity ; then no man would have any right to sit in "orthodox inquisition over any one," but believing, as the Christian does believe, that it comes from a higher than man ; he feels it his duty to bow before that higher Being, and to ask other men to do the same. The Christian does no more dragoon men into one mode of Christian faith, when he warns them against indulging too freely in scepticism ; than does the Chemist, when he warns them against indulging too freely in the use of

* Grant's Discussion, p. 156.

strychnia. The Christian student proclaims his discoveries, with their results ; as the chemical student proclaims his. I think also, most decidedly, that salvation *does* lie in the direction of "his freedom, his development, his happiness, and promotion of the public good."

It is here urged, that any particular belief is not at command ; that we cannot say to any one belief, come ; or to any other belief, go. That we must believe according to the evidence. All this I at once acknowledge. Now one thing is very clear, that, in any matter, I must either examine the evidence myself, or accept the examination of it by another. But before I can examine it myself, I must possess the requisite skill, power, or opportunity. A chemist may ask me to believe in his statement, that oxygen has certain properties ; but if I have no chemical skill I must of course take his word for it ; before I can search into the subject for my own satisfaction, I must train myself in the requisite experiments. And so with belief in Christianity, before any one says, that he will only believe according to the evidence as examined personally, he should be certain that he has the requisite training, and mental skill for the purpose. If he have not these indispensable requirements, he is surely responsible in some degree for their absence. He has, by his own act, brought himself into a state, in which he is unable to sift, or appreciate the evidence

laid before him. And can any sceptic say, that he has used *all* possible care and diligence, that he has economised *all* spare time and money for the development of his mental power? I fear not. And if not; and if further information would have cured his scepticism, (and it is impossible for any sceptic to say that it would not) then I hold that his sincerity, in such a case, is an aggravation of his sin, instead of being its atoner.

But supposing that he has the power *fully* to sift the evidence, it is also necessary that he has the desire to do it *fairly*. For this purpose he must acknowledge it to be his duty to obey the will of God; and then honestly desire to know what that will directs. I say, *honestly* desire to know, because it is here that the feelings, and wishes, begin to operate, sometimes causing such a state of mind that no amount of evidence *could* produce conviction. Suppose any one wishes to believe some doctrine; he cannot say at once I will believe it, but he can, by the exercise of his will, concentrate his attention on all the points that favour the desired view. He can crowd into court all the witnesses for the case he wishes to prove; and then the opposing witnesses will retire of themselves. It is an undoubted fact, that the feeling of desire exerts a continual and prevailing influence in determining the succession of our thoughts. The dispositions of the heart are continually working, for good or evil, in the

depths and recesses of the mind, qualifying our apprehension of things without us and within us ; exerting their several affinities, among the materials of our knowledge, modifying the processes of thought ; and establishing susceptibilities of feeling. I do not say that every sceptic *consciously* warps his judgment, there are many of them, I doubt not, as sincere as any man can be in the search for truth ; but I cannot help thinking that some *know* they do not fairly examine Christian testimony ; and that many more are unfair, unknowingly to themselves, because they have not sufficiently probed their own hearts.

Before any man can plead sincerity as all-sufficient, he must, consequently, be able to answer the following questions in the affirmative. Have I used all means at my disposal for the training of my intellectual faculties ? Have I a *greater* disposition to embrace, than to reject Christianity ? Have I used my mental powers *more* vigorously in arguments supporting Christianity, than in arguments antagonistic to it ? Did I put out all my strength in its defence, before I came to the determination of rejecting it ? If we try the works of sceptics by these tests, we shall be compelled to condemn the most of them, as incompetent or unfair. And the tests are true ones even for an Atheist.

Do not misunderstand me here, I do not for a moment wish to give the impression that God requires every one to be equally well educated.

This would not be possible, nor is it necessary. Many a poor man, who has but little secular learning, is taught of the Spirit; and holds the vital truths of the Bible with a clearness and a firmness of grasp that many a theologian might envy. But it is a totally different thing when a man says, I will not believe the Bible till I have critically examined it. Then we do say, before you undertake the task, you should be fit for it.

God does not require from any man, an impossibility. Unavoidable ignorance is an extenuation of the evil. Paul himself says "Who was before a blasphemer, and a persecutor, and injurious; but I obtained mercy because I did it ignorantly in unbelief."* Those also who have not had the Bible given to them, or who could not know it, shall not be judged by it, but by the law which they have, that of their conscience. "For as many as have sinned without law, shall also perish without law; and as many as have sinned in the law, shall be judged by the law."† More than an *extenuation*, however, it cannot be, for ignorance of truth is in itself an evil, and a thing (evil for example) cannot be and not be at one and the same time. Our responsibilities will be in proportion to our opportunities. The greater our facilities for knowing and believing in God, the greater will be our guilt in knowing and believing not. "For unto whomsoever much is given, of him

* 1 Timothy, i. 13.

† Romans, ii. 12.

shall much be required ; and to whom men have committed much, of him they will ask the more."

I would now, in conclusion, say firstly to Christians, do you by the nobility of your character—by the honesty of your actions—by the purity of your lives—show the nature of your faith, the strength of your belief, the influence of your creed, the holiness of your profession. "Let your light so shine before men, that they may see your good works, and glorify your Father who is in heaven." And to all I would say "I speak as unto wise men, judge ye what I say," and I pray that your judgment may lead you to Him, who is the way, the truth, and the life ; and that in Him you may believe and trust, and with Him abide for evermore.



Lecture V.

INSPIRATION & REVELATION.

REV. G. G. LAWRENCE, M.A., IN THE CHAIR.

I do not stand here to-night as the champion of the Bible. It requires none. It is its own best champion, having fought triumphantly against hostile empires, and overturned for ever stately and time honoured worships. It needs not the defence of human power, being now, as it ever has been, able to baffle alike the open attacks of the avowed enemy, and the treachery of the secret foe. It asks not aid from human skill, for it is still holding its onward victorious way, bowing nations before its intrinsic grandeur; and commanding the homage of the hearts and minds of men by its sympathy with their deepest sufferings, and its responses to their most earnest enquiries. I would, therefore, content myself with explaining my own views about Inspiration and Revelation, replying to the objections that have

been brought against our Bible, and lastly noticing very briefly, some of the many ways by which it proves itself to be the Word of God.

Inspiration, in its widest theological sense, I understand to be an action of the Spirit of God on the spirit of man generally. So that wherever there is a human being, this degree of influence is being exercised, even in the lowest savage ; sometimes restraining him from deeds of cruelty that he would otherwise have perpetrated ; sometimes punishing him for the commission of what he believed to be wrong, by stirring up his conscience to accuse him. In all cases urging him to attend to the law of right and wrong written in his heart. Among Christians, however, the effects of this inspiration are greater in degree, but the same in kind. But even among them we know it varies very considerably, some Christians being much more spiritual than others ; that is, some yield themselves much more freely and completely to the suggestions of the Spirit than do others. The word is frequently used in this sense by the Church of England. For example in the collect for the Fifth Sunday after Easter. "Grant to us thy humble servants, that by thy holy inspiration," etc. Again in the prayer for the Church militant, "beseeching thee to inspire continually the universal Church." And in Article XIII. "Works done before the grace of Christ, and the inspiration of His Spirit." From all this it will

be evident that the term is comparative, having its lowest degree in the soul of the least inspired man, and its highest in that of the most fully inspired. Amongst these latter I place the writers of the Bible, whose inspiration did not, I think, differ in *kind* from that of all other men, but only in degree. Still their superiority was so pre-eminent that, in comparison with it, all others might be called uninspired. In the same manner as we call one who has a little learning, but only a little, an unlearned man, when contrasted with another of great erudition. So completely were the Biblical writers filled with the Spirit of God, that *whatever* they recorded, I hold to be infallibly true, in the sense in which it was written. Not that they were in this state at all periods of their lives; but were only so specially acted upon when they were writing that which was to be for the guidance of all men, in all time. I cannot explain the mode in which this operation is accomplished, I only know it shows a correspondence of nature between God and man—shows that man is made in the Divine image. A beast could not be spiritually inspired, because, although possessing mental faculties, it does not possess spiritual, and so has no basis for the reception of the influence.

We should also be careful to remember that while the whole Bible from Genesis to Revelation, is an inspired and infallible record; that which is thus recorded, is very frequently ignorance, or crime ;

simple national history, or individual biography. We believe that every incident or speech which it relates, is truly related, but we do not believe that they were all suggested by God. The friends of Job, for example, angered God because they had not spoken of Him the thing that was right. It is not, therefore, to be held responsible for the notions of uninspired men about science, or morality; it is responsible only for what it *approves*; or for the direct teachings of its writers. Had, therefore, any of the men named in it believed the most palpable fallacy with reference to science, and we had been told of it; this would not shew that the record was uninspired, or untrue, but that the man was scientifically ignorant.

It may be asked, however, why the historian of Israel should have been thus inspired any more than the historian of England; or why he needed this supernatural influence to enable him to write certain chronicles of political events? "Were any man, or any body of men, commissioned to take the record of English history, from the days of Julius Cæsar to the present time, and to select from them those portions which should give adequate instruction to all subsequent ages, correcting what was erroneously stated, supplementing what was defective, making no mistakes respecting the motives or the characters of men, exhibiting the dealings and the purposes of God throughout, and in all things giving us the

Divine mind upon human affairs, could such a work be accomplished, unless these men were inspired? God inspired men by His Holy Spirit, with wisdom to select, with insight to discern, and with ability to compose. Under that power they were enabled to give to the church of God a record of true history, fitted to instruct men in all things, for which history is valuable. In this light we see the fulness and perfection of the historic portions of the Bible in their apparent deficiencies. The ordinary historian would gladly find in them many things for which he searches in vain. These are not unskilful omissions. They have a Divine purpose. They remind the historical student of the higher and holier purpose of the sacred narratives, and tend to show him that for that purpose they are faultless.”*

It may also be enquired, why we have an inspired account of opinions that were erroneous, and of actions that were vicious? Because an accurate representation of error may sometimes be more valuable than an accurate representation of truth. It frequently happens that a clear and definite description of a fallacy is its best refutation. And, moreover, as truth is so often an outgrowth from

* “The Holy Scriptures” by the Rev. Joseph Baylee, D.D. This volume is part of a “Complete Course of Biblical Instruction,” which will be a great boon to all who care for the thoughts of an earnest and independent Thinker, and the researches of an accomplished scholar.

untruth ; it is well that we should know exactly through what forms of untruth the mind has passed, and thus be enabled the better to appreciate our present position, and our future prospects. And so far as vice is concerned, it is reported for our warning ; showing us where some have been wrecked, that we may avoid the like dangerous rocks, and steer our way in the deep channels of purity, truth and holiness.

Revelation, I understand to mean the communication of new truth to the mind. Like Inspiration it is a comparative term, there being different means by which truth may be imparted ; and different powers of receiving it in different minds. One mode is by the material world. Every new fact a man learns by observation is a revelation to his mind, from the mind of God. For that fact, suppose it to be the structure of a flower, was in the mind of the Creator before the thought was put forth in creative energy. By matter and its laws, God reveals himself as Almighty, All-wise, All-loving. To this revelation Paul appeals in his address to the Lycaonians when he said, "Nevertheless he left not himself without witness, in that he did good, and gave us rain from heaven, and fruitful seasons, filling our hearts with food and gladness."* He also reveals himself as a moral Governor, by the voice of conscience, telling man that there is right, and wrong ; reward and retri-

* Acts xiv. 17.

bution. Of this kind of revelation the same Apostle writes to the Romans, "Which shew the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts the meanwhile accusing or else excusing one another."* But above these there is a special revelation of the mind and will of God—as Creator, Governor, and Redeemer of men,—given us in the Bible. That revelation was immediately imparted to the minds of the writers, by the direct agency of the Holy Spirit. In one sense, Revelation and the Bible are co-extensive; if we consider the whole Book as a declaration from God, of what is best for man to know about the subjects that concern his eternal welfare. But, in another sense, revelation proper is confined to those truths which were not known by the scribe at the time he wrote, but which might afterwards have been discovered. Such would be the revelation of any scientific fact, in advance of the science of the time. It includes also those truths which never could have been discovered by any power of man. Such are the facts relating to the Incarnation, the Atonement, the Trinity, etc. Paul tells the Ephesians that he received his knowledge of these things by direct revelation. "For this cause I, Paul, the prisoner of the Lord Jesus Christ for you Gentiles, if ye have heard of the dispensation of the grace of God which was given me to you-ward, how that by revelation (*κατὰ ἀποκάλυψιν*) he made known unto me

* Romans II. 15.

the mystery ; which in other ages was not made known to the sons of men, as it is now revealed (*ἀπεκαλύφθη*) unto the holy apostles and prophets by the Spirit." *

It is scarcely necessary to discuss the question of the *possibility* of such an inspired revelation. For if we grant the existence of a Creator, it must be competent for him to act on his own creatures in accordance with the natures he has given them. In point of fact, I am doing something similar as I now address you. My soul is so acting on your souls as to inspire you with my own conceptions ; and, in some few cases perhaps, I may be even revealing to your minds, truths before unknown to you. An inspired revelation is, therefore possible between man and man ; why should it not be between man and God ?

There are, consequently, two elements inseparably blended in the Bible ; these are the Divine and the human. The Divine element is the truth that was distinctly and forcibly suggested to the minds of the writers ; the human element is the form, and the words in which that truth was written. The penman was perfectly free to choose any words that might best convey his meaning, and thus each one has left the impress of his individuality on what he has written.

* Ephesians III. 1, 2, 3, 5.

It needs not much study to tell that the books attributed to Moses, Isaiah, and Ezekiel, were not all penned by one man. We can as easily distinguish their separate authorship, as we can in the case of Milton, and of Pope. The Divine element, however, while leaving the human perfectly free as to manner, preserved perfect accuracy of matter. This matter being for the use of man, must necessarily be restricted to that which is comprehensible by the human intellect. *All* truth could not be communicated, even by God, because the creature being finite, could not receive it. There must, therefore, be a limit to the subject matter of revelation, but that limit is measured only by the capacity of the finite. The knowledge thus imparted to us, while it is not full knowledge, is true. We have not perfect information on any one subject, but still the information that we do possess, is real. I do not know all that is involved in the properties of a circle ; but that does not weaken the fact which I do know, that the circumference is greater than the diameter. In like manner, although we do not know all about God, or any of his actions, what he has been pleased to tell us is as true in itself, as though he had told us more, or could have told us everything.

But while man cannot receive all truth, his power of reception becomes greater as his faculties grow by culture ; or as he benefits by the

results obtained by thinkers who have preceded him. Thus the man who carefully trains his mind, has a far greater intellectual grasp than he who does not so train it. And the man who lives in this nineteenth century, has more material for thought ready to use, than had the man who lived in the ninth century. That the Bible be adapted to all degrees of civilisation, it must contain matter suitable to the infancy of humanity, and matter suitable also to its most perfect development. This requirement is met by its expansive power. Its thoughts are adjusted to the level of its original hearers, and yet endowed with a power of rising far above that level. There are latent meanings, hidden teachings, beneath its words, which only become developed as the mind of the student develops in power of research. It is scarcely possible to read the writings of the prophets, and compare them with their contemporary history, without the perpetual conviction that more was meant—not perhaps by the human speaker, but by the inspiring Spirit—than met the earliest listener's ear. Throughout the entire range of the Old Testament Scripture, there exists a deeper signification than the literal—a signification which is veiled alike under command and precept, type and symbol, history and prophecy, stern denunciation and triumphal psalm. On this basis rests the process of development which Christ and his apostles have unfolded. Such is Paul's mode of dealing with Scripture history, in the facts of which, he describes

deep allegories, containing the germs of Christian doctrine. The facts recorded, were true historic facts, but God caused them to be typical facts, and the record of a typical fact becomes a prophecy, though it might not in all cases be known to be such at the time when it was written down.* Hosea was doubtless thinking of the Exodus as he wrote "When Israel was a child, then I loved him, and called my Son out of Egypt;" but we are told by Matthew that this was prophetic of the calling of Christ out of the same country. It would be well for sceptics to bear this simple principle in mind, when they criticise quotations from the Old Testament in the New.

Now, although the Bible consists of sixty-six books, written at different periods within fifteen hundred years, and by about forty authors of very different culture, disposition, and character; having been superintended and inspired by one Spirit, we might naturally expect to find amid all the human diversity, a Divine Unity. And such an unity must be at once evident to every impartial reader. There is historical unity. It is, throughout, one continuous narrative, as much so nearly as though it had been written by a single historian. In doctrine there is the same unity, the same development; all the

* Those who wish to see this subject freely and ably treated are referred to the Bampton Lectures, for 1863, by Dr. Hannah.

incidents are in their proper places, first the creation, then the fall, the promises, the training, the redemption, and the restoration. Whoever holds the pen, it is the same Spirit who guides the flow of thought. Hence it is "that no prophecy of the Scripture is of any private (separate) interpretation. For the prophecy came not in old time by the will of man ; but holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost." *

I now proceed to examine some of the leading objections which have been brought against the Bible as a book supernaturally inspired, and therefore of Divine authority ; commencing with those of a scientific character. We should in the first place remember that its purpose is to purify the morals, sanctify the spirit, and save the soul of man ; not to teach him scientific truth. Consequently, any very detailed, or elaborate system of physics would have been altogether inappropriate. A man goes to his Bible to know how he is to regulate his conduct, what he is to do to be saved ; and if, instead of information on these points, he had been told the laws of astronomy, it would have been but sorry comfort for him. Scientific notices are but few, but these few when stamped with the writer's authority, we should expect to be correct, and these we will now investigate.

* 2 Peter I. 20, 21.

It is said that the language in which natural phenomena are described is incorrect; Joshua, for example, commanded the sun to stand still; whereas it was the earth that he should have addressed. I reply to this, that the Bible does whatever every other book does, and that is to describe phenomena as they are related to us. Perfect accuracy in describing things as they *are*, is yet beyond the power of any human being. For example, the Hebrews called light by a word which means flowing, the Greeks by one which signified shining, and we call it light, or without weight; it will be observed that these names do not describe light, they only seize some one property which we know it to possess, and name it after the particular one selected for the purpose. In exactly the same manner there is in Astronomy the term "Solstice," a strictly scientific term be it remembered. But what is the meaning of it? The sun *standing*. At certain times in the year he *appears* to remain stationary for a few days in a point of the ecliptic, and that is called the solstitial point. Why then is the Bible to be censured for not being more accurate in its language about astronomic phenomena, than is a professedly formal treatise on the same subject? But suppose that a strictly scientific language had been adopted, how could we have understood its meaning? In the earlier ages it would have been universally incomprehensible, and even in this present time, it might be very obscure in many of its details. What would sceptics have said then?

“Do you call this an inspired volume, given for the instruction of all mankind, written in language that no human being ever yet has understood, and apparently never can understand?” Instead of this, he who runs may read, and he who sits down critically to examine, will not find anything to offend his judgment, or his taste.

To pass from its language to its facts, it is asserted that they are at variance with recent discoveries. That its geology, for instance, is irreconcilable with the present state of that science. Supposing this were so, what matters it, unless it can be shown that the present state is a sure and certain one, based on facts that are incontrovertible? So far, however, from this being the case, geology is at present in a state of most profound uncertainty on many very important points. If we bear in mind the fact, that a very small portion of the rocks which are accessible to the hammer, have as yet been examined; and that the great majority of rocks form the bed of the ocean, and therefore cannot be examined; we shall be cautious how we manufacture theories about the succession of life on the earth, etc. It was long held that no mammals existed on the earth's surface before the Tertiary period. But I had better use the words of Sir Charles Lyell, in describing not an opinion but a fact. “But the most instructive lesson read to us by the Purbeck strata consists in this:—they are all

with the exception of a few intercalated brackish and marine layers, of fresh water origin ; they are one hundred and sixty feet in thickness, *have been well searched by skilful collectors*, and by the late Edward Forbes in particular, who studied them for months consecutively. They have been numbered, and the contents of each stratum recorded separately, by the officers of the Government Survey of Great Britain. They have been divided into three distinct groups by Forbes, each characterised by the same genera of pulmoniferous mollusca and cyprides, but these genera being represented in each group by different species ; they have yielded insects of many orders, and the fruits of several plants ; and lastly, they contain ‘dirt beds,’ or old terrestrial surfaces and soils at different levels, in some of which erect trunks and stumps of cycads and conifers, with their roots still attached to them, are preserved. Yet when the geologist enquires if any land animals of a higher grade than reptiles lived during any one of these periods, the rocks are all silent, *save one thin layer a few inches in thickness, and this single page of the earth’s history suddenly reveals to us in a few weeks the memorials of so many species of fossil mammalia, that they already outnumber those of many a sub-division of the tertiary series, and far surpass those of all the other secondary rocks put together !*” And again he writes, “The imagination may well take alarm at the confusion which we may expect to encounter in settling sundry

questions of Geological chronology when we have to deal with ancient deposits found on the frontiers of distinct Natural History provinces." *

He also said in his address as President of the British Association. "Late discoveries in Canada have at last demonstrated that certain theories founded in Europe on mere negative evidence were altogether *delusive*." "We have every reason to suppose that the rocks in which the animal remains are included are of as old a date as any of the formations named Azoic in Europe, if not older, so that they preceded in date rocks once supposed to have been formed before any organic beings had been created."—Surely such utterances from such a man should teach opponents of the Bible the wisdom of hesitating a little, before they ask it to adapt its calm and sagacious utterances to the baby prattle of every new born fancy they choose to foster. But let them not talk about geology and Genesis being at variance, while geology is still in its youngest infancy. I know there are some geologic facts which are indisputable, but I know also that with these Genesis is in perfect harmony. That I may show this to be so, I will examine in detail the first chapter of Genesis, and give what I believe to be its meaning with the reasons for my belief. I do not hold myself to be infallible, so that my interpreta-

* Lyell's Elementary Geology. Supplement to the fifth Edition, pp. 28, 39.

tion may be erroneous ; the error of the interpretation, however, if erroneous it be, does not in any way affect the truth of the narrative.

“*In the beginning*” (v. 1,) means simply at first, for the word *'reshith* is derived from *rosh*, the head ; it is therefore the head of time. It should also be noticed that in the original the definite article *the* is absent, so that the literal reading is “in beginning ;” showing that it is indefinite in its signification, and may mean previous eternity, or previous time, according to the subject spoken of.

“*Created*” is the translation of the word *Bara*. This is never applied to any created being, but is confined exclusively to God, and God alone is called *Bore*, Creator. Creation is, consequently, a Divine act ; and although it does not necessarily signify the production of something out of nothing, it does signify the production of something new, or that did not exist before.

“*Heavens*” (*Shamayim*) “and earth,” mean, the material universe. It is quite clear that “the heaven” of the first verse is not the same with “heaven” of the eighth verse ; because the former was made at the beginning and the latter was not made till the second day. I am aware that this is called a contradiction, and that they are both held to be one and the same ; but the contradiction, in such a case, would be so very palpable to the writer, as to be inconceivable. I hold, therefore, that the

first verse tell us, that it was God who at the first created all things.

“The earth was without form, and void.” The words used are *thohu* and *vohu*. The first means *waste, desert, desolate*, and the second means *void*. The earth was then at first desolate and empty, and over this chaos the Spirit of God *brooded*, for this is the literal rendering of the word *rachaph*. We are next told, that light was then produced. This has caused many objections, one is thus stated by Mr. Bradlaugh. “It has been fairly objected that the creation of light on the first day, and before the sun, which was not created till the fourth day, is a point of difficulty.” Now, if we adopt the nebular hypothesis of the origin of the solar system, this same difficulty meets us. For that hypothesis assumes that there was one great central nebulous mass which rotated on its axis till the equatorial diameter became so great that the centrifugal force exceeded the centripetal; and the excessive matter flew off, time after time, and formed the planets. That primary central mass was either luminous or non-luminous. If it were luminous, then all the bodies derived from it must have been luminous also, but we know they are not; if it were non-luminous, the sun did not receive its light till after the planets were all formed. And if they had light at all, it must have been from some other source—a perfectly possible circumstance. Astronomy tells us that the

sun is a dark non-luminous body surrounded by a luminous atmosphere ; and that large openings are frequently visible in this outer floating matter, enabling us to see the body of the sun within. What was to prevent this brilliant matter from existing by itself, and apart from the central body, in the spaces of the system, giving them a general diffused light, or even an alternation of day and night as they turned to or from it? For if it were condensed into one part of space, it would cause day and night just as really as where it is at present. That I may at once finish this part of the subject I shall pass on to consider the work of the fourth day, which was the making of *two great lights*. The word used is *ma ór* (not *or*, light, the word used in the third verse) or light-bearers. We are not told that God made the sun itself on this fourth day, this was done in "the beginning," but that he made it to be a light-bearer. If my former supposition be correct, this would be done by placing the light-giving matter around the sun. And, may I ask, could any man even at the present day, name the sun more appropriately than by calling it *maór* or *light-bearer*? It is not luminous, as a jet of gas is, it is simply a carrier of light, as is a lamp. The word "set" in the 17th verse, is also objected to as though it meant to fix firmly, or place anything ; but that it does not mean this may be seen by referring to verse 29, where the same word *nathan*, is rendered "have given," and also in chap. iii. v. 12. it is "gavest." To set, conse-

quently signifies to *give* as light-bearers, with all the resulting effects.

The next point that demands attention is the word "day." This may mean either a period of twenty-four hours, or a period of indefinite length. We find it used in the latter sense, so as to include the six days, in chap. ii. v. 4. "In the day that the Lord God made (not created) the earth and the heavens." I believe it to have this sense in the first chapter, the days being periods of time of indefinite, and varying lengths; no two of them, perhaps, having the same duration. It is contended that "this interpretation cannot be true, because the same word is used in the fourth commandment to express the seventh part of the week." Before this objection can have force, it must be proved that a day must always have the same signification. I have shown that it has not; it must be also proved that a day of the Lord is the same thing as a day of man; but I read that "one day is with the Lord as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day." It may be more plausibly urged that each day is limited by a "morning" and an "evening;" thus confining the time within a natural day. If morning and evening necessarily must mean a literal dawn and close of day-light, as we have it at present, then of course I must be in the wrong. But does it necessarily mean this? We shall see. The word for evening is *gerev*, which is from a root, meaning arid or sterile,

hence the secondary application to darkness or dreariness. The word for morning is *boker*, which means to break forth, as the light breaks forth from the sterility of night. I put these two ideas together and gather, that the evening of each period was the time in which it remained barren of all that was to be produced in it, or to characterise it; and that the morning was the breaking forth of this, whatever it may have been, whether light, or plants, or animals. If this thought be correct, the evening and morning would imply nothing more than the beginning and completion of the work of each separate period. It seems to me, however, that they cannot possibly mean periods marked by the sun, because the sun did not become a bearer of light till the fourth day. I find *boker* (morning) used in this sense in Amos v. 8, where it is said, God "turneth the shadow of death into the morning, and maketh the day dark with night." That is, if Israel would call on God, no matter how deep their calamities, he would cause them to pass away; and prosperity, and happiness to break forth on them once more. Again in Daniel viii. 26, we read "And the vision of the evening and the morning which was told is true," by referring to v. 14, I find that this evening and morning includes "two thousand and three hundred days." In other words, it was a long period of time, in the beginning of which (the evening) there was to be "the transgression of desolation," and after this (the morning) the sanctuary was to be cleansed.

I am, consequently, not without authority for giving the meaning I have given to these two words.

In vs. 6, 7, we are told that God said, "Let there be a firmament in the midst of the waters, and let it divide the waters from the waters. And God made the firmament and divided the waters which were under the firmament from the waters which were above the firmament." On this Mr. Bradlaugh writes, "This was to have water above, and water beneath it, and the stars were afterwards fixed in it. Where is now this firmament? If it means the atmosphere, there is no water above it, the clouds float in it, and the stars are not in it." To this I reply, that we are not told anywhere that the stars were *fixed* in it, as I have shown that the word "set" does not carry this meaning. "Above," is *megal*, the root of which means to ascend, or go up; the waters rose up from beneath the firmament into it, and, as we are told, rested on it. In nearly every case, where the word is used in this particular form, it means being on something else. And I contend that this is scientifically true of all waters that are not beneath the firmament.

But this very word firmament, *rakia*, has been cavilled at as meaning a solid expanse. Mr. Goodwin writes, "That the Hebrews understood the sky, firmament, or heaven to be a permanent solid vault, as it appears to the ordinary observer, is evident enough from various expressions made use of con-

cerning it. It is said to have pillars, (Job xxvi. 11,) foundations, (2 Sam. xxii. 8,) doors, (Ps. lxxviii. 23,) and windows, (Gen. vii. 11.) * If we turn to the passages mentioned we shall see that these words are wholly figurative, for the pillars are said "to tremble and be astonished at his reproof;" that the foundations "moved and shook because he was wroth." I presume it will not be contended that "doors and windows" are literal, for if so we may extend the list and add the "bottles" also. I wonder could Dr. Colenso calculate the size or number of bottles required to hold a tropical shower of rain? I should also like to know, which first takes place, the uncorking of the bottles, or the opening of the windows? Perhaps he will also some day try to discover what the Jews thought the "garment" was made of, in which the waters were bound up, (Prov. xxx. 4.), or where they imagined the "bars and doors" were, which the ocean had, (Job xxxviii. 10). All these quotations are from poetically figurative language, proving nothing about the scientific conceptions of the writers, which are found in such passages as this, "All the rivers run unto the sea; yet the sea is not full;" why? Because that "unto the place from whence they came thither they return again." † But if the Hebrews were so intensely stupid as to imagine the firmament a solid vault, how comes

* "Essays and Reviews," p. 220.

† Ecclesiastes i. 7.

it that they make the birds to fly there and the winds to blow there?*

Either they did not think it a solid vault, or else they must have thought that birds could wing their way in it, solid as it was; and that even winds could blow in it, solid as it was. The firmament is, consequently, the expanse in which the watery clouds float, the birds fly, and the winds blow.

The next act was to separate between the land and the water, so that large areas of earth might be available for the purposes of vegetation, and animal life. The manner in which this was accomplished is stated by David, "Thou coveredst it with the deep as with a garment; the waters stood above the mountains. At thy rebuke they fled; at the voice of thy thunder they hasted away; the mountains ascend, and the valleys descend, (marginal reading,) unto the place which thou hast founded for them."†

What has science to say against this? Is it not in strictest accordance with undoubted fact?

There being now dry land, vegetation next appears. Then the waters are caused to teem with life, and the air receives its inhabitants, the fowls. Mr. Bradlaugh on this says, "we are told that 'the fowls of the air were produced from the waters.'" The margin of his Bible would have shown him the

* See Gen. i. 20. Deut. iv. 17. Ps. lxxviii. 26.

† Ps. civ. 6, 7, 8.

correct rendering to be "let fowl fly;" the word being *y'gopheph*. And lastly were produced all the terrestrial animals, and man. The order, therefore, of creating and making as given in this first chapter of the Bible is, first the production of the matter of the universe, our earth being without plants or animals; next the production of light, then of the atmosphere, then the causing of the dry land to appear, and the consequent gathering together of the waters. There being now light, air, land, and water, the conditions of its growth, vegetation is made. Afterwards the light is placed around the sun so as to cause the regular alternation of day and night; and this, be it noted, before there are any animals on the earth, who require day and night. Then fishes, birds, and indeed all kinds of animals are placed on its surface, already perhaps covered with a luxuriant flora. I say that all this is the order we might have expected, and it is in harmony with all that science has as yet told us definitely. Mr. Bradlaugh, I know, writes, "Yet the best student of geology declares that an universal primeval flora cannot be sustained, but that on the contrary the development of the vegetable world has been slow, gradual, and spread over enormous periods. According to the text, herbs and trees were created on the third day, while fishes, reptiles, and creeping things were not made until the fifth and sixth days. Yet the stone records teach us that there existed fishes, reptiles, and creeping things long before the period of those plants whose existence is

now testified by the huge coal beds of our country.”† What glorious logic have we here? Coal beds of a certain age are found in certain rocks, therefore, no plants existed before those so found! The assumption, and it is a most absurd one, is that no remains can exist in unsearched rocks, because we have found remains in searched rocks. I must tell Mr. Bradlaugh that until most of the records of the stones have been read, geologists can know nothing whatever about the succession of life on the earth. As a student of physics and natural history, I can still receive this chapter as the inspired Word of God.

It is also asserted, that the Bible teaches that the earth is immovable, as in the following passages, “The world also is established that it cannot be moved,” (Ps. xciii. 1.) “Who laid the foundations of the earth that it should not be removed for ever.” (Ps. civ. 5.) If these verses are to be understood literally then there are some others that must also be understood literally, as “The righteous shall never be moved.” (Prov. x. 30.) If, therefore, a man be righteous, he is to remain fixed for ever in one position! We also read, “Hold up my goings in thy paths, that my footsteps be not moved.” (Ps. xvii. 5.) The prayer of the Psalmist was, of course, that God would fasten his footsteps to one spot of earth, so that he should never walk again? The Hebrew

† “Genesis,” p. 37.

word used is *mot*, which signifies to waver, shake, or totter ; and in this, the true sense, the earth is not moved ; it wavers not, nor shakes, nor totters ; but age after age rotates on its axis, and revolves in its orbit, with a precision so accurate, that the astronomer can calculate to the smallest portion of a second the time when it will arrive at any point in its path. Thus understood, the Bible does teach that the earth is immovable, and astronomy teaches the same. Thus understood, the righteous are as immovable as the earth itself, for “neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor powers, nor things present, nor things to come, nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature, shall be able to separate them from the love of God, which is in Christ Jesus our Lord.”

If we want scientific mistakes, which are at once seen to be at variance with well ascertained facts, we must go to other books than the Bible for them ; we can go to the “Vestiges of Creation,” for example, “that extraordinary work,” as Mr. Bradlaugh calls it, and there we are told “that there is in the solar system a *progressive increase of bulk*, and diminution of density from the planet nearest to the sun, to the one most distant in the solar system.” * The truth is, that the bulks of the planets are most irregular, the following being their respective masses :—Mercury, 0.175 ; Venus, 0.885 ; Earth, 1.000 ; Mars, 0.132 ; Jupiter, 338.475 ;

* P. 10. as quoted by Mr. Bradlaugh, in “Genesis” p. 13.

Saturn, 101.066 ; Uranus, 14.255 : Neptune, 18,900. We can see by this that Mars is smaller than the the Earth, Saturn than Jupiter, and Uranus than Saturn ! Who likes, may take the " Vestiges " as his Bible, I will still give my allegiance to the " old and antiquated " ? volume which has claimed the honor and respect of generations of thoughtful men, and survived the envenomed attacks of hosts of foes.

I pass now to objections which have been brought against it of a general character. One of these is the derivation of the human race from a single pair. On this Mr. Bradlaugh writes, " I am inclined to the opinion that the doctrine of a plurality of sources for the various types of the human race is a correct one." " It seems to me that science emphatically declares man to have existed on the earth for a far more extended period, affirms that as far as we can trace man, we find him in isolated groups, diverse in type, till we lose him in the anti-historic period ; and with nearly equal distinctness, denies that the various existing races find their common parentage in one pair." * I might rest in the statement that all this is mere *opinion* on the part of the writer ; but I will give my own reasons for the different opinion that, the Bible account is the correct one, premising that the antiquity of the race has no bearing on the unity of its origin ; except perhaps rendering it still more difficult for our opponents to

* " Were Adam and Eve our First Parents ? " p. 1.

prove their point. Mr. Bradlaugh *seems*, with several others, to acknowledge the unity of *species* of the human family, while denying the unity of *origin*.† I may, therefore, confine my attention to this one point, did all mankind spring from one pair? When we look around at different nations, we no doubt see a great variety in colour, form, appearance, etc. Could all these in course of time have become what they are from a single pair? And if they could, did they? I believe they *could*, because I believe that the bodily peculiarities of men are dependent on external circumstances, and, although I quite agree with Mr. Bradlaugh in saying, that type remains permanent *under its own climatic* conditions, I do not think it remains permanent under *varied* climatic conditions. It would be, of course, impossible for me now to enter into all the details of this subject and show, how altered circumstances have altered types; but I may as an illustration mention that the Turks dwelling in Europe and Western Asia differ widely from their countrymen in Eastern Asia, the former possessing the oval, and the latter the pyramidal skull. As regards colour, I do not see how there can be any doubt that it depends on climate. Will any one say that the dark hue of the native of the tropics has no relation to his tropical sun, has not been originally caused by it, in fact? That which has caused, may also alter, and *has*

* "Genesis," p. 27.

altered in many cases. Look at the various colours of the Jew. The original inhabitant of Palestine was doubtless dusky-skinned and dark haired: but the cooler sky and more temperate air of Poland and Germany have substituted a fair complexion and light hair. On the other hand, the scorching sun of India has curled and crisped his hair, and blackened his skin. On the Malabar coast of Hindostan, are two colonies of Jews—an old and a young colony—separated by colour. The elder colony are black, and the younger comparatively fair, so as to have obtained the name of the “White Jews.” And again the Siah-Pôsh, or race of Kaffirs, who inhabit the high region of Kohistan, are people of great beauty, with fair complexions. But in the plains and lowlands of the peninsula, the blackest men are seen, for there no check exists to the fierce heat of the sun. I might go on multiplying proofs, but these are sufficient for my present purpose. Indeed, when such an ethnologist as Dr. Pritchard maintains the power of physical conditions to alter type, I might be excused from entering into the subject, and decline all controversy on it till it be scientifically settled, one way or other.

The next question is, have we any indication that men *have* descended from one pair? I think we have, in the similarity of particular *traditions* among all people. If we find races, which are separated very widely, holding certain

traditions which cannot be thought the natural results of their own reflections, we may assume that they all derived them from some common source. Of these there are many. But a still surer evidence is that of *language*. In tracing up and classifying the various families, we observe that they become fewer, and are connected by fewer ties, until we reach three great divisions, Sanskrit, Hebrew, and Chinese. Minute and careful research has shown that the numerals, pronouns, and other essential elements of even these, possess a likeness which proclaims union, though interrupted by an early separation. Wide asunder as the Semitic and Indo-Germanic classes appear to be, hieroglyphical studies are filling up the gulph between them. Bunsen affirms, that the Egyptian language "clearly stands between the Semitic and Indo-Germanic, for its forms and roots, cannot be explained by either of them singly, but are evidently a combination of the two."* "All dialects," says the Petersburg Academy quoted by Dr. Hall, in his introduction to "Pickering's Races of Men," "are to be considered as the dialect of one now lost. It is the opinion of Klaproth, 'that the universal affinity of language is placed in so strong a light, that it must be considered by all as completely demonstrated.' Herder, who does not believe the the Mosiac record, admits 'that the human race, and language therewith, go back to one common stock,

* "Egypt's Place in the World's History" Preface x.

to a first man, and not to several dispersed in different parts of the world." But I must refrain, what I have said will show that Ethnology adds its testimony to the truthfulness of the Bible, when it tells us that, all men have come from one single pair.

Another objection is, that all minds which are brought into contact with the Bible do not receive it as Divine ; whereas had it been inspired by God, he would have made the evidence of its supernatural origin so manifest that all minds would have been compelled to believe it. I answer, is there any one fact that has been always believed in by all men ? One would think the evidence of the existence of a material world tolerably manifest. And yet this has been doubted by whole schools. One would think the evidence of the existence of our own minds not at all dubious, and yet this too has been doubted. What can be plainer than the fact that we ourselves are in being, still it is not evident enough to have commanded the assent of all men. Nay there have been men who have held that "they knew nothing, not even that they knew nothing." Can doubt further go ? It would really be very interesting to know, what must be the nature of the evidence exhibited, so as to compel the assent of *all* men.

I am very much afraid, however, that the rejection of the Bible does not, in all cases, arise so much

from want of evidence, as from want of will; that the rejection is frequently the result of a wrong spirit. When a critic chooses from several possible meanings, that one which tell most strongly against the Bible, and then argues from it, what are we to infer? Or when they reject its authority on some arbitrary speculative tests, there is an indication of want of sincerity. This is well shown in what is called the "Elohistic" controversy. It is assumed that the use of the two names, "Elohim" and "Jehovah," is owing, not to any internal peculiarity of the narrative, but to a diversity of persons in the narrator, and supplies the certain mark of two authors of different dates. It has been rightly said, by a recent writer, that "but for the fact that it was the sacred Scriptures that were subjected to such treatment, this criticism might be viewed on account of its very presumption, as a matter of critical pleasantry!" Yet with all this, such is the undoubting self-confidence of the critics, that, on these arbitrary grounds, they have divided the book of Genesis between their two or three supposed authors so minutely, as not only to have dislocated chapters, but to have divided verses, and even separated particular words from one sentence to add them conjecturally to another. The endless contrarieties of opinion that exist between these writers as to the conclusions of their own scheme, and the hopeless chaos of confusion which is the result, are so significant of the absolute uncertainty of all speculative criticism, as to deserve a further

brief illustration. Taking four masters of the higher criticism, Astruc, Eichhorn, Ilgen, and Gramberg, and comparing the results which they have separately arrived at, as to the book of Genesis, the result is that all four are agreed only as to the authorship of 93 verses out of the 1533 that compose the book, and there are only 330 on which any three of them are unanimous. It is difficult to find language adequate to express the vanity of such a criticism. No wonder the Bible is rejected, when such methods are adopted for examining its credentials.*

Another reason alleged for rejecting Scripture is on account of the various readings of the text which we find. Mr. Bradlaugh asks, "Tell me if it be true, as the Unitarians allege, there are 130,000 different readings of these four gospels? and, if so, do not some of the vital points of faith become affected by these 130,000 readings?"† I do not know the exact number of variations, nor do I much care to know; but this I do know, that they are as trivial as they are numerous, and not only do they not affect any vital point; they affect no doctrine whatever, important or unimportant. Michaelis spent thirty years labour on this subject. Dr. Kennicott spent ten years in examining 581 Hebrew manuscripts, and Professor Rossi collated 660 manu-

* See Boyle Lectures, for 1861, by Rev. E. Garbett, M.A.

† Matthias Discussion, p. 88.

scripts. We have also the researches of Mill, Bengel, Griesbach, and many others. But what does the learned rationalist, Eichhorn, himself acknowledge, that the different readings of the Hebrew manuscripts collated by Kennicott scarcely afforded enough interest to repay the labour bestowed on them.*

I will give the sceptic leave to take the most widely diverse readings, and place them instead of the received text, and I will accept it as my Bible.

We may, therefore, say in the words of Dr. Stanley, "The various readings which in the Koran were suppressed once for all by the Caliph Othman have broken out freely by thousands and thousands over the whole face of the Christian Scriptures—the stumbling blocks here and there of faithless disciples, *but the delight of the Christian scholar, the safeguards of Christian doctrine, the relics of Christian antiquity.*"†

It is further urged that "supernatural inspiration was unnecessary because we find in many heathen writers sayings as good as any in the gospels." I at once admit most gladly, that we do find some heathen men saying very fine and beautiful precepts. Such as Confucius, Plato, etc. Nor is this to be wondered at if we remember the origin of man, that he was made in the image of God. Indeed the wonder lies the other way, that more men have

* "Einleitung, 2, Th. S. 700.

† "The Bible" etc. p. 31.

not given utterance to sayings worthy their origin. Man no doubt has become very degenerate, corrupt, and sinful ; but still he cannot have so far lost *all* resemblance to his Divine Original, as nowhere, and in no case, to have anything good left within him. Still, at the best, these precepts, good as they are, were far more formal than real ; they were frequently mere oratorical flourishes, the results of some subtile speculation ; and scarcely understood by the speakers themselves. I am very glad to be able to agree with Mr. Bradlaugh sometimes, and I do most heartily in his praise of Confucius, and to show that it is not undeserved, I will give a quotation from him. “ He who shall be fully persuaded that the Lord of Heaven governs the universe, who shall in all things choose moderation, who shall perfectly know his own species, and so act among them, that his life and manners may conform to his knowledge of God and man, may be truly said to discharge all the duties of a sage, and to be far exalted above the common herd of the human race.” * All this is very beautiful, but it is wholly devoid of power. If all that men required to know was, that to do just was just, and to be moderate was better than to be immoderate, it would have answered admirably. But, as we shall see presently, they wanted more than this ; and because fine utterances could not supply it, heathen philosophers and sages produced

* Work of Sir William Jones, vol. i. p. 107.

no lasting or practical moral influence on their age or country.

There is another objection closely allied to this, which is, "that the heathen had many Christian traditions prior to the Christian era;" and especially, that in most mythologies there are traditions of the incarnation of God. The inference is, that the Christian mythology is on a par with all the others, that is, that it is false. There are such traditions undoubtedly, very distorted and very puerile many of them are, but still they exist. I thank Mr. Bradlaugh for calling my attention to them, as I believe they will prove most useful allies. Suppose then, that we go into many countries and find the people holding a belief that God became man and dwelt on earth, you can account for it only in one of two ways. Either, it must be a feeling so natural to the mind as to be everywhere present; or else it must have descended from some one original source. The very name "tradition" seems to me to settle the point, for tradition is something handed down from father to son, not something that can be discovered by every mind for itself. And I would ask, is the incarnation a likely thought to arise generally in the mind? Far from it. I cannot imagine a more unlikely. We must then adopt the second explanation, that of a common source. Receive the book of Genesis and all is clear, reject it and all is inextricable confusion. As the presence of false coin shows the presence of real,

so the traditions of false incarnations, show the reality of a true one.

I must, however, confess my surprise at Mr. Bradlaugh turning to the works of Sir W. Jones, as he so often does, for any confirmation of his views ; and, whose words he has mis-quoted, perhaps accidentally, but on an important point. The quotation is "that a connection existed between the old idolatrous nations of Egypt, Greece, India, and Italy, long before the birth of Moses." * The words of Sir W. Jones, are "I am persuaded that a connection subsisted between the old idolatrous nations of Egypt, India, Greece, and Italy, *long before they migrated to their several settlements ; and consequently before* the birth of Moses." The words in italics are those omitted by Mr. Bradlaugh, and they at once show where the tradition of the incarnation came from, that these nations were together "before they migrated," and as they separated they of course carried their traditions with them. .

But Sir W. Jones adds presently "Still less can the adamantine pillars of our Christian faith be moved by the result of any debates on the comparative antiquity of the *Hindus* and *Egyptians*, or of any inquiries into the *Indian* Theology." He then gives the tradition of Chrishna, of which Mr.

* Rutherford Debate, p. 23.

Bradlaugh makes so much. It is as follows :—He was educated among Herdsmen “and passed his youth in playing with a party of milkmaids ; a tyrant, at the time of his birth, ordered all new born babes to be slain, yet this wonderful babe was preserved by biting the breast, instead of sucking the poisoned nipple, of a nurse commissioned to kill him ; he performed amazing, but ridiculous miracles in his infancy, and at the age of seven years, held up a mountain on the tip of his little finger ; he saved multitudes partly by his arms, and partly by his miraculous powers ; he raised the dead by descending for that purpose to the lowest regions ; he was the meekest and best tempered of beings ; washed the feet of the *Brahmins*, and preached very nobly, indeed, and sublimely, but always in their favour ; he was pure and chaste in reality, but exhibited an appearance of excessive libertinism, and had wives and mistresses too numerous to be counted ; lastly, he was benevolent and tender, yet fomented and conducted a terrible war.” Mr. Bradlaugh asks, referring to the story of Christ, “is there not a parallel here ? Is there not a striking similarity of outline ?” The one played with a party of milkmaids, performed ridiculous miracles, preached in favour of the authorities, had mistresses too numerous to be counted, and conducted a terrible war. The other—but I forbear. Sir W. Jones accounts for this by saying, “This motley story must induce an opinion that the spurious Gospels which abounded

in the first age of Christianity, had been brought to India, and the wildest part of them repeated to the *Hindus*, who ingrafted them on the old fable of *Cesava*, the *Apollo* of Greece." Oh, Mr. Bradlaugh, how vainly you labour to make the worse appear the better cause !

The Chronology of the Bible is another point attacked. It is asserted that the Egyptian researches of Bunsen and Lepsius, carry men back to a period long prior to the Adamic era. Now although modern research should overturn a system of chronology added to the Bible, it would not therefore overturn the authority of Moses ; unless indeed, it carried it so far back that it would not be possible naturally to reconcile it with Biblical records. So far, literally nothing has been discovered to disturb in the slightest degree the "orthodox" chronology. I will give Mr. Bradlaugh's words first and then examine them. "Baron Bunsen claims an authority for the human race of at least 20,000 years prior to the Christian era, and traces in Egypt a double empire of hereditary kings to 5,413 B.C., (that is, to near 1,000 years prior to the time of Adam.) Before these he discovers elective kings reaching back to 7230 B.C. Prior to these, Priest kings, the first of whom (Bytis the Theban,) ascended the throne B.C. 9085. Farther back still does Bunsen trace the Egyptian peoples by the aid of their pyramids, their obelisks, their stone records, rescued from the sand

ocean, which for centuries had hidden them from human gaze." Certainly there is no reconciling this with Moses, so far as I can see ; nor is it necessary to make the attempt, as the whole is what may be called a chronological dream. There are three ancient historians of Egypt, Herodotus, Diodorus, and Manetho ; the history of the first is irreconcilable with that of the second, and the few fragments of Manetho's narrative are flatly contradicted by both. It is not even agreed who was the first human king ; some say Menes, and some Sesostris. It is stated by Manetho, Bunsen's great authority, that before this time Egypt was ruled by gods, demi-gods, or heroes, and Manes for a period of 25,000 years. These we may pass unnoticed. The accession of Manes, even Bunsen places only four centuries before the Septuagint date of the flood. But what is the basis of the whole system ? A single passage in Syncellus. And, by a series of perfectly arbitrary additions of years in one place, and subtractions of them in another, Bunsen succeeds to his own satisfaction in reconciling the dynasties of Manetho, with a list of Theban kings preserved by Eratosthenes, which was necessary before he could proceed. But where did Syncellus get this important date ? For there were two Manethos ; the true one, the native historian of Egypt ; and a false one usually called Pseudo-Manetho, who usurped the historian's name as a passport for his imposture. There is no evidence that Syncellus

had ever seen the fragments of the true Manetho, but rather the contrary. Even Bunsen admits that, Syncellus in *every other instance*, quotes the *false* Manetho alone, even when his statements contradict those of the genuine author. And internal evidence shows that the statement on which he relies is, like all the rest, from the wrong man, and erroneous. I hope I shall not be thought too fastidious if I decline receiving a chronology on so false a basis.

But Mr. Bradlaugh takes us from Egypt to China and says, "although I admit at once that the Chinese claim a much greater antiquity than I should be inclined to concede, because I cannot follow them in their calculations—yet, why should not the Chinese priests be as true as ours, when they claim an existence for several hundred thousand years?" * Why not? Although he cannot follow their calculations, they are no doubt as trustworthy as Christians who give detailed history for the whole period; a history moreover confirmed by the stony records of many countries! *Chinese chronology for several hundred thousand years back possibly as true as Christian!!* What will be said next? Once more I turn to Sir W. Jones for some information on this point. "In the twelfth century before our era, the *Chinese empire* was at

* Matthias Debate, p. 166.

least in its cradle. This fact it is necessary to prove, and my first witness is *Confucius* himself." "It was not till the eighth century before the birth of our Saviour, that a small kingdom was erected in the province of *Shen-si*." * I think I may now pass on from chronological difficulties.

Those next in order are of a historic nature. It is said that there are many discrepancies between separate Scripture narratives, and between some of these narratives and profane history; which could not be if the whole were Divinely inspired. I acknowledge that there are many *apparently* discordant accounts, but I do not think they are really so; they appear so to us for several reasons. We are often ignorant of *all* the circumstances of the case; the recital being in most cases very brief, only the more important points are related. Discrepancy is not contradiction, it may simply be the result of suppression or divergence of detail, which a fuller information would reconcile. I cannot of course enter here into all the separate cases of discrepancy which have been brought forward; I can, at most, only give a few illustrations of principles.

I, one evening, as I was leaving a house in company with a friend, picked up a sixpence by the light of the moon; we had about two miles to walk before

* Works, vol. i. p. 100.

we arrived at home. I might have written an account of my walk, stating that the moon was shining very brightly as we started. My friend might have written, stating that she was just rising as we entered our home. Now here, many would say, was a manifest contradiction, one said that the moon was up at the beginning of the walk, and the other said she was not up till the end of it; the explanation being that, as we returned home, we came under the shade of a hill that caused the moon to disappear for a time. A good illustration of this principle is related by Dr. Lee. "On the evening of Sept. 5, 1839, a rumour prevailed at Zurich, that an attack was to be apprehended from an armed force. The greatest commotion was excited, and a body of men was drawn together in the district of Pfäffikon, to repel the attack, the rumour was soon found to be without any foundation, and means were taken by the government to allay the popular tumult. On subsequently enquiring as to these events, Ebrard was informed by one person that the government despatched N., one of their number, at a late hour, with a letter to Pfäffikon. On another occasion Ebrard was told by a second informant, that N. after going a short distance, returned with the intelligence that the tocsin was already ringing in Pfäffikon. A third related that two persons on horseback had been dispatched; while a fourth averred that N., had sent his messengers on horse-

back to the disturbed district. If ever four accounts appeared irreconcilable, these did so. And if a harmonist were to conjecture that N. had been sent to Pfäffikon, that he had been met on the Zurichberg by two peasants coming from that place, with the intelligence that the people were already on the march ; that he had returned with them to Zurich, and entering the neighbouring house of a magistrate, had caused two horses to be at once saddled, and commanded the peasants to ride back in haste to proclaim peace ; all this would, no doubt, be set down as a highly improbable and artificial conjecture, and yet it is no conjecture, but the simple, true account which N. himself gave me when I asked him about that event."

Another illustration of apparent errors being explained by further information is found in Genesis x. 8, 10. "And Cush begat Nimrod ; and the beginning of his kingdom was Babel, and Erech, and Accad, and Calneh, in the land of Shinar." Many ethnologists believed this to be altogether erroneous, for they thought these were Arameans, sprung from Shem and not from Ham, the father of Cush. Indeed so strong were the arguments against the Bible supposed to be, that any attempt to maintain its truthfulness was ridiculed. Recent discoveries, however, have proved the Bible right, and ethnologists wrong. The mounds of Chaldea

having been explored, it is shown by inscriptions which have been discovered, that the language of ancient Babylon was not the language of the times of Nebuchadnezzar, but belonged to a different family, and this, Cushite or Ethiopian. Another instance of the same kind is the date of the birth of Christ. Mr. Bradlaugh says, "while Matthew states it occurred during the reign of Herod, if Luke's assertions are reliable, it took place *after* Herod's death!" Luke's assertions are reliable, and yet it took place during the reign of Herod. The difficulty has arisen from the statement by Luke that "this taxing was first made when Cyrenius was governor of Syria." It was, until recently, supposed that Cyrenius (Quirinus) was not governor of Syria till after the banishment of Archelaus, who succeeded Herod his father. This no doubt was a great difficulty; but A. W. Zumpt, of Berlin, has shown that Archelaus was governor of Syria, *twice*. The first time from B.C. 4., to B.C. 1., when he was succeeded by M. Lollius. Ignorance of the true state of the case caused rejection of the narrative, when correct knowledge would have caused acceptance. Another illustration of the same point, for it is a most important one, and I shall finish. In Isaiah xxxix. 1., we read, "At that time Merodach-baladan, the son of Baladan, king of Babylon, sent letters and a present

* Rutherford's Discussion, p. 13.

to Hezekiah ; for he had heard that he had been sick, and was recovered." This statement has been said to be contradictory to profane history, because at that time there was no king of Babylon. It has been discovered however, that Berosus states, that Merodach-baladan was an usurper, who reigned at Babylon for six months, etc. But even this has been rejected by sceptics, who have said, that Eusebius, who preserved the fragment, was a Christian, that Gesenius was a Christian who recovered it, and that the existence of such a man as Berosus was dubious. But evidence still more convincing, if possible, of the truth of Scripture narrative has been found on the bulls of the palace of Kouyunjik, by Layard.

Speaking of the bulls discovered in the palace of Kouyunjik, Mr. Layard writes, "On the great bulls forming the centre portal of the grand entrance was one continuous inscription, injured in parts, but still so far preserved as to be legible almost throughout. It contained one hundred and fifty-two lines. On the four bulls of the facade were two inscriptions, one inscription being carried over each pair, and the two being of precisely the same import. These two distinct records contain the annals of six years of the reign of Sennacherib, besides numerous particulars connected with the religion of the Assyrians, their gods, their temples, and the erection of their palaces, all of the highest interest and importance." * It is here recorded "that in the first year

* Second Expedition to Nineveh, &c., p. 138.

of his reign he defeated Merodach-baladan." It should also be remembered that when Mr. Layard translated the inscriptions he was not aware of the fragment from Berosus.

Yes, the Merodach-baladan, whose existence was supposed to be a dream ; whose name was affirmed to be an indelible blot upon the Scriptures, that proved them unauthentic ; whose deeds were too insignificant to appear in the annals of his own country, had yet his name recorded on the walls of his conqueror ; and its stones have been faithful to their trust, and preserved, down to the present age, this unmistakable evidence that the Holy Scriptures are correct, even when they appear to contradict themselves.*

Having now examined, as fully as my time permits, the principles of the leading objections against the Bible, I will pass to the more agreeable duty of stating a very few of the evidences in its favour. To state them all would require a volume, rather than the latter end of a pamphlet. I can, therefore, only indicate what they are, in their broad features. I cannot lay before you all their detail. We

* Those who wish to see these alleged errors examined, and explained in detail are referred to Dr. Baylee's "Introduction to the Study of the Bible," vol. iii. Gaussen's, "It is written." Rev. T. R. Birks', "Bible and Modern Thought," They have been so frequently and so unanswerably explained that it seems almost needless to refer to them.

have then, in the first place, to ask, would any amount of evidence be sufficient, morally, to convince a man, that a certain book, professing to be Divinely inspired, was in truth what it professed to be? I do not see how we can hesitate to reply in the affirmative. Our opponents themselves acknowledge this, when they argue that the evidence in its favour is not *sufficient*; for this involves the supposition that a greater amount would have been enough for the purpose. What amount, therefore, are we entitled to expect before we yield our consent, and agree to receive it as the Word of God? It should, in the first place, be *distinctively* characteristic of its Author. Or it should have its origin demonstrated by external signs. This latter point I must omit from present consideration, and confine my attention to its internal evidence. I choose this, rather than the evidence afforded by fulfilled prophecy and miracles, because I think it more intimately related to our own feelings. The Bible is characteristic of God in the fact that, its revelation of his character confirms what man's reason has supposed it should be; and those peculiarities which have been unknown till revealed, commend themselves to his most highly cultivated intellect. It is also characteristic of its Author, inasmuch as it is always in advance of man; no matter how great his progress in mental acquirements, he finds this book before him. But it is specially characteristic of him in that, it meets wants in human nature, which never have been met by any other means.

What are these wants ? A longing by man to know whence he came, what he is, and whither he is going. Without it he is a puzzle, an enigma, and perplexing mystery to himself. He feels within himself a dignity surpassing all earthly honors ; he feels that he can soar, in imagination, through the starry fields of space ; he knows that he can create glorious combinations of thought, and hold commune with the Infinite himself. And yet, he also feels that with all this he is little, mean, and sordid ; that for an hour's gratification he can degrade his noblest powers ; that for the sake of gold he can lower himself to the degradation of dishonesty. He feels sometimes almost inclined to worship himself as a god ; and then to despise himself as a devil. How these things can be, he wants to know. Again, he is somehow impelled, by a kind of instinct, to worship some unknown Being. He cannot tell who, or what, or where this Being is ; all he can tell is that, in certain circumstances, he is forced to cry with Shelley, "O Great Being, O Great Being." He wants to know who he is, and what ? Looking within himself he is strangely uneasy after many of his acts ; he feels he has done wrong and is afraid of some unknown evil happening him. Could he only be informed exactly about the nature of the evil impending, he would nerve himself to bear it ; but the suspense in ignorance is intolerable, and so he strives to expiate his offence by bodily torture. He wants to know how he is to be at peace with

himself again. He is also conscious of an ever-restless longing that stretches away into the future, desiring something more than it has, reaching out for,—he knows not what. He looks at the grave, and will not believe that the longings are to be quenched there ; and so he invents a heaven for hereafter. He wants to know of what sort that hereafter is to be. Who, or what can answer these, and a thousand other similar enquiries ? Will nature shed her light on the darkness of the soul, and make manifest the story of his being ? Will the voices of the rocks, the roar of the ocean, the ripple of the stream, or the song of birds, speak to him and tell him of his history ? Will the countless harmonies of the material world speak peace to his conscience, and tell him how he is to be at harmony with self. Alas ! they never have done so. Where nature is brightest, her sunshine most unclouded, her tints most brilliant, her treasures most abundant, and her riches most lavishly poured into the lap of man ; there man is darkest and most benighted. Listen to the cry of the votary who is throwing himself to be crushed beneath the car of his idol ; hear the wail of the old man who is left to perish by the banks of the Ganges ; witness the licentious superstitions of India ; the cannibalism of tropical islands ; the savagery of savagedom ; if you would know what nature, unaided, can do for her devotees. She can, and does teach much, but the want of the heart, the aspirations of the soul, are beyond her grasp. Phil-

osophy, even in its highest, purest forms, never met the deeper needs of men. As we study the bewildered speculations of the ancients, we are like men in possession of a riddle, listening to the attempts of others who try to solve it. With infinite pains they kindle a light, and then demand applause for putting it under a bushel. It is to the praise of Zeno and Epicurus that they attempted to apply philosophy to life. But their endeavour was a failure. The ideal of either was alike fantastical and impracticable; for on either side a suicide of half our nature was required. Many disciples went over from one to the other *blasé* with pleasure, and wretched with *ennui*, as French gentlemen, tired of gaiety, turned, with their aching remnant of a heart, from Voltaire to St. Francis de Sales, for penance and austerity.

Revelation, therefore, of some kind is a *necessity*. Without it there would be a distinct vacancy in the scheme of knowledge. There would be a universal preparation for it, and yet that itself should be wanting. There would be man with power to comprehend, with desire to know, with impulse to receive; and there would be God with power to communicate, but not doing it. In a word, leaving his own creation with a huge blot in it, and that blot uninstructed, uncompleted, miserable man. Without a revelation, reason is a curse and not a blessing, it knows nothing, relatively worth knowing. But a revelation is professedly given—does it supply the

deficiency, and respond to the universal cry of humanity for more light? Yes, it solves the problem of the universe, by substantiating a real existence beyond and independent of our own thoughts and consciousness, an existence that would still exist were all finite mind and thought obliterated. It tells man the cause of the conflict between good and evil within him, when it tells him of the holiness of his first estate, and the pernicious effects of his fall. It speaks peace to his conscience, when it speaks to him of the atonement, by which his sins may be forgiven. It casts a light into the gloom of the tomb, when it recounts to him the glories of the resurrection of the blessed. It satisfies, more than satisfies, the yearnings, the aspirings of his spirit; when it opens to his gaze the gates of heaven, and points him to the state in which he may live happily for ever. And all this it does in perfect conformity with the whole nature of man. It addresses not itself to one faculty or feeling, to the exclusion of the remainder. It appeals to his reason; not telling him to believe at the word of command or die, as did the soldier of the Crescent. "Come now and let us reason together, saith the Lord." His affections are won, by the insight he is given into the love of God; his heart is gained, by being shown the heart of his Redeemer. His conscience is, as I have said, pacified, and taught to judge rightly. And his will is, also appealed to. He is never treated as an

unintelligent machine, but always as a conscious, rational, and responsible being. Mankind also includes men of innumerable ranks, of differing powers of intellect, and living under almost every possible circumstance. To all these revelation is equally well adapted ; being as much at home in the palace as in the hovel, at the table of the philosopher, as in the hand of the peasant ; where wealth reigns, as where poverty cowers. To all, it has a message for welfare, for guidance ; sympathising with joy in the hour of joyousness, and sympathising with sorrow in the hour of sorrowfulness.

“ It has always found men everywhere polytheists and idolaters—with public morals at a very low, if not the lowest possible ebb,—and under the influence of narrow and selfish principles which have tended to set nation against nation, family against family, and man against man ; and everywhere and always the Bible, when allowed to exert its influence on the community, has gradually discredited polytheism, eradicated idolatry, elevated the tone of public morals, and diffused a spirit of philanthropy, the tendency of which is to unite mankind in a true and enduring fraternity. We assert this without the slightest hesitation. The fact is one which no man with the page of history before him can pretend to question. We have the detailed experiment of more than eighteen centuries to appeal to in support of it. During that extended period Christianity has been at work among the nations with the Bible in her hand. She has had to deal with peoples at every stage of progress, from the lowest grades of savageism to the highest reach of intellectual refinement. She has come in contact with men who seemed but a little removed from the brute, and with men whose genius and intellect have

borne them to the loftiest apex of human attainment. She has confronted all forms of religion, from the rude Fetishism of the negro or the wild Indian, to the massive idolatries of India and the refined and graceful mythologies of Greece and Rome. Her experience, therefore, has been ample and diversified, so that an induction may be made on solid grounds from the facts which she is able to supply. We ask, then, has Christianity ever yet found a nation with a religion better than her own? with more pure, spiritual, and, rational conceptions of the Deity than she teaches? with a holier and more elevating worship than she unfolds? with a higher tone of morals than she inculcates? with more of charity and philanthropy and brotherly kindness than she commends and inspires? Is it not notorious that, until she appeared, all men, with the exception of the Jews, were idolaters, deluded by the grossest superstitions, immersed in the vilest immorality, hateful and hating one another? Is not this the case still, with every nation that is destitute of Christianity? And is it not equally notorious that wherever she has come these great evils have been mitigated, and wherever she has got a firm footing they have gradually disappeared, some utterly, others in a degree proportioned to the extent in which her principles have been sincerely embraced?"

But nations are composed of individuals, and the national effect has been so great, because the individual effect has been great. Ask men, whose characters have been completely changed, whose most darling vices have been strangled, whose motives have been altogether altered, whose lives have been thoroughly amended, who have become, in a word, new men; ask them, I say, what has done it all, and they will tell you, it was the

Bible. Enter the dwellings of the poorer classes, and as surely as you find discomfort, disorder, wastefulness, the wife unwomanly, the husband unmanly, and the children unfilial, you may be sure in *all* cases that the Bible is, practically, there unknown. But enter a house the reverse of all this, and you may, in the vast majority of cases, expect to find it studied and practised. Cross a country, Ireland for example, and it needs no guide to tell you when you are in a Romish district, where the Bible is prohibited to the people ; and when you are in a Protestant one, where it is fully circulated. The squalor and ragged regiments of beggars in the former, and the neat farmsteads, well cultivated fields, and tidily dressed farmer, tell their own tale. This I assert to be not a coincidence, but an effect of Scriptural education. And, as I have already shown in the Lecture on "The Soul," when the last hour of all shall come, it is not philosophy, it is not the "poetry" of annihilation, it is not the belief that all in front is impenetrable darkness ; which can meet the wants of man in that hour. It is the word that reveals to him a Saviour ready to receive his spirit, and conduct it to its eternal home ; it is the word that enables him to say, "Yea, though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death, I will fear no evil ; for thou art with me ; thy rod and thy staff they comfort me."

But, it is not merely by studying the Bible, by analysing its contents, by critical acumen, that men can receive its benefits. The patient does not expect to recover by studying the components of his medicine, or by an accurate analysis of its constituents; but by taking it as his physician prescribed; and then having so taken it, and become conscious of its beneficial influence, he has obtained more faith in its efficacy, than could ever have been given to him by the united efforts of all the chemists in the world. And so it is with Christianity. The man who has trusted Christ as his Saviour, and *feels* the sanctifying influences of his Spirit, has an evidence within himself worth all the arguments that could be devised; powerful enough to gainsay all the cavils of all the sceptics. And the man who has not so trusted,—not having tried the Bible as its author has directed,—is not qualified to give any opinion whatever, as to its power over the soul of man.

Oh! I beseech you all to try it thus, try it by your hearts; receive it into them; cherish it; cling to it; as you value true happiness in this world; as you value true happiness in the next. Christ is waiting to be gracious; you have only to cry from out a sincere heart, "Lord save me, I perish," to feel his hand in yours, to be guided by him, from the treacherous quagmires of a conceited and fallacious scepticism, into the old paths of truth, in Christ,

and in God your Father. But if you will still persist in rejecting this heaven-sent light, and walking on in darkness, then I can only say, in the words of Christ himself, when praying for his crucifiers, "Father forgive them, for they know not what they do."



Lecture VI.

THE SPIRIT OF THE AGE, AND THE DUTIES OF ITS TEACHERS.

REV. G. G. LAWRENCE, M.A., IN THE CHAIR.

HUMANITY is an inter-connected whole. Soul sympathises with soul—thought with thought—feeling with feeling. Action and re-action permeate the social system. It is wholly impossible to separate a man from his fellows, so that he shall have no influence on them, or they on him. In this sense we are all one. As some mental states act on others,—aiding or hindering them ; so man acts on man—for weal or for woe—helping him up towards virtue, or dragging him down towards vice,—strengthening him in the battle of life, or robbing him of the courage he would else possess. In every age there are, there must be, influences at work ; some for good, some for evil ; if those for good be

most influential, then we say the spirit of that age is good ; but if those for evil have the pre-eminence, then we must hold its spirit to be an evil one. And whatever may be the prevailing nature of the superior power, such we assert is the nature the spirit possesses. It is manifestly important that men should know what is the spirit of the age in which they live, that, if good, they may lay themselves open to its action ; but that, if evil, they may fortify themselves against it. Such is my object in calling your attention to this subject at the present time, for the spirit of the present age is most distinctly marked, and is, on the whole, vitiating in its tendency. I say, on the whole, because there is much that is good and true,—much that is ennobling to the intellect,—much that is expanding to the sympathies,—much that is purifying to the heart,—energising in the minds of the present generation. But there is more that is exactly the reverse, nestling there ; and of this I would, in my present lecture, principally speak. I must also bear in mind, that this is one of a course of Anti-Secularist addresses, and will, therefore, view the subject more especially as it concerns what is called “Free-thought.” If I say anything displeasing to my audience, it will not be because I wish to offend, but because I must say that which I believe you ought to hear, whether you are pleased or not. My mission on this, or any other platform, is not that of a popular pleaser, but of a truthful teacher ; bear with me therefore, for I

trust, that if the words I speak be a little bitter to the ear, they will be sweet to the mind afterwards.

The basic character of the age, that from which others spring, and on which they rest their foundation, is its general materialism. I do not mean a theoretic materialism as opposed to spiritualism; but a practical, as exemplified in the love for good eating, good drinking, ostentatious display, costly dress, and exciting pleasures, that prevail at present. None of these things, however, can be had without money; and the greater the amount of that valuable commodity possessed by any individual, the more freely can he indulge in his selfish gratifications. The next downward step is, consequently, an idolatry of gold. Nor is this to be wondered at; if men are content to remain mere sensuous animals, nothing can be more natural. Such men see its almost magic power; they know that it can bring to their tables the costliest products of the sunny east, or of the ice-bound pole. They know that it can put in motion the energies of unnumbered servants, whose care shall be to supply their every want. They feel that they may buy with it an overwhelming majority of their fellow-men, aye and of women too. Thank God, not *all* may thus be bought; but far, far, too many. They see youth and beauty sacrifice itself, and all it should hold most dear, before the golden image. They know that mothers scheme to hurl their daughters to its devouring flames; while

those daughters are willing victims to its power. They see fathers send their sons where wealth may be won, regardless of the danger to all that is worth preserving—his heart. They know, by a large observation, that the man who has enough gold, be he vulgar boor, or vicious sensualist, is frequently a welcome guest, and honoured visitor; when, were he penniless, he would be kicked like a cur from the door. What is, what must be, the inevitable consequences of such a sad state of society as this? A headlong race for the talisman,—an eager and exciting race. How many are the runners, how few the spectators! Here one, and there one, men who dare to stand aloof, and are bold enough not to be ashamed of being “miserably poor;” men who are not regretful at exclusion from the crowd of ignoble sycophants; men who are not content to purchase the world’s ephemeral and hollow applause at the cost of all that is truest and noblest in human nature; self-respect, conscience, intellect, and holiness. It is, moreover, a race not confined to the capitalist, the merchant, or the manufacturer; it extends to the lowest worker in any of our mills. For, in many cases, the workman sees his master differ from himself in no one particular save wealth. They may be both equally illiterate, rough, and undeveloped. Both may equally have started life in the same capacity as servants; why then should not he, who is still the servant, become in turn a master? He sees no reason why, and so one thought is burned

into his brain, and burns out all others ; wealth at any cost, wealth at any sacrifice. With this one thought before him he toils, and saves, and scrapes, and denies himself for years and years ; fondly fancying that when he has obtained his mansion, his carriage, and his retinue, he will have obtained all his heart can wish, that he will then be content, and have left no void within himself. Poor man ! He knows not that, moth-like, he is hurrying on to that which may burn his wings, destroy his manhood, and let him fall to earth a scorched, a shrivelled, and a blasted thing. Poor man, he seems to forget that an ox in the field is a natural object ; but that, place it in a state carriage, it remains an ox still ; only, an ox ridiculous, which it was not before.

The next step is, that by this state of mind the thoughts are fixed on the present, to the entire exclusion of the future. It may be all very well to attend to the affairs of a future existence in the hour of sickness, or when there is leisure for it, which there is not in the very middle of the race. The runner fancies that if he only halt for a moment, some other will pass him, and win the prize instead. Eternity being thus shut from view, is practically lost to memory, and becomes to man as though it were not. This life and its concerns are his alpha and his omega, his all in all. Everything is, consequently, viewed from a practical point of

view, that is from a monetary point of view. What the Germans call the "bread and butter sciences" are the favourites. No matter how elevating any particular study may be to the mind, unless it will promise an equivalent for the time spent on it, in the form of loaves, coals or shoes, it is snubbed as something fit only for visionaries or dreamers. Men pride themselves on being, what they term, practical men; or, in other words, they adopt the thoughts of scientific students, who have lived in other years, and who, through pure love of science as such, have searched out many secrets of nature, and given them to the world. Our modern money-monger coolly, and without one word of gratitude or acknowledgement, seizes the facts so discovered, turns them to his own profit, and sneers at the discoverer. What is it worth? What will it bring? What is its use? are the invariable questions asked about any study that may be brought to the notice of these most intelligent individuals. Such beings have no leisure hour for calm and quiet thought about themselves. There is no searching of the depths of self; no communings with their own spirits; no retirement for a little while, from the strife of men, that they may look themselves fairly in the face, and ask themselves, how do I stand as a human being destined for immortality, with regard to my own mental, moral, and spiritual character? What *am* I at the present hour? How am I developing all that is eternal within me? Ah no—the man is afraid of

looking honestly into the depths of his own soul, and so he plunges deeper and deeper into the mire of his mere practical (?) traffic, and lives a coward in his own esteem. Sometimes, perhaps in a moment of forgetfulness, his better nature may get the mastery over him, and carry his thoughts far away, but so soon as he becomes conscious of the indiscretion, he says to them—

Return my thoughts, come home
Ye wild and winged ! what do ye o'er the deep,
And wherefore thus the abyss of time o'ersweep
As birds the ocean foam.

Return my thoughts return,
Cares wait your presence in life's daily track,
And voices, not of music, call you back,
Harsh voices cold and stern.

Rather, if you would not sink from the man to the thing, from a nature given in the image of the Creator, to a nature closely resembling that of the brute, say to your thoughts instead—

Oh no return ye not,
Still farther, loftier, let your soarings be ;
Go bring me strength from journeyings bright and free,
O'er many a haunted spot.

Go seek the martyr's grave
'Midst the old mountains and the deserts vast ;
Or through the ruin'd cities of the past,
Follow the wise and brave.

Go shoot the gulph of death,
Track the pure spirit where no chains can bind
Where the heart's boundless love its rest may find,
Where the storm sends no breath !

Higher and yet more high
Shake off the cumbering chains which earth would lay
On your victorious wings,—mount, mount,
Your way is through eternity.

The practical materialism of the age also strengthens itself in the slight education given to many of our youth, and the irreligious education given to more. Traders keep their sons but a short time at school, because, unless they begin their business early, they are not supposed to become good business men ; and so, as soon as reading, writing, arithmetic etc., are fairly known, out of the school-room and into the counting-house with them. The master has not time given him in which to train the intellect to correct habits of thought, to impart any sound and lasting information ; or to educate the will so as to make it the master of passions or desires, rather than their servant. Religion also is politely ignored, as a something to be bowed to and then passed by. True, in most schools, a chapter may be read, and a few words, miscalled prayer, hurried over ; before the real business of the day begins. All this, the master knows, is the parents' wish, and he acts accordingly. The pupils are thus practically taught that religion is but, at best, an appendage to their little bit of education. A kind of safe ornament to

the building, that may help its appearance to the eye ; but is of no value so far as its stability is concerned. They see the earnestness with which all secular subjects are treated, and contrast it with the listlessness with which religion is treated, and thus learn most surely, a lesson of practical scepticism ; or rather, of positive indifference to all theological beliefs, and all theological creeds. The school-boy having become the man, attends his place of worship, no doubt with exemplary regularity, and preserves a becomingly solemn expression of countenance while there ; but the natural result of his past training is, that the truths enunciated have the same interest for him, as they would have if they referred to the mental states of a supposed man in the moon. He has become a perfect formalist, and cares for none of the things that concern his eternal welfare. All this does very well, and leaves him very comfortable,—for a time. But he presently finds out that it is not safe to leave the mind a blank on religious subjects. It may be aroused by some stirring appeal, by some personal danger, or by some domestic bereavement ; and then it asserts its right and claims some belief of some kind. The man now finds out that he must have some creed, that it is a necessity of his very nature. But which creed is he to adopt, for there are many ? If he take the Bible it will reprove him for his past sins, and selfishness, and Godlessness ; it will tell him that if he is to be a Christian man, he must be an honest man, a virtuous man ; that expediency cannot over-

rule right ; that while he should be diligent in business, he must be also fervent in spirit, serving the Lord. Now all this is calculated to make him feel rather uncomfortable, for he dearly loves his gains, and his old but scarcely honourable methods of obtaining them. He feels, therefore, that he would like to disbelieve the Bible if he could, and be once more, as he fancies, at peace with himself again. And now, perhaps, Secularism comes to claim his allegiance, telling him that it is all folly to let his conscience trouble him, for he has no such thing ; telling him that a lie is as justifiable as truth, if it be only political to tell it ; telling him that he may cheat, steal, drink, murder, do anything, in a word, which foolish men call devilish, and be all the while as blameless as though he had done exactly the reverse of all these things. At first, his instinctive convictions of right and wrong recoil in horror from such a diabolical system, but then he looks at it askance, and then gradually becomes more tolerant of it, and ends by embracing it, because it exactly suits his inclinations. It may be objected here, that we must believe according to the evidence, that we cannot will to believe any particular statement. This is true, and yet we can by the exercise of the will, bring ourselves to believe what we wish to believe. The will acts on the attention, causing us to attend to certain states of mind, rather than to others ; it also determines the succession of our thoughts, so as to introduce one train in preference to another.

If I wish to believe that Napoleon was a good man, I can fasten my attention on those acts of his life that seem to favour my desire ; and so, by the mental law of association of ideas, all the good is suggested, but not the evil of his life. Man may, in this way, bring himself to believe almost anything he wishes to believe ; this belief, when erroneous, is consequently, the result of the want of a right will, and not the want of sufficient evidence. We have an illustration of this influence of the will in the unfairness with which the Bible is treated. No other book has been ever subjected to the same absurd criticism. No matter how circumstantial the details of any event, or how corroborated by other writers, or by monumental evidence ; all is set aside by some passing remark, or slight suggestion by a profane writer. Nothing more is required to show the animus of Secularism than the paltry and disingenuous character of its Bible criticisms. Again, all other books are viewed from their own stand-point ; a poetical work from a poetical point of view, an historical work from an historical point of view ; but not so with the Bible, it must be treated in all its details as an ordinary volume ; and from a point of view not its own, it is judged, and, of course, wrongly judged.

I do not think that, in all cases, men are conscious of having their thoughts and feelings thus warped and biassed by desire ; there are, no doubt,

many instances where the influence is like an under current, flowing steadily but unfelt, because the mind in which it exists has never been honestly probed by its owner. But there are others where even the largest charity can hardly bring itself to feel that the men are thoroughly sincere in all they say. When we read the vulgar profanity, the ribald blasphemy, and stale objections poured forth in one vile torrent by such men as Mr. Bradlaugh, we can only hope, against hope, that they are not utterly depraved, but that by some mental hallucination they are incapable of seeing the folly of their statements. In justice, however, to Mr. Bradlaugh and his school, we must remember that, did he, or any of his followers, stand forth to say that which they knew was a deliberate lie, they would hold themselves perfectly justified, inasmuch as their action was necessitated, and they owe no responsibility to any one, so that they would contend we had no right to find fault with them.

Another characteristic of the present age is the great diffusion of literature by means of Mechanics' Institutions, cheap printing, free libraries, etc. If men can read at all, there is no difficulty in obtaining books. But this very fact becomes too frequently a great evil. The desire for information is kindled, a new world appears to be opening before the reader, facts are revealed to him of which he had previously no conception. There are book-shelves stored with standard works, and he wants to know something

about them all ; he is, however, without control over himself ; he cannot be content to plod quietly and slowly up the steep and rugged paths of learning. He knows not that he is the wise man who is content to remain ignorant of many things. Subject after subject is rapidly skimmed, now it is astronomy, and now geology, and now history, and now "The Woman in White." There is a wholesale dash over everything, a correct knowledge of nothing. There has not been any digesting of ideas, no amalgamation of the thoughts of other men with his own thoughts. All is superficial, foggy, and indistinct. How few men are there who will spend weeks and months, not over a few works, but over a few ideas. In former times, when works were fewer, men were more masters of their contents, they had less surface to traverse, but what they did traverse was familiar to them, every inch. As for many of the working classes, the way in which they gallop over bulky volumes, would be laughable were it not lamentable. I will, however, do them the justice to say that they take out from the libraries, generally, more sensible books than their masters ; also their reading (I speak of what is called the *élite* of the artisans) is frequently of a more solid sort. I account for this by the supposition that the master takes his cares home with him, and has to think of markets, prices, etc., even at his own fireside ; while the servant leaves his cares behind him, and can give all his thoughts to any subject he cares for.

We can never say we *know* a book, till we are able to close our eyes and look at it mentally, see it all, as it were, before us ; or be able to write out the pith of all its pages. This, however, requires so much time, trouble, and study, that men will not check their headlong speed, but go on learning ever, and never learned. All this, of course, applies only to those writings which are worth being mastered. For there is no denying the fact, that the reading of the overwhelming majority is confined to the literature most appropriately called "light literature." There are few sadder facts relating to the morality of society in the present day, than the character of the volumes found too frequently in the hands of its members. Would-be moral young ladies devouring tales filled with immoralities,—would-be modest young ladies greedily drinking in stories saturated with every vice, whose name a woman should loathe ; stories she would hurl into the fire with indignation, were she half as womanly as she pretends to be. As, however, there is no pretence to knowledge, on the part of the ladies and gentlemen who spend their time on such debauching rubbish, I may pass it without further comment. But I feel myself justified in saying that the English people, as a whole, and perhaps especially the manufacturing and artisan portion are intensely ignorant, or intensely superficial. I know there are very honourable exceptions in all classes, those whose minds are cultivated, and whose converse is an intellectual

treat ; but still I hold such are the exceptions and not the rule. The demand for "popular" everything, combining "instruction with amusement," has had a very marked influence on the writers of books, as well as on their readers. While there still remain some few authors of repute and power, giants in the midst of the surrounding pigmies ; the greater number of authors are mere caterers for public taste. Certain capitalists embark in a literary commerce, and watch the market ; the authors are but their workmen, receiving their orders, and producing the required article according to pattern. Authorship is thus made a mere profession, a man writes, not because he has anything to say, but because it is a respectable way of earning his bread. Hundreds, perhaps thousands of persons, who before would have distributed themselves through other professions, now flock to this, and write to order, the quantity and quality being such as will suit expected customers. Individuality is thus almost annihilated, ambition dwarfed, for such writers have no hope of living in their works ; and the whole stock of their productions is respectable mediocrity. Again, I exclude many of the most popular novels of the present day, whose writers are powerful enough to be independent of publishers, and unscrupulous enough to be independent of all morality, and of all decency. Literature conducted on such principles cannot be expected to do much towards developing deep thought, or imparting accurate detailed informa-

tion. Thinking clearly and closely is hard work, from which men shrink ; they prefer having a few leading facts daintily dressed up, which they can readily and easily absorb, and which require no digestion. That masculine grasp of a subject, in all its details and results, which marks the profound student, is now but seldom found. Readers have no taste for it, and consequently they are not troubled with books requiring it. The average number of our "Epitomes," and "First Principles," and "Popular Expositions," would be useful if used only as elementary foundations, but they become very pernicious when they lead to the supposition, that their perusal has made the reader acquainted with the sciences of which they treat. The smattering so obtained has produced, as it must ever produce, a very large amount of mental *conceit*. A varied and extensive information must produce true humility, because it shows how very little is as yet known of all that may be known ; because it tells mostly, of other men whose knowledge was far fuller than our own. But a little learning is a dangerous thing ; its vision is so very circumscribed, that all within the little area is supposed to be fully mastered. The intellectual baby has actually learned the first four letters of the alphabet, and fancies himself very clever, because yesterday he knew only three.

The superficiality of the age has, consequently, given birth to the mental vanity of the age, which

is shown in a variety of ways. Firstly, by depreciating all minds that differ from itself, by sneering at the productions of earnest, grave, and thoughtful men. By contemptuous expressions at all that is beyond its own little modicum of brain-power to comprehend. Whenever we see a young gentleman strut along the street, swinging his small cane, and cutting most fantastic antics so as to impress the people with a notion of his importance ; we may be quite sure that he is very uncertain himself about his own dignity, or he would be quieter in the display of it. The man who is certain of the possession of position, dignity, or power, is content without a continual and ridiculous self-assertion. In like manner all the *me-ism* of the present day is a sure sign of mental weakness, and of want of culture. There are, I grant, strong temptations to deny everything that everybody has written, especially every orthodox body. There could not be an easier way of being thought clever by the empty-headed companions of such empty-headed fops. Between the puffs of a cigar, our beardless and bejewelled youth will pooh-pooh, as fit only for women, the thoughts of the world's greatest minds. They know too much of the world to believe such ancient rubbish as their fathers thought true and noble ! Poor lads, our wish for them must be, that they may soon come to years of discretion ; and desire rather to *be* clever, than to be *thought* clever. And among our working classes the same vanity is even more dis-

tinently manifested ; nothing can well exceed the artisans' self-conceit and dogmatism at present. Witness the following from the *National Reformer*. A working man has written several letters to statesmen, in one to Lord Shaftesbury, he says "A working man myself, with but little time to spare for any public duties, I pen these lines with little care and much haste. What leisure, however, I have, I feel a pleasure in devoting to the overthrow of superstition." What a very intelligent workman this must be, who, with a necessarily defective education, can pen letters worthy of a statesman's attention ; and that so easily that they are dashed off with "little care and much haste." Would he only pen them with much care and little haste, what marvels they would be ! He is also about to overthrow the learning, the talent, the genius of nineteen centuries. What a Thomson, an Ellicot, a Stanley, a Candlish ; what, in a word, the scholars of England believe to be truth, is to be overturned, single handed, by this modern Samson. Can empty conceit become more conceited ? We would fain believe such a mental hallucination to be confined to this one poor man ; but if we may believe his words concerning his fellow-workmen, many seem to be in a similar plight. He says "It is such an unusual occurrence to meet with an intelligent handicraftsman who really believes in what is called the 'Gospel,' that it is really worth one's while to stand aside and attentively regard him." Again, he says, "For the last

thirty years I have been in the habit of mixing with working men in manufactories, mills, or committees, and at public meetings, and I unhesitatingly declare that ninety-nine out of every hundred of the *élite* among them have been men whose very intelligence has led them to reject "the gospel. I wonder if working men know when they are insulted, for certainly the above paragraph is an insult, if ever there were one. To say that the intelligence of working men is, or could be, superior to that of men whose whole lives have been spent in study, and in developing their intelligence, is simply absurd. I know I should consider it a deep affront, were a man seriously to tell me that I knew better how to dispose of an army in the field, or how better to manage a fleet than did all the generals or admirals of our country; and yet our working classes hear and read such fulsome bombast with the utmost self-complacency, as though it could, by any possibility, be true. But the fact is, that they have been so dosed with this pernicious stuff by demagogues, and leaders of all sorts, for their own purposes, that they really cannot tell when they are made ridiculous. They will, consequently, deliver the most dogmatic opinions upon the most abstruse points, as though they knew something about them. I have the utmost respect for the artisan who does his best to educate himself, and who spends his spare moments in making himself a nobler man; and such I would help forward by every means in my power. But the conceited ignoramus—

who will *condescend* to hear your opinion, and then say "it's not so," without power to assign a reason for the assertion ; who will talk as though he knew everything, knowing nothing ;—deserves no quarter, nor is it right to give it him, for so long as he thinks that he knows as much as anyone else, there is little stimulus to improvement. The calm, earnest, sincere searcher for truth demands every consideration, every kindness that can be shown him ; and should be met by reason, and by argument, and not by dogmatism or denunciation. But the self-sufficient egotist merits only chastisement.

This mental conceit manifests itself in a loudly expressed contempt for all the influences, and teachings that have descended to us from the past. In the words of Dr. Vaughan, I may say that there are many among us who talk of the past as though nothing, or next to nothing, had been derived to us from it. In the view of these persons, our own age stands wholly independent of all preceding ages. It does not seem to be suspected that the present, in at least some nineteen-twentieths of what it includes, is really the creation of the past. Civilisation is of slow growth. It has required the labour and enterprise of eighteen centuries to place these independent speculators in the condition in which they were born. In spite of themselves, their outward allotment and their very habits of thought, have come to them not as something self-originated, but as something in-

herited. Quarrel with this dependence as they may, they do owe it to their civilized progenitors that they are not themselves savages. Now, I must be allowed to say, that in the language of contempt in reference to the past, to which we are sometimes compelled to listen, there is, I believe, something more censurable than folly—than mere flippancy, or coarseness of feeling. Such conduct betrays a want of gratitude, no less than a want of taste. It is dishonest and ignoble. The men whom those parties despise after this fashion, are the men who have been their greatest benefactors. As to the pure folly of this kind of talk, it will suffice to remark that, next to the resolve not to profit by the experience of ancestors, should come the determination not to profit by that of contemporaries; and the man who has thus decided that he will not profit at all by the experience of others, has only one step in this chain of consistency remaining, which is, to decide that he will not profit by experience in any form—not even by his own! So logical and refined may men become in an age so far transcending all others in its development of wisdom.

The same tendency is manifest in the rejection of all that is unfathomable or mysterious. What the individual mind cannot freely understand must be summarily dismissed as unworthy of belief. "Mystery," says a Mr. Alfred Roscher, "is the antagonist of truth; it belongs to a fabulous not to

a true religion, for truth never envelopes itself in mystery."! * Then in that case truth can have no existence, as no acknowledged truth can be named, that has not some mystery attached to it. What is mystery to one man may not be mystery to another. Would I be justified in asserting that, because I do not as yet know how a message could be sent by the electric telegraph, it therefore could not be sent. If not, why not? as "truth never envelopes itself in mystery." Why, shallower nonsense was never penned. There is no one truth, on any subject, that does not begin in mystery, and end in mystery. But such slightly-trained minds fancy that it would be lowering to their dignity to acknowledge the existence of anything they did not thoroughly comprehend, and so they save their self-esteem by copious denials. They modestly make themselves the standard of truth, and whatever harmonises with their notions must be true, and whatever does not harmonise with them must be false. The most laughable instance of this kind that I have met with has been Mr. Bradlaugh, who, not content with the more safe position of saying that there is not sufficient evidence for the existence of a God, actually asserts that such a being is *impossible*! And what are his reasons? Nothing more than this, that he, Mr. Bradlaugh, does not *know* God. What a pity that men generally do not believe in his infinite knowledge. His own disciples must be very fortunate individuals, as they have

* *National Reformer*, No. 352, p. 82.

only to ask him what is truth on any subject, to be at once, and infallibly informed. Really, one can scarcely tell whether to pity the ignorance of such a man, or to be indignant at his impudence. But these intelligent individuals who would shut out mystery seem not to be aware of the fact that they thus increase mystery infinitely. The Theist believes in an omniscient and omnipotent First Cause ; One who knew what he wished to do and had power to do it. But the Atheist says he believes in the great mystery of changes occurring without a producing agent! Believes that all the order of the material world has just somehow happened without intelligence, consciousness or will! Believes that we can have a science of mechanics without inertia, and laws of motion without momentum ; that is, believes a thing can be, and not be, at the same time ! O Atheist, great is thy faith ! He is apt to sneer at the Christian for his faith, but the faith of the Christian is but a microscopic thing compared with that of his antagonist. With regard to science, he has to believe that any such thing is, as I have proved in my fourth lecture, an impossibility. He has to believe that he is not certain of his own existence. He has to believe that he is as much an irresponsible machine, as the engine on a railway. For once, let him acknowledge any of these points, and his whole system falls to the ground.

Nor is this all his faith has to gulp down. With

regard to the miracles of the New Testament for example, he must believe either that they were *frauds* on men's senses, committed at the time ; or else were *fictions* afterwards fabricated. There is no other alternative for him, as a sceptic. If he accept the fraud hypothesis, he must believe that a vast number of apparent miracles—involving the most astounding phenomena, performed in open day, amidst multitudes of malignant enemies, imposed alike on *all*, and triumphed at once over the strongest prejudices and the deepest enmity. He must also believe that the original performers, in these prodigious frauds on the world, acted not only without any assignable motive, but against all assignable motive : that they maintained this uniform constancy in unprofitable falsehoods, not only together, but separately, in different countries, before different tribunals, under all sorts of examinations, and in defiance of the gyves, the scourge, the axe, the cross, and the stake. And that in a few years, though without arms, power, wealth, or science, they were to an enormous extent victorious over all prejudice, philosophy, and persecution ; and in these centuries took nearly undisputed possession of the temples of the ejected deities ! Or if he adopt the fiction hypothesis, he must believe that many independent minds concocted a story that challenged triumphantly the opposition of Jew and Gentile, and was successful, beyond all imagination, over the hearts of mankind. That the world, while the fictions were being pub-

lished, and in the known absence of the facts they asserted to be true, suffered itself to be befooled *into* the belief of their truth, and *out* of its belief of all the systems it did previously believe to be true; and that it acted thus notwithstanding persecution from without, as well as prejudice from within. He must also believe that the men who were engaged in the compilation of these wonderful fictions, chose them as the vehicle of the purest morality; and, though the most pernicious deceivers of mankind, were yet the most scrupulous preachers of veracity and benevolence! Surely of him, who can receive all these paradoxes—and they form but a small number of what might be mentioned, we may say, O, Infidel, great is thy faith! *

But in point of fact, it is very great, as confessed by themselves; Mr. Bradlaugh's word is taken against the scholarship of the world. At his dictum they are ready to become, Atheists, Theists, or aught else he may dictate, as we see in the *National Reformer*, No. 352, where a correspondent, named "Questa," asks whether he is to be Deist or Atheist, Republican or Monarchial! Let not the Secularist again sneer at faith, unless he begin with himself. True, the Christian has faith, and glories in it; but not faith in such absurdities as I have pointed out: his faith is one that trusts his God, relies upon his

* For a fuller examination of this subject see *Reason and Faith*, by H. Rogers.

word, and stakes his eternity on his love. It is a faith that joins together earth and heaven in one united family, the humblest child and noblest seraph, as creatures of the same creator; dwellers in the same home. It is a faith that binds all in a common bond of common sympathy.

Another result of the want of accurate information is, that objections against the Bible, or Christianity, have far greater weight than they deserve. If the believer in Christianity derive his belief from an *experience* of its effects on his own nature, he has an evidence that no amount of scepticism can ever shake: he *feels* that this system has made him better, wiser, happier, and that is sufficient. But if the faith be of the intellect merely, it may be shaken intellectually by sceptic doubts. Now, a man may have sufficient information to enable him to understand the meaning of the objection, but not have sufficient to enable him to detect its fallacies—if there be such in it—or to meet it by a satisfactory reply. Such men hear or read the stale declamations, and stock-in-trade charges against the Bible brought by lecturers of the Mr. Bradlaugh stamp; and they can feel that if true, they are very serious. But they do not detect the numberless instances of false reasoning, shallow scholarship, unsound philosophy that underlie them all, and that earn for them the contempt of most well-informed minds. They know not that these objections are no new things, that they

have been unanswerably replied to again and again. The way in which Secularist speakers treat their audiences, shows most distinctly that they rely upon their supposed ignorance : were it not for this they dare not go on year after year in the same circus round of wearisome repetition, without condescending to notice any of the replies made to these statements, or showing how or why these replies were insufficient. Secularists are not aware of the fact that their system is looked upon as simply "absurd," not by theologians only, but by philosophers,—by such men as Professor Huxley, whom none will accuse of too strong tendencies towards Christianity. They are not aware that the teachings (?) of their President are looked upon in the scientific world—when they are looked upon at all—with pity, and are rejected even by Mr. Holyoak himself. They are not aware that a philosophical system based on the tenets of Mr. Bradlaugh is a simple impossibility ; and so from want of information, and of inability to distinguish between harangue and logic, they remain Secularists.

Those of them who are aware of the superior learning, and greater mental culture and scholarship of their opponents, will not acknowledge that their difference of belief arises from their greater information, but they at once attribute it to low and unworthy motives. But then, what motives could induce anyone to profess an adherence to a system that would condemn his selfishness and his wickedness, and

praise him only when he led a true and holy life ; nay that would condemn his very hypocrisy in professing that which he did not believe ? A motive, however, has been found by the Secularist, and attributed to the Christian. The *National Reformer* says, “ And the parsons who teach that men are not born to enjoy life, but to prepare for death, are themselves a living refutation of their doctrine, for they amass more money to enjoy life than any other order of men ! ! ” * Here is news for the clergy, they are the richest order of men : richer than merchants, or than nobles ! The old story of the loaves and the fishes : as though the overwhelming majority of the clergy did not get a thousand-fold *fewer* loaves and fishes in the Church than they would out of it. I may say there is scarcely a man who enters the ministry of the Church, and who is without influential friends, that does not voluntarily resign all hopes of wealth, or even of a moderate competence. Let any man look round upon a city’s merchants and a city’s clergy. Pray, which are the richer ? And why should the man who devotes himself to commerce become wealthier than the man who devotes himself to mind and soul ? Is it because the former is, in himself, a better conducted, or an abler man than the latter ? No ; it is because the latter has withdrawn himself from the possibilities of gain.

* I do not know what “ parsons ” may teach, but I know that Christianity teacheth that God “ giveth us richly all things to enjoy.

In point of fact, *the clergy receive less money for their services than any other body of educated men.* Their share of the loaves and fishes is smaller than if they had embarked in any other occupation fitted for gentlemen. This then, the only possible motive that could be assigned why they should act contrary to their conviction, is found to be as untrue as it well could be.

A further consequence of the practical spirit of the age is the preponderance given to the study of physical, over metaphysical science. Physical science, such as the study of electricity, meteorology, optics, mechanics, etc., can be made distinctly serviceable in the commerce of the world. They can be made available in telegraphy, navigation, and engineering, and so be made very profitable. They, therefore, find many students; and many minds are devoted to the investigation of their laws. Attention is thus diverted to the phenomena of matter, and away from logic, and mental philosophy. This is dangerous in many ways. We find some of our best physicists most incompetent logicians, and drawing the most illogical conclusions from their own observations. They also frequently are guilty of most ridiculous psychological blunders. A man cannot be a good and safe experimentalist unless he be acquainted with the laws of reasoning; nor can he be a good theorist unless he knows the philosophy of mind. The service that Lord Bacon rendered to science,

was not by conducting elaborate researches in physics, but by introducing new *mental* principles of investigation. The study of matter and its laws is necessarily the study of order and uniformity: everywhere there is observed the same effects from the same causes. The mind dwelling on this one special kind of study, and having little philosophical knowledge to counteract it, arrives at last in a pure naturalism; acknowledging, indeed, the existence of a Creator, but practically banishing him from the guidance of his own creation, by ignoring all power, and all providence. The mind dwelling exclusively on mental phenomena, becomes mystic; but dwelling exclusively on material phenomena, it becomes materialistic. The latter is the present fashion, and is called Positiveism, its great leader being Comte. It is not now my purpose to enter into an examination of his philosophical principles; there can be no doubt he was a great thinker, and that his classification of the sciences must be very valuable. But we have in him a remarkable illustration of the fact that the heart, when fairly stirred, must have some object of worship, must have some religion. Up to the age of forty-five he was content with his cold abstractions, but at that time the fountain of his affections was opened, and he became an altered man. He then fell in love with a lady separated from her husband. In the words of Mr. Lewes, "A new influence, penetrating like sunshine into the very depths of his being, awakened

there the feelings dormant since childhood, and by their light he now saw the world under new aspects ; he grew religious ; he learned to appreciate the abiding and universal influence of the affections ; he gained a new glimpse into man's destiny ; he aspired to become the founder of a new religion—the religion of humanity.” His lady-love was soon taken from him ; but he, modest man, endeavoured to make himself happy with the possibility of creating a new *Grand Etré*—a new Bible ; a new Catholic Church, and a new calendar ; a new currency, a new priesthood ; nine new sacraments ; a new spiritual power ; a new heaven and a new earth. To these ends he has instituted what he calls the Positivist Society, which is to work wonders in the inauguration of all these new things. He would ruthlessly tear from us our hope of immortality, malign the providence of God, the love of Christ, and all the Christian holds most dear, and give us in their place—what ? The adoration of his ‘*immutable compagne*,’ and his ‘*éminente proeétaire*,’ or his sainted wife, and his excellent cook ! The strain of his love is certainly very tender and romantic, and his affectionate ‘*dédicace*’ to the memory of Madame de Vaux, ‘*morte sous ses yeux*’ does honour to his feelings ; but when he talks of the immense moral regeneration which she would have accomplished, if the lot which neither he nor she deserved at the hands of the invariable laws of nature had not befallen them—when he cites a few of her sayings and doings as

worthy of everlasting remembrance, and expects all the world to recognise her virtues and commemorate their love to each other, he becomes nonsensical, and certainly shows that he could in nowise say with Kent, "not so young, sir, to love a woman for singing, nor so old as to dote on her for anything." Positivism, he says, will take away from woman all necessity for active labour of any kind. She will be the priestess of humanity, and the embodiment of love and virtue; and as Positivism drives a vindictive God out of the world, *she will have no rival in her husband's affections!* Prayer is to be made to the pretty darlings continually* After all this it is difficult to say before whom these feminine divinities should themselves bow the knee, and Comte is evidently a little posed by that consideration. Let us see the delicious way in which he escapes from the dilemma: "To woman alone belongs such a task, and I had reserved it for my distinguished companion, whose premature decease I shall thus cause to be *universally* deplored." Our Secularist friends rail at Church organisations, bishops, priests, etc., do they know to what their pet Comte would treat them? The spiritual power was to consist of an assembly of savans: at first, of the principal Western nations,—eight French, seven English, six Germans, five Italians, and four Spaniards, *assisted by six ladies!* Eventually, Russians, Tartars, China-

* "In one word, the knee of man should never more be bent except before woman".—*Système de Politique Positive*, I, 259.

men, Malays, etc., will be represented. To these worthies and thirty-six thousand priests, scattered through the Western world, their docile representatives and devout apostles, was to be assigned the task of establishing Positive Science, of governing public sentiment, and of preventing all differences of opinion by their united wisdom. And all this farrago of nonsense is Positive Philosophy! And all this is to replace Christianity and the Bible! Verily, the spirit of an age that can tolerate such sentimental insanity, that can welcome it as a substitute for the simplicity of the Gospel, must be intensely bigotted and superficial.*

Secularists further profess to find a plea for Secularism in the sectarian differences they observe. They say "Calvinist is against Arminian, Presbyterian against Episcopalian; you have numberless sects within your Christian community, and yet you all profess to hold the Bible: when you differ so among yourselves, which are we to agree with?" That there are such differences is undeniable, and in many respects deplorable; but still these divisions are not understood by one who is outside them all. They are somewhat like a quarrel between husband and wife over some trifling household mishaps. A stranger hearing the harsh words uttered on both sides might say "how they hate each other." But do they? Let the stranger only echo the words said by either to the other, and he will find out at

* See *British Quarterly Review*, Vol. 19.

once his mistake. Or, let the husband enter his home with real misfortune saddening his brow,—will he then hear a word of reproach or anger from his wife? No; her sympathy, her love, her counsel, will support and cheer, and guide him. So is it with Christian sects: they may quarrel, and pass harshly sounding phrases from one to the other over some not very important point; and they may appear to hate each other. But it is appearance only. Once let their common hope, their common faith, their common Saviour, Lord, or Father be assailed, and then in a moment their petty bickerings are forgotten, and they will join shoulder to shoulder to repel the common foe, and to fight under the one banner of the Cross. Redeemed by the same Christ, children of the same God, heirs of the same glory; hoping to spend eternity together, they must and do consider all other points but as dust in the balance. Our differences are good things, if not carried too far, they cause us to provoke one another to good works, to out-pray, out-work, out-love, each other.

In what I have said I do not wish to give the impression that I object to “free thought,” that I would deprecate full and fair examination of all the foundations of our faith. My aim has been to show that comparatively few men are competent to the critical task; but that all are competent to prefer a creed indulgent to vice, to one intolerant of it; that ignorance enables them to persuade themselves that

their desired creed may be the true one. That the materialism of the age, the selfishness of the age produces ignorance ; and ignorance based on self-indulgence produces scepticism ; which is thus shown to be, not what many assume it to be, freedom *of* thought, but rather freedom *from* thought. As Lord Bacon has said in his essay on Atheism, "It is true that a little philosophy inclineth man's mind to Atheism ; but depth in philosophy bringeth about men's minds to religion ; for while the mind of man looketh upon second causes scattered, it may sometimes rest in them, and go no further ; but when it beholdeth the chain of them confederate, and linked together, it must needs fly to Providence and Deity." Perhaps the opinion of Bacon may be allowed to have a little weight with the followers of even Mr. Bradlaugh. True, free-thought has been very useful to Christianity in clearing the mirror of the faith from some of the dust which has rusted on it, in the course of ages. Slight concretions of human opinion had gathered there, like decayed leaves on the summit of a rock : the wind passes, carrying these light and fragile things with it, but leaving the rock itself the purer for the cleansing. I therefore hail free-thought as being, against its will, a friendly ally to Christianity ; I hail with gladness every effort to dispel the ignorance that is abroad, and curb the selfishness that is rampant : knowing that when these depart, we shall have heard the last of Secularism ; knowing that in pro-

portion to the clearness of the intelligence will be the grasp of Revelation ; and in proportion to purity of heart will be love to God and Christ. I welcome true free-thought, because my Bible marks it with the stamp of true nobility. "These were more noble than they of Thessalonica, in that they received the word with all readiness of mind, and searched the Scriptures daily whether these things were so." *

And now, my task is finished. I have done what I could to place before you, what I believe to be truth ; as fairly and impartially as I could ; and as fully as my time permitted. I have endeavoured to do so in no unkind or captious spirit ; but feeling the greatness and importance of my subjects, my aim has been, in all kindness, to lead you, if possible, to see them as I do myself. I know my incapacity for adequately treating such momentous topics ; and no power would ever have persuaded me to the attempt, had I not also known that, the battle is not always to the strong ; that my weakness could be made perfect in the strength of a stronger than man. My one, my only aim has been to work for the welfare of my brother man, while I have health and strength. To do what I believe to be my duty, till the hour for rest arrives. I ask you to do your duty to yourselves, by calmly and fairly

* I do not publish what I said upon "The Duties of the Teachers of the Age," as I would rather receive advice from others in the ministry, than appear to give any to them.

weighing what I have said; and if I shall have aided you to grasp with a firmer hand the sublimities of the Christian faith, and the nobilities of the Christian practice, I shall have widened the basis of true Secularism, by showing you the real good of *all* time. "Godliness being profitable for the life that now is, as well as for that which is to come." Believing this, you will be industrious and provident workers for the comfort of your homes, remembering that he who provides not for his own household hath denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel. You will be honest and earnest in business, remembering the command to be "diligent in business, fervent in spirit, serving the Lord." You will be men, in the full grandeur of moral manhood, and spiritual purity. Men, noble by integrity of character, noble by earnestness of action, noble by courage in adversity, noble by sympathy in the adversities of others, noble by unselfishness in motive, noble by radiant hope in death, noble in heaven by eternal communion with the King of Kings, and Lord of Lords. Oh! then,

Tell me not in mournful numbers,
 "Life is but an empty dream!"
 For the soul is dead that slumbers,
 And things are not what they seem.

Life is real! Life is earnest!
 And the grave is not its goal;
 "Dust thou art, to dust returnest,"
 Was not spoken of the soul.

Not enjoyment and not sorrow,
Is our destined end or way ;
But to act, that each to-morrow
Find us farther than to-day.

Lives of great men all remind us
We can make our lives sublime,
And, departing, leave behind us
Footprints on the sands of time ;

Footprints that perhaps another,
Sailing o'er life's solemn main,
A forlorn and shipwrecked brother,
Seeing, shall take heart again.

Let us, then, be up and doing,
With a heart for any fate ;
Still achieving, still pursuing,
Learn to labour and to wait.



APPENDIX.

SECULARIST OBJECTIONS TO THE BIBLE.

IN my recent debate with Mr. Bradlaugh on the Anti-Secularist Lectures, I was continually compelled to decline answering certain objections to the Bible, which he brought forward ; because they were wholly out of order, and would have led us far away from the proper subjects of discussion. My antagonist, perhaps unconsciously, would perpetually fly off at a tangent from the argument in hand, that he might indulge himself and his audience in one of his well known vapid declamations. As, for example, when the favourite subject of "Science and the Bible" should have been argued, he threw my lecture on the table, turned his back upon it, and cast Science to the winds—Science that he had challenged me to discuss—Science that Secularists had *previously* said was antagonistic to the Bible—he, now, when he had the opportunity of showing this if he were able, actually left the whole question, fairly fled from it; and made an excursion over the whole Bible, beginning at Genesis, and ending, I think, with Revelation. It

was something similar on every other night, except, perhaps, the last. Mr. Bradlaugh was willing to debate anything and everything but the subject, when he knew full well I would not follow him. Not one whole argument in any one of my lectures has he shaken; he did not so much as attack one. He did not attempt even to defend his own system; *he would not approach it*; but kept repeating, till we were weary of them, oft answered objections to isolated texts, etc. And this after having *signed* an agreement to reply to my arguments in the order in which they had been delivered. But, indeed, a discussion with a man holding his opinions is as impossible, as to teach arithmetic to one who affirms that two and two are equal to five. He, in fact, falsifies his own principles by reasoning at all, for his assumption of *infinite* knowledge (*e.g.* in the adoption of the term Atheist, instead of Non-Theist) should make his dictum quite sufficient in all cases. He also renders himself logically incapable of reasoning, by cutting away the first principles of everything; by, at one time when it suits his purpose, saying he knows *all* things; and then at another, holding that he cannot know even his own existence. But I was determined that, although I would not follow all his irrelevancies, they should not go unnoticed, for the sake of those who may fancy that they are unanswerable. I, therefore, now purpose reviewing certain Secularist objections to the Bible, which have not been examined in the Lectures; not con-

fining myself to those introduced during the course of the Debate, but selecting any that I may consider as important, or the solution of which conveys interesting information. But before doing so, I would ask Secularists to compare the scholarship, the intellectual training, the education of the men in England who, at the present day, receive the Bible, with that of the Secular lecturers who deny it, and say which should be supposed most competent judges? Mr. Bradlaugh himself says that he does not pretend to the learning of such men as Dr. Stanley; that he has had to work for his living, and could only pick up information in leisure hours. I grant that he, and all such as he, deserve every credit for spending their leisure hours so profitably; and I do not blame him if his knowledge be but very superficial and crude; I only hope that as he lives longer and studies more, he will be able to appreciate the value of the follies he has been teaching, and atone for the dogmatism of ignorance, by the humility of learning. But while I say all this, I must also say that, I cannot help thinking it a little inconsistent for ignorance to flaunt itself in the face of erudition, saying I know better than you. Did it never occur to Secularists, that Christian scholars are as able to compare passages of Scripture together as they are, and see if there be errors or contradictions in them? Does it not occur to them that while possibly a small degree of critical acumen may detect an apparent discrepancy, a greater degree

may detect also the reply to it? It is really amazing, the coolness with which Secularists, who can scarcely perhaps read a line of the original Scriptures, assume that they are better judges of their value, than profound scholars, who have spent their lives in the study of them. For men, whose education is of the most meagre kind, to talk about their rejection of the Bible, or indeed any other received book, on *intellectual* grounds, is a farce too ridiculous to be seriously treated. It is somewhat similar to a rather conceited young gentleman going to a chemist of world-wide fame, and telling him that, although he did not know anything about chemistry, he altogether denied his theories, which were so warmly received by all clever chemists. Where lies the difference between this act, and that of men, who are no doubt very worthy in their way, and who can spend an hour or two in the evening over some popular treatise, rushing into print to tell certain of the clergy, who have spent their whole lives in study, that from their sublime altitudes they really look down with pity upon their ignorance or stupidity? The whole thing is mental madness. I do not say this in any unkind spirit, but that such men may really see the foolish position in which they place themselves; and by learning their own folly, take the first step towards wisdom. The following pages are, consequently, written for the man who, confessing his ignorance, asks for information; and all such I shall be ever most happy to assist, as I would hope

to be assisted by those who are far in advance of myself. Were I writing for the trained critic, I would try to do it in a very different style from the present, but that I leave to better scholars than I am, and content myself with explaining the subjects that I may notice, in the simplest manner consistent with accuracy.

LITERARY OBJECTIONS.

I find these stated concisely in the following paragraphs: "And why do they speak of the original Hebrew in which Moses wrote? It can hardly be pretended that the Deity selected the Hebrew for its flexibility and capacity for expressing his meaning. On the contrary, the Greek far excels the Hebrew as a written tongue. Nor is the Hebrew the most ancient written language. The construction of the various Hebrew roots affords reason to the contrary; and it is absolutely certain that the whole of the vowel points (which in many cases entirely change the meaning of the text) are of comparatively modern date,—say from the second to the fifth century of the present era—probably not earlier than A.D. 450. The present square letter form of Hebrew, and the twenty-two letter alphabet, are also of limited antiquity."*

* "Genesis," by Mr. Bradlaugh, p. 2.

I may add to this some objections taken from the debate. "I ask him to fix the dates of the first and last books within 100 years ; and to tell me in what language originally written, and how he knows it." "Whether square-letter-Hebrew is not a modern language entirely." The several points here to be replied to are the following : the flexibility, antiquity, transition, and points of the Hebrew ; also the date and language of the last book as well as the first.

Firstly, why was not such a flexible language as Greek chosen, rather such an inflexible one as Hebrew ? Simply because of this very inflexibility. It is firm as a rock, almost incapable of any great amount of change. From Moses to the captivity no important alteration took place. And surely this was one great requisite in a language that was to preserve, unaltered, a great body of inspired truth till the time came for it to be given forth to mankind at large. This, therefore, that has been objected against it, is in point of fact its greatest possible recommendation. Next, what is the antiquity of its writing ? It is believed by most linguists that Hebrew is the oldest language, that from which all others have sprung ; but whether this be so or not, one thing is as yet certain, that no older language is *known*. As to the date of its earliest writing, we are not so sure. It may not be the most ancient, but whether or not, does not matter, it must have been as old, I suppose, as the man who first wrote

it. And it was chosen, not on account of its antiquity, but because it was the character understood by the men who were to write it, and by the nation that was to read it. It is, however, exceedingly probable that the Hebrew is the oldest known written character. All historical accounts direct us to the Asiatic Shemitics as the inventors of writing. It is generally conceded that the Phœnicians conveyed the knowledge of writing to the Greeks, but some hold that they brought it direct from Egypt when they learned it. On comparing, however, the old Hebrew character with the Phœnician they are seen to be so essentially one, that a common source must be ascribed to both, and that cannot I think, for many reasons, be Egyptian. A class of Egyptian priests appears in Genesis, xii. 8, under the name חֲרָטִים, magicians. Evidently the name is not of Egyptian origin, but of Shemitic. We have, therefore, here, as in several other instances, the *translation* of an Egyptian expression into Hebrew. And it also follows, that at that time the instrument of writing חֶרֶט or style was received into use. The expression שָׂטָרִים, officers, frequently occurs in the Pentateuch, and testifies of an ante-Mosaic age. The radical meaning of this word is *writer*. So that the office of writer was one well known and common among the Israelites before the visit of Moses to Egypt. There are many other testimonies to shew that writing was no new thing,

but was well known in the Mosaic age. The literature of the Hebrews, however, begins with Moses, who, no doubt, copied much of what he wrote from documents at that time existing, being guided as to what he should copy by the Spirit of God. I shall not now dwell upon the determination of the date when he wrote, I am content to leave it where Mr. Bradlaugh himself does, somewhere within a hundred years, that is about B.C. 1480 as centre. That Moses was the compiler and author of most of the Pentateuch, has been doubted on what I must consider very insufficient grounds ; while the testimony in his favour is clear and decisive. The Pentateuch itself says it was written by him ; other books of the Old Testament affirm the same ; the Hebrews, who have some right to be heard on the subject, add their testimony, which is confirmed by the assertion of Christ and his apostles. But Mr. Bradlaugh is as earnest on this point of authorship, as though it were of more than mere literary interest. It is, of course, pleasant to know who wrote a certain book, but this knowledge does not add to the truth of the statements, or the beauty of the diction. The history attributed to Herodotus, would be exactly the same, though written by a man, living at the same time, who bore another name. Could Mr. Bradlaugh prove that we did not know who was the writer of any one book of the Bible, he would leave the Bible exactly where

it is. All the criticism, however, that has been spent on this subject, has not disproved the received authorship of a single book.

The next point to be noticed is the transition from the old Samaritan character, into the square or Chaldee. That such a change has taken place is undoubted; it was accomplished shortly before the time of Christ. There are certain coins still in existence that date back to the middle of the second century before Christ, having characters inscribed on them in Samaritan. There are sufficient grounds for believing that the alphabet of these Asmonaeon coins was that employed 140 B.C., in copying the manuscript of the Bible, and in the general business of life. But at this time, *before* the square character had come into use, the Septuagint translation of the Scriptures *had been made*. This version in Greek, copied, remember, from the *Samaritan*, and not from the Chaldee, we still possess; it agrees so accurately with the Chaldee that the quotations made by Christ and his apostles are chiefly made from it, instead of from the Hebrew. And yet I am asked, "whether the square-letter-Hebrew is not a modern *language* entirely?" Mr. Bradlaugh would have the less intelligent of his followers infer that, a change from one form of *letter* to another, means a change in the *language*. Suppose parliament, for some reason, were to pass a law that all books should henceforth be printed in capitals only,

instead of the ordinary type ; we should then, according to the reasoning of the President of the Secularists, become possessed of a new “language entirely !” The only difference between the two cases is that, the latter transition (the English) would be made suddenly, while the former (the Hebrew) was the work of time.

The vocalisation of the text, or adding of vowel points, is next in order. With the exception of the three vowels, א, ו, י, *Aleph*, *Vau*, and *Yod*, the Hebrews *wrote* only consonants. Thus they would write the word *Lecture*, LCTR ; they always, of course, used the vowel *sounds*, but did not write them. The writing of them would not vary the pronunciation, because this was well established for each word. When the Hebrew ceased to be a living language, it became necessary to append in *writing* to the sacred text whatever could contribute to its exact preservation, and stamp permanently its *original* meaning. This was done by the Masoretes, and was not in any degree an arbitrary vocalisation, but must be viewed as strictly regulated by adherence to the tradition handed down to them. The addition of signs to mark well known sounds has consequently no more influence on the text, than the transition from Samaritan to Chaldee had, and cannot consequently be regarded as any objection to the present Hebrew text.

It is also stated that "at the time of the captivity all the sacred Hebrew books were destroyed, and Ezra employed scribes to re-write every word of them, from the beginning to that time." Now this could not be so, because these books are referred to as well known written documents, then existing ; and Ezra moreover did not call upon the people to hear what had been written, but they called upon him to read the law. "And all the people gathered themselves together as one man into the street that was before the water-gate ; and they spake to Ezra the scribe, to bring the book of the law of Moses, which the Lord had commanded to Israel.* There is, I am aware, a tradition that Ezra wrote the Old Testament in the Chaldee character, after the return of the Jews from captivity. This tradition, however, which I have already shewn cannot be true, would by no means lead us to infer that the *books* were *lost*, but that many of the people during their period of captivity had forgotten their own writing, and become familiar with the character used by their captors ; and that for the convenience of such, Ezra or his scribes, *copied* the books into Chaldee. But in whatever way we may explain the origin of the legend, its truth cannot be maintained. The posterity of the captives of Babylon used the old Hebrew characters (the Samaritan) upon coins several centuries after the return of their fathers ; and at the time they were thus inscribed,

* Nehemiah viii. 1.

there is every mark of their having been the usual written symbols of ordinary life. The best evidence, however, that the books of the Old Testament were written by different writers, and at different periods, is afforded by an examination of the language in which they are written. The diction of no two of the writers exactly coincides, indeed the differences are so great that a good Hebrew scholar could tell the age of any of the sacred writings by their internal peculiarities alone. The Pentateuch is rich in expressions which are due to the residence of the Hebrews in Egypt ; such are אָחוּ, (*achu*) seed of the Nile ; יְאוֹד, Nile-stream ; בְּהֵמוֹת, (*behemoth*) Nile-horse, etc. In later books other words are substituted for the Egyptian words of the Pentateuch ; thus instead of שֵׁשׁ, (*Shesh*) Egyptian for fine linen, constantly in the Pentateuch, we have equally constantly בּוֹצ, (*bootz*). There are also grammatical forms peculiar to itself. The making no distinction of gender in the pronoun הוּא, (*hoo-he, or it*) is *regular* in the Pentateuch ; in all the other books, however, the masculine and the feminine are *invariably* discriminated, by employing הִיא (*hi*) for the latter. There are many other illustrations of the same which I cannot here enumerate. In addition to these we meet with a number of unusual and antique terms and application of words, as גּוֹזַל (*gozal*) is used of young and old, whereas בֶּן (*ben*) was used in later Hebrew.

Again כֶּשֶׁב (*Kesev*) sheep, occurs fourteen times in the Pentateuch ; but it is never found in the other parts of the Old Testament. Instead of it we have כֶּבֶשׂ (*Keves*). There are also certain modes of expression peculiar to the Mosaic books, as that in Numbers xiv. 9 ; their shadow צֶלֶם (*tsillam*) is gone from them, which is an ancient poetic phrase for “their help is taken from them.” It occurs nowhere else, though the term צֶל (*tsel*) in the sense of protection, is frequent in poetry. Instances of this kind might be multiplied largely, these however will suffice to show that, the language alone of the Pentateuch would establish its unity of character and authorship.

The poetry of David’s time has a more polished aspect and purer diction. The language is easy and flowing, the parallelism carefully observed, and the rhythm peculiarly marked. The compositions of the inspired writers belonging to this period, present the lyric poetry of the Hebrews in a very high state of cultivation, equally distinguished by purity of language, and by sublimity and beauty of conception. In the writings of Solomon there is a very distinctly pronounced lingual character. In this the works of Solomon which we possess strikingly agree, whilst there is much that is clearly peculiar to each ; the pieces, as respects their subjects, being very different. But while the book of Job, the writings of David and Solomon, have each their own distinctive charac-

ters, they accord in many things that prove them to belong to one common period. Of the historical books belonging to this time, (Judges, Samuel, Ruth) the style is easy and smooth; the ancient artless method of history still subsists. The division of the tribes, however, after the death of Solomon, and the decay of the national religion, produced on literature a most injurious effect. In all the qualities that are usually thought to constitute the highest excellence of poetry, the writings of the prophets are far below those last named. The nature of the prophetic discourse is more rhetorical than poetical. At times, it is true, it assumes the form of that earlier character, and this for particular reasons, as Isa. xii., Hab. iii., etc. We must, however, carefully attend to the time in which they wrote, because there is a marked difference between their prophecies. Only the earlier part of the prophetic literature belongs to the golden age of the language. In this is found a correct and classic style, uncorrupted by foreign idioms. The diction of Hosea betrays throughout its antiquity. "As young effervescing wine," says Eichorn, "bursts the old bottles, so does he also the fetters of grammar. He struggles with language, and breaks it when it will not yield to the current of his thought; he despises the ordinary words, and chooses the rarest, as he cannot with the former express himself strongly enough." Hence he has peculiar constructions and combinations of words and clauses, such as the expression כְּמִרְיֵי כֶּחָן,

iv., 3, "like priest combatants," which is a brief allusion to Deut. xvii. 12.

The succeeding prophets, Joel, Isaiah, Micah, Nahum, Habakkuk, and Obadiah, may be all classed together as possessing a similar complexion of language. Among these Micah and Isaiah are remarkable for the most beautiful plays on words. The third chapter of Habakkuk has been justly regarded as one of the most splendid portions of the prophetic writings, the language presenting the highest specimen of lyric poetry.

From the time of the death of Josiah, Judah being continually exposed to invasions from Babylon, there began to be a disturbance of the purity of the ancient mother-tongue. This period is marked by the influence of the Chaldee dialect on the Hebrew. In consequence of this Aramæan tendency, there arose a new literature, strikingly different from the earlier; the language of the conquered approximating to that of the conquerors. A comparison of the books of Kings and Chronicles shows, in a marked manner, the declining state of the language. Although the date of their composition is separated by less than a century, yet their styles are very different. The transition to this period is made by Zephaniah, the contemporary of Josiah. Although his language be pure in relation to the time in which he lived, yet there are many striking proofs of its corruptness. Still more corrupt

is the style of Jeremiah, who lived somewhat later, and in whom the influence of the Aramaic is already very evident. This influence is, as might have been anticipated, still more marked in those writers who composed while actually living in Babylon during the exile—Ezekiel and Daniel. The former has carried negligence of form so far, that it may with truth be said that, he contains relatively the largest number of grammatical irregularities and incorrectnesses. The language of Daniel does not contain so remarkable anomalies as that of Ezekiel, but it still has many Aramæan forms as כְּתָב (*Ketav*) for סֵפֶר (*sepher*), a writing, x. 21, מוֹעֵד (*moed*) for עֵת (*eth*) a definite space of time, חִידָה (*chidah*) for מְרִמָּה (*mirmah*) fraud, viii. 23, etc.

The writings that appeared soon after the exile—Chronicles, Ezra, Nehemiah, and Esther—present features of language similar to those that characterise the times of the captivity. But after this time several writers laboured to reproduce a purer Hebrew. Haggai, Zechariah, and Malachi, have written in a style free from Aramæisms, and purer in dialect. To assert therefore that all these varied styles and minute peculiarities were the work of a set of writers acting on the dictation of one man, would be similar to asserting that Tennyson could write the *Canterbury Tales*, *The Fairy Queen*, *Paradise Lost*, *Macbeth*, and Hume's *History of England*, without having had them committed to memory.

I may be allowed to remark here that the varieties of *style* of the Bible writers is quite consistent with even a *verbal* inspiration.

Mr. Bradlaugh also says that there are different versions of the Scriptures, and asks me "why the church prefers one version when Christ preferred another," and further adds that "the quotations from the Old Testament in the New are not correct." A version of any book is a faithful and accurate rendering of it into another language than that in which it was written. There may be also versions in the same language, when the original text of the author is accompanied by a commentary or annotation. Of the Scriptures there are many such versions, some of them ancient, some modern. Of the former are the Chaldee paraphrases called Targums; the Greek translation, called the Septuagint; the Latin, called the Vulgate, etc. Christ preferred the Septuagint, because Greek had in his day become the popular tongue, and his quotations were consequently more generally understood. Our church prefers an English version because a Greek one would not, I am afraid, be universally intelligible.

In the quotations from the Old Testament there are occasional variations, but not inaccuracies; they are caused by the impossibility of literally translating any one language into another; so that there could not be precise verbal accuracy of quotation. Correct translation is accomplished when the transla-

tor masters the thought of the original, and expresses it truly in the idiom of the tongue into which he puts it ; so verbal variation is quite consistent with accuracy. For example, Peter in quoting Gen. xxii. 18. in Acts iii. 25, uses *πατριά*, kindness, for *ἔθνη*, nations, although the latter is the proper rendering for גוֹיִם, the original word ; but by so doing he reminded the Jews that the Gentiles were their brethren. A full examination of all the quotations will teach many important lessons on Biblical interpretation, and shew us that wherever there is variation, some truth is to be made clear by it, which perhaps would have been lost had a mere mechanical system of transposition of words been adopted.

Much fault is also found with our English version, as being "a miserable translation"; and Mr. Bradlaugh would fain weaken the confidence of the mere English reader in his English Bible. Mr. Bradlaugh's criticisms on the English version of the Bible might justly be passed with the contempt they deserve, were it not that some may, without crediting what he says, desire information on the subject. Fifty-four of the best scholars of the Elizabethan age were chosen for the task of revising and correcting the existing versions, and making one that should be complete and accurate. There has not been so learned an age since, and these men especially were noted as able Hebrew and Greek scholars. The

English language itself also was in a most favourable state at this particular time. During the long reign of Elizabeth, education had been widely spread, and theology had been diligently cultivated. The expression was terse, the structure dignified, Saxon being the predominating element, with a large admixture of Norman. Had the language been that of the time of James I. instead, it would have been a great misfortune, as it then became sadly deteriorated by the introduction of copious Latinisms. For three years these men worked steadily, comparing notes with each other, and with the versions in other languages. When any differences of opinion arose they were to be referred to a general meeting, and in all cases of difficulty they were to consult scholars elsewhere. The directors of the whole were Andrews, Dean of Westminster; Barlow, Dean of Chester; and the Regius Professors of Hebrew and Greek at both the Universities. And, in addition, the Universities were authorised to appoint three or four overseers of the work. Yet a version undertaken by such, and so many men, and rendered with such scrupulous care, is called by such a man as Mr. Bradlaugh, "a miserable translation"! Really some men, in the ardour of partisanship, forget common decency. There are, no doubt, several passages of which some would prefer a different translation, but they mostly refer to a mere critical point. But still the present authorised version is a noble monument of erudition, care, and holiness; a practically

correct and reliable representation of the Hebrew and Greek texts. The English reader, therefore, has in his English Bible everything that an earnest and true student wants for all purposes of piety, of morality, of guidance to life eternal.

While speaking of the translation, I may answer a question of my opponent. "Why he should call them cherubim when the Bible calls them beasts, I don't know, unless it be that it sounds nicer." This refers to the beasts in Rev. iv., which I had called cherubim. Probably Mr. Bradlaugh did not know why, but I will now tell him. The Greek word translated beasts is ζῶα, which literally means, living ones, the life being intense. These four living creatures are one with the four living creatures of Ezekiel i., or the cherubim; and consequently I called them cherubim because they are so.

HISTORICAL OBJECTIONS.

Several cases of apparent discrepancy between different Biblical records, are adduced as reasons for the rejection of the Bible; and to them are added other relations of events, which are asserted to be incredible. Some of these I now proceed to examine; before, however, any such case can be used as a reason for scepticism, it must be *shown*—not merely

asserted—that no possible amount of new information, about the details of the circumstance, could in any way solve the difficulty ; for so long as there remains a *possible* solution, we can say no more than that, we are ignorant of the required knowledge. I have already shown in Lecture V. how added light has dispelled the darkness that shrouded several of the historic incidents in Scripture. Mr. Bradlaugh should have stated whether this were so or not,—should have admitted or attempted to disprove my *principle* ; instead of introducing fresh instances when historic discrepancy was *not* the subject of debate. I might, therefore, rest my case thus, that no one has proved *a single instance* of *impossible reconciliation* ; that no one has shown that any one narrative, *necessarily* contradicts any other narrative. I, however, select a few fair illustrations, to show how easily they may be harmonised ; and how capacious, or how ignorant the man, who would place them as barriers to a reception of the Word of God. Mr. Bradlaugh said in the debate, “ I presume that if we find in one record inconsistent accounts of the same event, this would show to my friend’s satisfaction that the Bible could not be infallibly true. Take as an illustration the account of the gift of quails as told in the 16th chap. of Exodus, contrasted with the 11th chap. of Numbers.” He then states that the date, manner and place of the gifts all differ, and concludes by asking, “ Does Mr. M’Cann hold the 16th chap. of Exodus and

11th chap. of Numbers to be infallibly true?" Most decidedly yes; inasmuch as quails were given *twice*, at two different places and times, and for different reasons. We might as reasonably object to the truth of English history because the dates, places and details of the battles of Waterloo and Talavera do not harmonise!

In the debate on Lecture IV. we have the following: "To ascertain whether Bible miracles are or are not in accordance with the laws of Nature—meaning by laws of Nature the uniform sequences as explained on a previous evening—shall I take the miraculous deluge, with the water rained down from non-existent reservoirs through fabulous windows, and drained away to nowhere afterwards; shall I take the miraculous Tower of Babel, which God thought would have reached heaven had he allowed it to be finished; shall I select the miraculous Melchizedek, without father, without mother, without beginning of life or end of days; shall I take the miraculous struggle between the mysterious angel and Jacob? Or will my friend prefer the miraculous turning of the water into blood when there was no water left to turn; or will my antagonist wish me to select the miraculous cavalry of Pharaoh, mounted on horses, all of which had been once dead, and some of which had been three times killed; shall I select the miraculous angel seen by the miraculous donkey? Or would Mr. M'Cann wish me to take

the miraculous man born without a father, but whose mother's husband had two fathers; or will he wish to have the miraculous whale which swallowed Jonah, or the miraculous three days and three nights which passed between late on Friday and early on Sunday morning?" This racy quotation is a very fair specimen of Mr. Bradlaugh's mode of discussion. He strings together a number of distorted statements, in which he suppresses the true and suggests the false, and which have *nothing whatever* to do with the subject in hand, and then asks his opponent to reply to them. I challenged him to prove that miracles are antagonistic to science, as his own quotation from my lecture shows, and selected a case for him to determine it by,—the raising of a dead man to life. His own followers wished to hear this question of miracles fully debated. I wished it also; but no, the above paragraph is all that he could be induced to say about the science of them. It purported to be a reply to my argument, or it had no business there. Had it been extemporaneously spoken in the heat of debate, when the speaker had forgotten what exactly he had to meet, it might have been pardoned; but as it was deliberately penned, and composed at home, with my lecture before him, it is simply an insult to Secularists; and is the best possible evidence that my argument on miracles was unanswerable,—by him at least—or he would have made some *attempt*, during some part of the evening, to have refuted it. He asked me

which miracle he was to take. I told him, but did he take it? Not anything more on that subject would he say. I have, consequently, introduced here the paragraph quoted, because, as a mere enumeration of incidents, it has no connexion directly or indirectly with the *science* of the subject. And first, as to the Deluge. The whole statement regarding it has no foundation, save in the distorting imagination of Mr. Bradlaugh. We are nowhere told that the rain came from reservoirs, but that it rained from heaven, or the firmament; the windows are not fabulous, but merely—and very slightly—rhetorical, the word here for window אֲרוֹבָה (*aroobah*) not being the same as that used when speaking of a window, or light צֹהַר (*tzohhar*) in the ark. That the Jews believed in reservoirs holding water somewhere up above an opaque screen, and did not know what the clouds were, or that the rain came from them, is a supposition so absurd, as to refute itself. It is also contradicted by the following passages: “The clouds also dropped water.”—Judges, v. 4. “For He maketh small the drops of water; they pour down rain according to the vapour thereof; which the clouds do drop.”—Job, xxxvi. 27, 28. “The clouds poured out water.”—Psalms, lxvii. 17. “If the clouds be full of rain, they empty themselves upon the earth.”—Eccl. xi. 3.

That the waters afterwards “drained nowhere” is a statement too ridiculous to merit observation.

It seems useless at present to discuss the scientific aspect of the question, inasmuch as there is not sufficient *certain* data on which to proceed. We do not know positively whether it were universal or partial; the locality of the mountain on which the ark rested, nor how many species of animals existed before the flood, nor their habits, nor localities. We may conjecture evidence for, or evidence against, but so long as it must remain conjecture, we can *prove* nothing on either side. That a flood did somehow happen is, I think, rendered evident by the almost universal traditions regarding it. In every country there is some memorial of a flood, which must have descended through successive generations. It has been stated that Egypt had no records of the deluge, but is there not Thebes, and Theba means ark; and one of the most sacred objects in many of the Egyptian temples was a boat-like shrine. Even in Mexico, as A. Von Humbolt shows, the Aztecs, Nixtecs, Tlascaltecs, etc., had paintings representing the deluge of Coxcox. The painting represents Coxcox in the midst of the water waiting for a bark. The tradition says that he saved himself, his wife Xochiquetzatt, his children, several animals, and grain. How is it possible to account for all this, except by receiving the Scripture narrative?

What there was miraculous about the tower of Babel, I am at a loss to conceive. Nor is there one

word in the whole narrative to lead us to infer that God thought the tower would reach heaven, when finished. The expression in Genesis xi. 4, is that of the people, and is a mere hyperbole for great height, as in Deut. i. 28, and Dan. iv. 2. The design of the tower seems to have been for a landmark on the plain, so that when the people wandered far away, they would have a high conspicuous object as a guide for their return, "lest they should be scattered abroad upon the face of the earth." It was better, however, that they should be thus dispersed, and so their purpose of concentration was frustrated. The ruins of the tower have been ascertained by M. Oppert, the greatest of authorities on the antiquities of Babylon, to be the same as the basement of the mound of Birs-Nimrud, at Borsippa. And there has been discovered a cuneiform inscription, in which the tower is mentioned in connection with the confusion of tongues. And in addition, all linguistic researches point steadily to a time and place when and where "the whole earth was of one language, and of one speech."

The expression in Heb. vii. 3, regarding Melchizedek is, "Without father, without mother, without descent, having neither beginning of days, nor end of life." All which simply mean that his parentage was unknown. The word for without descent is ἀγενεαλογητος, which *cannot* mean anything else than "without genealogy."

It, in point of fact, is true, as there is no genealogy of him recorded in Genesis ; he appears suddenly, and as suddenly disappears from our view. We are not *told* who his father or mother were, where he was born, or where he died ; in all which there is nothing very miraculous ; for if there be, I think the miracle must be extended to the greater number of the human family.

Why the typical wrestling of Jacob and the angel has been introduced, is puzzling ; unless indeed it was to fill up time with words, words, words, when matter and thought were absent.

We are next introduced to the plagues of Egypt. How can Mr. Bradlaugh be so careless (not to use a severer word) as to say "there was no water left to turn," when we are expressly told that there *was* water left that had not been turned into blood ? "And all the Egyptians digged round about the river for water to drink ; for they could not drink of the water of the river." This accords with verse 20, where it says that "Moses smote the waters that were in the river," and "All the waters that were in the river were turned into blood." The *river* is mentioned all through as having been smitten, and no other waters are alluded to. Of course with the river I included all the streams that flowed *out* of the river, but not any that may have flowed *into* it. The whole statement is, consequently, perfectly consistent ; and the blunder is with this clever

manufacturer of errors. A fairer difficulty is found in the accounts of the plagues in which it is said (ix. 6) "all the cattle of Egypt died," and the Egyptians were afterwards told (19) to gather their cattle, etc. In the first place, the plague of murrain was limited to those cattle which were in the *field*,—"Behold the hand of the Lord is upon thy cattle which is in the field." And further the adverb כֹּל (*kohl*) which is translated *all*, does not necessarily mean totality, but the greater part only; as in Ex. xii. 33, "We be all dead men;" and in 2 Kings, xix. 35, "And when they arose early in the morning, behold they were all dead corpses." I almost wonder Mr. Bradlaugh did not ask "whether he would prefer the miraculous men that spoke, that arose in the morning after they were dead;" it would have *taken* better than Jacob and the angel. But this word "all" may also mean some of all sorts; so that the narrative would tell us that, in each plague the greater number of all sorts of cattle died. It is also asserted that the cattle of the children of Israel did not die; what, may I ask, was there to prevent the Egyptians from purchasing stock from them to supply their own loss, or even from procuring what they wanted, especially horses, from surrounding tribes?

Regarding the ass of Balaam seeing the angel, I need only say that it was an unusual circumstance, as every one acknowledges; but not therefore an untrue one.

“The miraculous man whose mother’s husband had two fathers,” is the Bradlaughian way of stating that the genealogy of Christ by Matthew, differs from that by Luke. Now so far from it being impossible to reconcile these two, there are several ways in which it may be done ; I, of course, do not know which is the correct one, nor is it necessary that I should ; I have only to indicate a mode by which it becomes possible. Mr. Bradlaugh may say to our methods, “the text dont say so.” Certainly it does not ; for if it did, no reconciliation would be necessary. One thing is morally certain, that they were both taken from authentic and public documents, such as the genealogical records preserved at Jerusalem. As the Jews believed that the Messiah was to descend from Abraham and David, the evidence of that descent would be most carefully examined. And when we add the fact that, the lineage of Joseph was actually made out from such records, for the purpose of the civil census ordered by Augustus, we may be sure that the genealogy of Christ was well established. Some believe that Matthew gives the genealogy of Joseph, and Luke that of Mary, in which case Joseph, being the son-in-law of Heli, would, according to Jewish custom, be called his son ; but this subject has been so frequently, and so ably treated, that it is unnecessary for me to dwell upon it here. The reconciliation which I prefer myself, is that which holds them both to be the genealogies of Joseph ; that is, of Christ as the legal son

of Joseph and Mary ; and in point of fact, though not of form, they are both as much her's as her husband's, as she was of the same family. That given by Matthew is the genealogy of Joseph as legal successor to the throne of David, exhibiting the successive heirs to the kingdom, ending with Christ. That by Luke is Joseph's private genealogy, exhibiting his real birth as David's son, and thus showing why he was heir to Solomon's crown. Joseph would consequently be the heir of his uncle Jacob, but the son of Heli. This theory explains all the steps of the ancestry with the greatest nicety, and reconciles many points that before were difficult.* Mr. Bradlaugh also asserts that the last tesseradecade contains only thirteen names, instead of fourteen. This is a mistake, as will be seen by counting from Jechonias (v.12)† to Christ inclusive.

The story of Jonah in the fish's belly must share the fate of all other miracles ; there is no more difficulty about it, than about any other ; indeed I consider it the least miraculous of them all, if we can use the term greater or less with regard to a miracle. There is no difficulty about the swallowing of Jonah whole, as it is a common enough occurrence for the white and other sharks to swallow men, without ever scratching them. Even horses have

* Those who wish to see it worked out in detail should consult "The genealogies of Christ," by Lord A. C. Hervey.

† The Jechonias of v. 11 is Jehoiachim, while the Jechonias of v. 12 is Jehoiachin.

been found whole in the stomach of the *Canis carcharis*, which has been caught 10,000lbs weight. M. Bränniche says, that during his residence at Marseilles, one was taken near that city in which were found two fish and a man, the fish were injured but the man was not. But Eichorn quotes from Müller a circumstance still more to the point. He relates that in 1758, in stormy weather in the Mediterranean, a sailor fell overboard from a frigate ; a shark was close by, which, as he was swimming, took him and swallowed him. The captain discharged a gun at the fish, which struck it so that it cast out the sailor, who was taken up alive and little injured. The only supernatural power required therefore, was to enable Jonah to live till the fish cast him out.

The three miraculous days and nights of our Lord's crucifixion are next in order. The Jews reckon their days from sunset to sunset, and any *part* of the intervening time is called a day and night, when reckoning general duration. Christ was buried before the close of their Saturday, and this would be called one day and night. He was in the grave all their Sabbath, which would be called the second day and night ; he rose on their Monday morning, which would be called their third day and night.

But again, my opponent said, " Mr. M'Cann gives, as an illustration of special revelation, the case of Paul, That case of Paul is recorded three times

in only one book. Paul was travelling to Damascus with certain others, and suddenly, upon the appearance of a bright light, the whole party fell down to the earth ; but although the infallible record says that all fell, only Paul fell, and the men that were with him stood speechless. Will my reverend friend tell me, as both of these statements are infallibly true, which is it that he believes ? and the men who were with Paul heard the voice but did not see anybody, and yet they did not hear the voice though they saw the light ; which do you teach your congregations to believe ?—that Paul's companions stood up or that they fell down, that they did hear or that they did not ?”

Now as I have not mentioned in my Lectures, either directly or indirectly, the conversion of Saul, I cannot imagine why Mr. Bradlaugh should have introduced it, unless he wished to draw me off from the argument by presenting a bait so tempting in its falsity and folly as the above, supposing, perhaps, that I would swallow it ; or else, he has somewhere picked up the apparent discrepancy, and thinking it too taking to be lost, determined to drag it in somehow. This kind of thing is what he calls “platform tactics,” but which I should call by a less complimentary term. He states that “only Paul fell ;” that “*only*” is his own coinage, and has no place in the narrative ; but I suppose he thinks it quite consistent with Secularist truth (*v.* policy) to

insert little words of his own that entirely alter the meaning,—I can only say that it is not consistent with Christian truth (*v. right*); but the two are distinct, even according to Secularists themselves. All the narratives may be most easily harmonised. When the light suddenly shone around, *all* may have been struck to the ground together, but the companions of Saul recovering themselves, may have stood up before they heard the sound. They all heard τῆς φωνῆς, the sound of the voice, but not τὴν φωνὴν τοῦ λαλοῦντός μοι, the words spoken and their meaning. And this is the more probable as the words were in Hebrew. I shall, therefore, teach my congregation, if I ever have one, to trust all the records, as I believe them all to be true.

Another equally important discrepancy is the following. “What is the revelation of God as Creator? That he made man and woman together the same day, and after he had made all the other animals; but that he made man first alone, that he afterwards made the animals, and brought them to the solitary man to be named, and ultimately, and at a separate time, created the woman?” This was actually *written* as a disproof of my statement that, the Bible revealed the mind and will of God to man as his *Creator*. It is exactly as though I should attempt to disprove the assertion that, the sun is round, by stating that, water is transparent. But is there even an apparent discrepancy between

the account as given in the first and second chapters of Genesis? The first chapter does not tell us that the two, male and female, were created *simultaneously*, that there was no interval between the creation of Adam and of Eve, but only the fact that, he created them male and female; there is no reference whatever to time, further than that Eve was created before the close of the sixth day. And if the days were lengthened periods, there would be ample time for the naming of the animals before the production of Eve. I should also much like to know where we are told that the animals were made after man; the 19th verse of Chap. ii. does not tell us this; all we can gather from it is, that God made them, and that he brought them to Adam; there is not one syllable about *time*, not the slightest hint as to *when* the animals were formed.

What must we think of that man's enmity to the Bible who seizes upon such easily reconciled passages as these, and, by every unfair and unscrupulous ingenuity tries to twist them, into an appearance of contradiction?

I do not recollect any other case of historic discrepancy brought forward, and as the debate is not yet printed, I cannot refer to it: but I may state that, so far as I have studied this class of objections, I cannot help feeling that, there are few cases where the difficulty is not the result of a *desire* for difficulty, rather than of fair and candid criticism.

MORAL OBJECTIONS.

Mr. Bradlaugh again says "Mr. M'Cann speaks of the works of, and powers of, nature as the productions of 'a loving father,' but does he learn this from his Bible? Surely I have read therein of plagues, pestilences, famines, earthquakes, fire from heaven, &c., as the productions of an irritated and vengeful deity." The reasoning here, and in all similar objections, is this: there are instances of suffering having been inflicted by God, therefore God cannot be loving.

The syllogism is thus stated:—

Whoever inflicts suffering cannot be loving.
 God inflicts suffering, therefore,
 God cannot be loving.

This is an argument that no sane Theist would for a moment maintain. The Secularist may do so consistently, for it certainly were most unkind to knock a man down, and then kick him for falling. And, as the Secularist belives himself compelled to all he does, it would be most unjust to punish him for doing it. What happy children must those of Secularists be, who never get punished, no matter what they do. The Theist, however, who believes that we can choose our actions, must allow that very frequently chastisement is love; and that injudicious tenderness is cruelty.

Mr. Bradlaugh's incoherent blasphemies about the fall shall go for what they are worth, those with whom they have any weight, after his *refusal* to answer my argument on the subject of the temptation, either cannot, or will not reason. I pass on at once to the "deluge slaughtering," as he terms it. We read that, "the earth also was corrupt before God, and the earth was filled with violence." Now suppose for a moment that God was "irritated and vengeful,"—why was he so? The corruption of men could not do him any harm, or cause him personally any suffering. If, therefore, he were irritated, it must have been on man's own account. And why should he be vengeful? If he had no love for man, but rather hate, he would have been pleased to see them do themselves so much injury; he would have preserved them, that corruption might have become still more corrupt. Not irritation, but gratification, must have been his emotion. Had revenge been his wish he could have tortured with bodily torture, racked men with pains before undreamt of, or swept all from earth without a moment's warning. But did he? No, he appointed Noah, "a preacher of righteousness," who, for 120 years, by exhortation, by example, and by the building of the ark, during at least a portion of that time, warned men of the coming judgment. There was love thus shown to those who perished, and there was love shown to all succeeding men by

their destruction. Suppose they, in all their intensified wickedness, had been allowed to remain on earth, polluting their posterity, causing the stream of humanity to be a baneful current of vile and pestilential foulness—blasting with an eternal blight the souls of men—where would have been the love? An envenomed cancer was eating the vitality from the morality and spirituality of man, was it unloving for the surgeon to apply his knife, cut it out, and save his patient's life? If the ante-diluvians suffered, it was for crimes and sins of their own producing, it was in spite of warning, it was demanded by justice to all men who were to come after. If a father find any one of his sons influencing for evil the remainder of his family, love and justice both require the expulsion of that vitiating child. Surely then God manifested only love and justice, by wrapping in that watery winding sheet, away from the eyes of after ages, the abominations of the ante-diluvian world.

The extermination of the Canaanites by the Israelites, may be explained by the same principles. The war waged by Joshua was not private, for personal aggrandisement, or personal ambition, but judicial; he was merely the minister of a higher power. There is all the difference between private warfare and judicial, that there is between murder and the execution of the sentence of death

pronounced by a judge. To hear Mr. Bradlaugh speak of these poor wronged Canaanites, you would fancy they were good, kind, innocent creatures, who were cruelly treated by those ferocious Jews. But what is the state of the case? In the first place, a few insignificant tribes, occupying an area less than England, were idolaters; this may be looked upon as a very little thing by our Secularist friends; but next, they *burned* their *children* as sacrifices to their idols; and next, men and *women*, those innocent women who claim the sympathy of the tender hearted Mr. Bradlaugh, were guilty of most unnatural, and lascivious crimes; of unutterable enormities; of all that could degrade and scathe manhood, or destroy and poison womanhood. No vice can be named, no matter how filthy or devilish, that had not its home there. The destruction, therefore, of those depraved and putrid hordes was a world-wide blessing. So far from questioning the love of God in their extermination, I should feel inclined to question his love, if I questioned it at all, for allowing them so long to contaminate the earth by their presence. But even for these sinners there was mercy, vile as they were; if they would renounce their idolatry with all its resultant cruelty and vice, they were offered terms of peace; but if these terms were refused their extermination was to be the consequence; and never did people more righteously deserve it. Nor was this punishment to be confined to the

Canaanites, the Israelites themselves were told that, like crimes would bring like punishments even upon them. “Whosoever shall commit any of these abominations, even the souls that commit them shall be cut off from among their people.”

Mr. Bradlaugh objects to this decree, in his opening speech on the fifth night; but I am not surprised at his doing so, for a man who will palliate and excuse adultery, as he did in his debate with Dr. Baylee, may, without difficulty, excuse all the rest. And this is the President the Secularists of England have chosen! Oh Secularists, if you are not ashamed of your President you ought to be ashamed of yourselves!

There were many other reasons why the Canaanites should have been conquered, that I have not introduced here, as my space forbids me, and they are not required for my present purpose.

All the punishments inflicted upon Israel resulted from forgetting God; whenever they lapsed into the vices or services of idolatry, they were recalled to their duty by the retribution that overtook them. It was of the utmost importance that the worship of the one true God should be preserved among men, that their minds should be directed to him as their Creator and moral Governor; whatever interfered with, or would weaken this recognition, was, consequently,

severely chastised; necessarily chastised if the health of the whole body was to be preserved for all time. Not one single case of suffering has been recorded which was not dictated by the purest and truest love; a love that, seeing into the future, chose to give pain in time, that it might be avoided in eternity.

Mr. Bradlaugh quotes the following verse as an instance of the love of Moses being greater than that of God. "Now, therefore, let me alone, that my wrath may wax hot against them, and that I may consume them; and I will make of thee a great nation." He would have the Secularists infer that God *could* not wax wroth, nor consume the Israelites, but by permission of Moses. If the cavil do not mean this, what does it mean? If God were independent of Moses, more powerful than Moses; able to wax hot, able to consume, whether Moses liked it or not; as of course he was, the words "let me alone" can only be highly figurative, with the object of expressing in forcible language the earnestness of the prayer of Moses on their behalf.

I have asserted in the lecture on Inspiration, that God reveals himself as a moral Governor; to this my opponent replies by the racy question: "Is this instanced when God sends a lying spirit to Ahab, or is it shown in his special injunctions to Hosea, or was it manifested in the choice of Abraham and David as examples for our imitation?"

The facts with regard to the "lying spirit" are very simple. Ahab had about 400 prophets, who told him whatever they thought would please him best, they were false and lying flatterers. Micaiah, on the other hand, was a true prophet of the Lord, and spoke that which was right; in his address he did not pretend to say that he had seen certain transactions in heaven; but he boldly told the King, in the most impressive form language admitted, that his prophets were liars. That the words were so understood, is manifest from the actions of Zedekiah, who smote him on the cheek. What utter folly to suppose that, if God wished to persuade Ahab to go to battle, he could not do so without the aid of a lying spirit. Really the childishness of such objections is only excelled by their venom. "The special injunctions of Hosea" rightly understood, do most distinctly show God to be a moral Governor. Wrongly understood, they show nothing but the error of the non-understander.

Abraham and David both did many things that were wrong, and which are recorded most impartially by scripture, not for our imitation, but for our warning. Are we not told how severely David was reprimanded by the prophet Nathan for his great sin? Do we not read of his deep contrition, and earnest repentance? Have we not narrated the heavy punishments that befel

him in the death of the child he loved so well, in the fact that from that time the sword never departed from his house. He deeply sinned, but he deeply suffered. And by the record of God's anger against him, by his suffering, we are warned against his sin. His sin was possible and common to any Eastern Potentate; but his sorrow and his punishment were possible only to a Hebrew King, revealing God as the moral Governor of Israel's monarch. What are the words of a writer as severe as most men on folly, or on vice. "David, the Hebrew King, had fallen into sin enough—blackest crimes—there was no want of sin. And therefore the unbeliever sneers, and asks, 'Is this your man according to God's heart?' The sneer, I must say, seems to me but a shallow one. What are faults, what are the outward details of a life, if the inner secret of it, the remorse, temptations, the often baffled, never ended struggle of it be forgotten?.....David's life and history, as written for us in those Psalms of his, I consider to be the truest emblem ever given us of a man's moral progress and warfare here below. All earnest souls will ever discern in it the faithful struggle of an earnest human soul towards what is good and best. Struggle often baffled—sore baffled—driven as into entire wreck: yet a struggle never ended, ever with tears, repentance, true unconquerable purpose, begun anew."*

* Carlyle "Heroes and Hero-worship."

Mr. Bradlaugh also frequently objects to the legislation on the subject of a beautiful female captive, as found in Deut. xxi. 10—14. Those who have read anything of Pagan history know how female captives were used by a victorious soldiery; a subject best treated with the eloquence of silence. Without any legislation on the subject, would not a similar terrible doom have been theirs at the hands of the early Hebrew soldier? But what was the change in their state as decreed by the law? She was to be taken to her lover's house, and remain there a *month*, with her nails pared and her *head shaven*, that she might have a quiet time to bewail the loss of her former home; and then she was to be *married* to the man who had taken her. He was to make her his lawful wife. If after that he ceased to have delight in her, he might divorce her, *provided he could establish the necessary charge against her*; as we see by Deut. xxiv. 1. What *gervah*, translated uncleanness, means, I do not exactly know. It was evident, however, that there was some code in accordance with which the bill of divorcement was given. And we may well imagine that, if the man lived in the house with her for a month, when she was without hair, and his love survived it, he would not afterwards lightly try to put her away. Further, when she was divorced she went forth free, she could not be sold as a captive, but had perfect liberty; so that, if she wished, she

might return to her own people. So far from this Mosaic legislation being "brutal," or even unkind, it was the greatest *blessing* to female captives that the times and the state of mankind permitted. For the law of divorce, as it then stood, was not *sanctioned*, it was only tolerated on account of the hardness of men's hearts, till the time should come for a higher and purer marriage tie, which was eventually promulgated by Christ himself.

The toleration of slavery is the next object of our Atheist's disapprobation. Slavery is now justly repugnant to every right thinking mind, but in the early ages it was almost a necessity, for there was no labouring class among freemen. Citizenship involved independence; if, therefore, a man could not support himself, slavery to his countrymen was the mildest alternative that offered. And as regards captives taken in war, had they not been made slaves they would have been butchered. However this may be, Moses found slavery in full operation, he did not *institute* it, he recognised it that he might regulate it. Among most of the heathen nations the master had absolute power over his slaves, of torture, or of death. We know that the slaves of Greece and Rome have been slain by thousands for their owners' pleasure; and that there have been wholesale massacres of them, when their power was dreaded by the state. But what was the

character of the Mosaic laws regulating their treatment? All Jewish slaves were to be set free in the seventh year of servitude, unless the year of Jubilee intervened. If they themselves wished to remain with their master, they were to signify it at the place of judgment, when they were bound to serve him "for ever." What "for ever" means has been much discussed. I think it refers to the year of Jubilee, which occurred every fifty years. His master was also admonished not to treat him "as a bond-servant, but as an hired servant and as a sojourner, and not to rule over him with rigour."

If a slave were beaten so that he died, his master was to be severely punished; true if he survived some time, it saved the master from the charge of manslaughter. And if at any time the slave were only slightly injured, as by the loss of an eye or a tooth, he could at once claim his liberty. If he escaped, whoever found him was *not* to deliver him up to his master. The knowledge of facility of escape, with the impossibility of legally recovering the runaway, would surely check any cruel treatment, or prevent such usage as would tempt the slave to try the advantages of flight. There is in this circumstance a good illustration of the different light in which slaves and property, such as the lower animals, were regarded. For if any of these latter were found

straying, they were to be returned to their *owner* ; not so the former, he never was looked upon as goods, he had a *master*, but not an *owner*, and was not to be returned. But his spiritual interests were provided for in addition to his temporal ; he was to be circumcised, and thus admitted into covenant relationship with God, and become entitled to participate in all the religious ritual and ordinances of his master, who was thus practically taught to feel that there is no respect of persons with God ; as he was theoretically taught by these words, “ye shall have one manner of law, as well for the stranger as for one of your own country ; for I am the Lord your God.”

While then it was not possible for Moses to uproot slavery altogether at once, he legislated for it in such a way as to render it almost a blessing, rather than a curse, which it would have been without his laws. And in addition to all this, *principles* of conduct were inculcated, which, if carried out, would have banished slavery altogether, such are “Love ye therefore the stranger ; for ye were strangers in the land of Egypt.” “Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself,” etc. Mr. Bradlaugh talks in his usual style about the “brutal enactment of the Pentateuch.” I give the following passage as an illustration of them :

Lev. xix. 9-18.

But this most fastidious Secularist charges the

Bible with being an impure book. Not the Pentateuch only is corrupting, but the entire Scriptures! Such minds as his are of so celestial and seraphic a purity, that the shadow of a thought of anything more sensuous, than rapt meditation on the absolute, would cause them horror most horrible. Ah! good sir, it is, I am afraid, generally the filthy *mind* that most readily finds "filth." If a man go into a sculpture gallery, and tell me it is a filthy exhibition, do I blame those exquisitely graceful forms, and delicately shaded figures that he has been looking at? No, I blame only his own filthy mind. It is somewhat strange, that if the Bible be so impure, impure men hate it with all their souls; that the purest love it best. That it, from first to last, denounces woe against every impure thought, word, or deed. He who calls the Bible "filthy," only does it as he brings a filthy mind to study it; and such a mind would find it in the purest and holiest thing that God has made.

My explanations of the moral points I have noticed may be satisfactory, or the reverse,—it matters little; one thing is clear, that whether we can explain, or whether we cannot, the Creator of this world *must* be a God of love. The Inspirer of Revelation must be the same. No omnipotent being who hated, would have made such a world as that in which we live, with all its untold beauties, with all its unspeakable pleasures. No God of hate, would have

given a Revelation teaching an atonement, pointing to a glorious resurrection, and a happy home in heaven. A Revelation imparting joy, and hope, and peace to the believer. No! the Universe and the Word both proclaim that "God is love." Every deed then, God has done, must be based on love, or as he himself has said, "I have loved thee with an everlasting love, and therefore with loving-kindness have I drawn thee."

But when one reads the scurrilous and outrageous remarks of such as Mr. Bradlaugh, one is reminded of the fairy mirror, the work of diabolic art, which distorted every object reflected on its surface. Everything fair assumed a mean or hideous aspect. The wicked looking-glass was broken, but of the fragments some men make themselves spectacles, through which they look at this day. With such a pair of glasses bestriding his nose, the President of the Secularists has studied the narrative, and the theology of the Bible. Thus provided he can see—as I cannot now help feeling he wishes to see—the exception as the rule, the abuse as the use, the practice forbidden as the practice sanctioned. What I say, pains me more to say, than it will him to read; but personal delicacy must give way when the interests of truth are involved. No man shrinks from wounding the feelings of another, more than I do; but having spoken in the interests of Christianity, I must forget myself when doing battle for my Master.

PRACTICAL OBJECTIONS.

Christianity is further objected to, because men calling themselves Christians have been dishonest, immoral, and unholy ; and because churches called Christian, have persecuted and opposed the progress of science and literature. "Christianity," we are told, "has planted its foot upon literature and upon philosophy, and given battle to advancing civilisation." It is most convenient to mistake persons for principles, and assert that, whatever a person does is taught him by his creed. Mr. Bradlaugh speaks of Christianity doing many very wrong acts, he does not pretend to show by what Christian *precepts* they are inculcated, it is enough, he fancies, to prove that they have been done. In other words he practically maintains that all Christians are perfectly consistent, and that whatever is taught them as being right, they do. And that whenever they ask God for pardon, they are telling lies ; for having done only that which was right they do not require pardon. If he does not mean this, what does he mean ? If he allow that Christians do many things against their belief, he should then turn from the taught to the teaching, and specify which are the precepts of *Christianity* that tell men to persecute, to be immoral, or dishonest, or ignorant.

The Church of Rome, the most persecuting and obstructing Church in Christendom, has lit her fires,

built her inquisitions, and placed her foot upon advancing civilisation. But why? Because culture and learning would have shown that she was false to her profession of Christianity; would have shown that she had adopted the Secularist principle of selfishness, and cast off the Christian principle of brotherly love. She therefore acted on the Secularist plan of expediency, and deserted the Christian plan of right. She knew that the Bible would condemn her tyranny, her pretensions, her avarice, and her corruptions; and so she shut it from her people, made it a crime to possess it, and openly burned it before assembled crowds. She found that, as men came to learn the Word of God, they cast off allegiance to her; and so, when she could, she burned them, rather than allow them to spread their influence. And yet Christianity is to be charged with the doings of a Church, which did its best to conceal the text book of Christians; is to be charged with the doings of men, who will themselves acknowledge, that whatever they do in opposition to the best interests of man in time or in eternity, must be in opposition to Christianity also.

But our own Church of England does not escape his censure. "I lay this," he says, "at the door of your Church, that it has prevented, that it has diverted man from a course that might have led to better things." This is as foul a libel as ever issued from the mouth of man. The Church of

England prevent men entering the noblest course of life and action that time can open! why it is absurd. What, may I ask, is that course? what are the better things prevented by our church? The architecture of her sacred buildings shows her appreciation of art. The founding of science chairs in her universities, shows her desire to foster its study. The bravest soldiers in the British army have been members of her communion. The most able leaders in the British Parliament have been her children. The education of the country is in her hands, few others being competent to the task. And if there is more ignorance than there should be, it is because avaricious men will not, or needy men cannot, take full advantage of the instruction she offers them. She gives the children of the poor a week's practical tuition for the same price, that one of their fathers would pay for a glass of ale, and this she does by the liberality of her individual congregations. Every measure of reform, every parliamentary enactment of progress has been granted by her; to her are we indebted for it, inasmuch as about *ninety* out of every hundred M.Ps. belong to her communion. She offers to the child of the poorest man in the country the opportunity of passing through her schools and colleges, of entering the civil service and of rising to the highest appointments in the state, if he be so inclined. I say the Church of England does this, because the money necessary for the purpose has been left by Church of England men,

to Church of England institutions ; has been left as the result of Church of England teaching. When Mr. Bradlaugh uttered the sentence I have quoted, he must have been thinking of Secularism ; and in that case his utterance was true. For it indeed does most effectually prevent men from courses that might lead to better things than fatalism, selfishness, irresponsibility, and anarchy.

I will just quote another delicious morsel about churches, as a climax. "Where people go to churches and chapels they are most enslaved, most miserable, most degraded." As to being most enslaved, perhaps he is right ; they are such slaves to a sense of responsibility to God and man, that they are afraid to do what is wrong. They are enchained by a tyrant conscience, that forbids them to injure either themselves or others. From all this, others are free. The Secularist is certainly no slave to any law of God or man. He may with most perfect impunity break them all. Himself is his own and only law, and care ; whatever he likes that he may do. But stop,—I was forgetting,—he is the greatest slave alive, for he has no will of his own at all ; he *must* do whatever that arch-tyrant "necessity" tells him. Poor helpless slave, he is bound with a chain which shall *never* be broken ; no hope of freedom here, and he has none of hereafter. Oh ! surely the slave to right, and truth, and holiness, which church and chapel give, is far preferable to such base, maddening

slavery as this. As to the "most misery," and "most degradation," being with the church goers, all, but especially the clergy, know its truth. We, by a very large experience, know its utter falseness, and Mr. Bradlaugh knows as well as we do, that the miserable and the dangerous are *not* church and chapel goers. One glance over the countries of the world will show that, as the people are enslaved, miserable, deluded, or degraded, in the same degree is the study and practice of Christianity neglected, but as I have spoken of this elsewhere, I need not enlarge upon it here.

But again he says, "May we declare that, the folly of the Christian creed is practically declared by the every day life of the majority of so-called Christians, and the failure of Christianity is manifest in its impotence for human redemption, despite eighteen centuries of opportunity?" This is exactly in accordance with its own predictions that men would be "lovers of their own selves, covetous, proud, boasters, disobedient to parents, unthankful, unholy, without natural affection," "lovers of pleasure more than lovers of God." The cause of this I shall give in the eloquent words of Mr. Birks."

"But it may still be thought that such a partial success is inconsistent with the claims of a true revelation, and that, even although predicted, it involves a serious charge against the Divine benevolence. Hence there is a craving, in many quarters, for some religion or philosophy which shall succeed fully in the work in which Christianity has failed. The sentimental poet

covets a more elastic creed than one which reveals specific truths, and commands their acceptance as the only way of life. He longs to be left free to expatiate as he pleases among the unknown mysteries of the universe, with the pleasant assurance that no dark spectre of guilt and remorse shall ever haunt him in his farthest wanderings, or his free soarings be ever liable to a sudden downfall upon Aleian fields of moral darkness—

“ Erroneous there to wander all forlorn.”

Above all, the philosopher cannot endure to be told that for himself, as for the peasant, the entrance is strait, and the pathway narrow, by which alone he can attain to life and peace. He is anxious to devise a scheme of the universe, in which, whether the throne of the Almighty be full or vacant, his own honour and dignity may be secure; and where man himself, either by the help of position, or transcendent science, may wield the sceptre of a world regenerated through the power of his own genius. With all these classes the partial success of Christianity, and the seeming stagnation of its influence, where it is nominally received, are imagined to be powerful objections to its divine origin. It is easy for these veiled prophets to utter magnificent promises, and fairy land abounds always in visions of beauty. But the wand of experience quickly dissolves the enchantment. There is an icy coldness in these speculative systems of human regeneration, which soon die out, like evening sunlight upon December snow; and, when the veil is drawn aside, the fair ideal of a spurious philanthropy resolves itself into some hideous reign of terror and blood.

“In reality, the wisdom and goodness of God may be clearly seen in those features of the Gospel, which have excited the opposition or awakened the taunts of philosophical unbelievers, and of all the discoverers of cheap and easy schemes for the world's regeneration. It makes no rich promises which it is unable to perform, and never disputes the immensity of those evils which it seeks perpetually to overcome. To those who receive its holy truths into their hearts, it never assures instant

freedom from internal strife, or immunity from outward trial and suffering. On the contrary, it gives them the prospect of a hard conflict, in which the fleshly nature strives against the higher instincts of the soul, and a law of sin in the members continually endeavours to regain its lost supremacy over the will, and to bring it down afresh into a fatal captivity. It announces that life must be still a humbling and painful discipline to those in whom the work of moral recovery is begun, and that only 'through much tribulation' can they expect to 'enter into the kingdom of God.' At the same time, it gives the most ample assurances that they who seek the favour of God with earnest desire will not fail to secure it; and that they who, by patient continuance in well doing, aim at immortal glory, shall receive a full blessing from the God of all grace in the free gift of eternal life. While the main object of hope which it holds up to view lies beyond the grave, it promises that the Christian shall experience, even in the present life, a large earnest of the blessing. And the promise is true and faithful. It is attested in every age by the experience of ten thousand souls, who drink in the pure and holy joy which flows from the heavenly messages, and attain, in their earthly pilgrimage, some earnest and foretaste of the heavenly blessedness. The warnings of trial and sorrow, the promises of peace and joy that still outweigh the sorrow, are equally verified; and the proved veracity of God's word, in all its revelations of the Christian's earthly experience, becomes one main anchor of his soul in waiting for the fuller and richer mercies laid up for him in heaven, which he hopes to attain, in their fulness, at the resurrection of the just.

"It is the perpetual recognition of the strength and malignity of the evil to be wrestled with, and finally overcome, which mainly distinguishes the revelations of God from the fallacious hopes and spurious theories of mere human philosophy. The colours of soap-bubbles may seem as beautiful as those of the rainbow, and they need no dark storm-cloud to reveal them, but they quickly burst and disappear. It is when the stormy clouds

of judgement begin to break, that the bow of the covenant discloses its heavenly beauty. The hopes it exhibits before us are more distant—we cannot reach it with our hands—but they will not burst with the touch of human fingers, as soon as some new theorist appears on the stage of philosophy. They are as enduring as they are bright and glorious. It is the pledge of an everlasting covenant, and the hopes it holds out to a guilty race repose on the surest foundation—the promise and oath of ‘God, who cannot lie.’ ” *

All this about the success of Christianity was in consequence of my statement in Lecture I, p. 2. : “If I succeed in showing Christianity to be rational and successful, I shall have proved its antithesis—Secularism—to be both a folly and a failure.” It will be observed that I do not here assert Christianity to be a success, I only say “If I succeed, etc.” I then explain the plan I purposed pursuing. But Mr. Bradlaugh ignores all this, treats an introductory statement as an argument, and as though I had made the unsupported assertion, that Christianity was successful, and therefore Secularism was a failure. But I carefully abstained from doing anything of the kind, and consequently, *all* my opponent said in this place about success, was a violation of agreement, and useless as argument. But Mr. Bradlaugh’s style of reasoning is peculiar. He quietly ignores his opponent’s premises, passes unnoticed his reasons, and then states that he has overturned his conclusions. Sometimes he will decline to discuss an argument “as a horrible ab-

* “Ways of God,” by Rev. T. R. Birks, M.A.

surdity," and then immediately proceed to declaim as though no answer had been offered to his objections. At other times he will seize on some illustration, or word *in* an argument, hammer away at that, as though it were the subject for discussion, and when you decline to follow him, he will ask you "what you put it there for?" Sometimes he will profess to answer, by re-stating his own old statements, which have just been combatted, and never even condescend to notice the arguments which have been brought against them.

If he really wish to have any Free-thought subject *fairly* discussed, he must reason as other men do,—lay down a definite series of *propositions*, and stick to them. If he will do this, many will no doubt meet him on any subject; but if he decline doing this, we must be allowed to draw our own inferences. Secularists should also remember that every objection as yet brought against the Bible, has been so often answered, that writers are getting weary of the task. Why do not Secularists insist on their lecturers replying to these, and showing where they are insufficient? Why do they not refute some of the many works on the Bible, instead of obstinately keeping their eyes closed to all that has been written on the other side? Christian advocates take up sceptics' works, and reply to them point by point; why do not sceptics follow their example? Is it because shallow declamation, and exaggerated

appeals to men's passions, is easy work, and safe ; while replying to clear and cogent reasoning might make their auditors, in a very short time, sceptical of scepticism ? It looks very like it. I may be mistaken. It *may* be that, the works of Lardner, Paley, Chalmers, Thomson, Ellicott, Alford, Birks, and all the Christian scholars of past or present times are unworthy the notice of the giant minds, and highly cultivated intellects who at present enlighten the world from the Secular platforms.

TESTIMONY IN FAVOUR.

I cannot close this section without stating the nature of some of the testimonies in favour of the *historic* truth of the Bible. It contains references, particular and specific, to a great number of the nations of antiquity ; very frequently referring to their kings, their customs, and their wars. It is not a book wrapped in transcendental mystery ; it contains precise statements upon historic subjects, which can be confirmed or refuted by historic documents. What is the fact ? That *every new historic discovery*, in any country named in Scripture, has added its testimony to the truth of the Scripture accounts, in so far as it has had any relation to Scripture at all. If we turn to the works of heathen historians, we find Pilate, Seutonius, Tacitus, Pliny, Martial, and others testifying to the life and character of Christ,

and the purity of the lives of the early Christians. While such writers as Herodotus, Berosus, Menander, Strabo, etc., bear indirect, but certain witness, to the truth of many narratives of the Old Testament. If we turn to the stony records of Arabia, Assyria, Persia, or Egypt, similar, or even more convincing testimony is borne to the truth of Old Testament history. On several of the rocks of Southern Arabia, are found inscriptions in large letters in the Himyaritic language,—or that of the Joktanite Arabs.* There is an almost exact identity between fourteen of the letters of their alphabet, and fourteen of the old Sanscrit,—pointing evidently to this land as that from whence it was derived. There are also on the rocks of Sinai thousands of inscriptions, extending for miles, in the very path of the Israelite wanderings. And these also, as deciphered by Forster, corroborate most fully the Mosaic account of the Exodus. It is supposed by the celebrated Hebrew scholar, Margoliouth, that these are referred to in Num. xi. 26., “But there remained two of the men in the camp, the name of the one was Eldad, and the name of the other was Medad: and the spirit rested upon them; and they were of them that were written.” These last words have puzzled many, but this scholar states that the literal translation of the words *w’haymah baccthoobeem*, is “They were among the *cthoobeem*, or inscriptions.” On examining what different travellers have written

* Genesis x. 25.

about the locality of these inscriptions, he says, "I am convinced that Eldad and Medad were there in that famous region, at the awfully memorable place, Kibroth-hattaavah, the very spot where the inscriptions are found."

And as for the Assyrian discoveries of Layard and others, the account of them reads like a commentary on the story that has been told by the inspired writers. The descriptions of her capital—Nineveh,—the relation of her wars, her triumphs, and her defeats,—the total downfall of her renowned Babylon,—the peculiar character of her cities,—and her hoar antiquity, are all illustrated by the remaining stones of her palaces, her tombs, and her temples. Learned men had demonstrated to their own satisfaction, that the early chapters of Genesis were fable, fiction, or myth; that the remarkable age ascribed to the Assyrian empire was nonsense. Semiramis was a creation of fancy—a fish goddess; Ninus, a myth; Nimrod, instead of being a mighty hunter, was a constellation of stars. It was settled in the very teeth of "the obsolete Bible narrative." Settled, till Layard began his excavations, when he at once unsettled it for ever, and showed that our rationalists were most irrational; that they were all wrong, and the Bible all right. This "mythical" Ninus has his name stamped on ten thousand of the bricks of Nimroud: "I. Ninus, King of Assyria." It is perfectly inexcusable, the way that sceptic cobweb

fancies are still being spun, when every breath of fresh investigation blows to shreds those previously existing.

Turn we to the mountains of Persia, and the same wondrous facts meet our gaze. There is a mountain-side of hard stone, in large part polished, and covered with writing, faced with a coating of siliceous varnish. It is called the Rock of Behistun, and its voice also is in aid of Bible evidence. Nor is Egypt any exception to the rule. The pictures and hieroglyphics in its tombs, having been partly hidden from the eye of man, and wholly from his mind for thousands of years; are now exposed to his gaze, and revealed to his understanding. They tell their readers that Moses wrote a true tale, and that he must have been intimately acquainted with the customs of the Egyptian people. Causal remarks made by him, and incidents but slightly noticed, are explained and confirmed by monumental evidence.

As there are several works examining these points in detail, I need here refer to only one or two cases by way of illustration.* In Gen. x. 2, we read that of the sons of Japheth were Meshech and Tiras. Among the Asiatic nations, which are represented on the monuments as engaged in war with the Egyptians

* See especially "Egypt and the Books of Moses," by Hengstenberg. "The Monumental History of Egypt," by Osburn. And the Works of Young, Champollion, Lepsius, Rosellini, &c.

are the Toersha and Mashoash, which are the same as Meshech and Tiras. In the same verse Javan, the representative of the Ionians, or Greeks, is mentioned. According to Rosellini, the Uoinim, the Ionians are found among others, in a symbolic painting representing King Menephthah I., as in the sight of Amon-re he slays one individual of each of the conquered nations. These same people were also mentioned on the monuments which belong to Thothmes V. Similar evidence is found in relation to the names of Cush, Mizraim, Lahabim, and Naphtuhim, etc., mentioned in this chapter.

Again, we are told by Egyptologers that the tombs of the eras following that of Apophis, bear unequivocal testimony to a great political change having taken place in the condition of the inhabitants of Egypt at this time. The tombs of the period following Joseph show clearly that the subject sustained a new relation to the king. The key to this is found in the legislation of Joseph. "And Joseph bought all the land of Egypt for Pharaoh ; for the Egyptians sold every man his field, because the famine prevailed over them; so the land became Pharaoh's." There are also the ruins of a tomb at Sakkara, in Lower Egypt, in which the names and titles of Joseph appear. The name is written in hieroglyphics, *Ei tsuph*—"he came to save." He is also called "Director of the Granaries of the chiefs of both Egypts." All who have read the

story of Moses, remember the circumstances attending his youth, and specially the finding of him by "Pharaoh's daughter." The monuments tell us that there was associated at this time, with Tothmes II, a Queen called Amen-numpt, who appears to have been the real governor while Tothmes was only nominally such. She left many fine monuments as witnesses of her taste and encouragement of the arts, the chief of which are the obelisks of the temple of Amen-ra at Thebes, one of which is still standing, and on it she is repeatedly termed "Pharaoh's daughter."

Tothmes IV, was the reigning monarch at the date of the Exodus. The Sphinx was dedicated during this reign, and appears to have had some very interesting connexion with the history of Egypt as related to that of Israel, but into this I cannot at present enter. However on it there is an account of the reign of Tothmes, describing first his character, next his exploits, then the line of his predecessors, finishing with the words "and then"—What a significant ending to the history of the leader who, the Bible says, perished in the waters of the Red sea. It is also a fact that his tomb has never yet been found, while those of his predecessors have been identified, and also that of his successor, Amenophis. There is also a most striking picture representing the Queen of Tothmes as having given birth to a son. Two handmaids are chafing her hands, as if she were in sorrow, fear, or peril. This birth took

place about the time of the death of the first born ; and it is moreover known that Amenophis was not the king's elder, but his younger son. He had an elder, of whose life and *death* nothing is said. What is the natural inference ? but that the word is true which says, that the first-born were all slain, from the first-born of Pharaoh that sat upon his throne. Such illustrations of the truth of Scripture might be multiplied indefinitely, I have, however, given sufficient to show that wherever Sceptics may find weapons against the Bible, they have not been discovered in the monuments of Egypt.

There is an evidence in favour of Christianity, which I have never yet seen explained by Sceptics, and it is the fact that—Christianity is. I should much like to know how they account for its origin, its progress, and its power. How a few men without political influence, social station, or the force of arms, should brave and conquer the power of the Roman Empire, and overturn her time-honoured superstitions ; should change the whole aspect of the civilised world, and be a power felt wherever learning, or culture, has been felt. How Christianity, if it were not something truer, and more in accordance with the wants and wishes of humanity, than any other belief with which it came in contact, was able to uproot and overturn them all. I will close with a few testimonies in favour of Christianity, culled, not from Christians, but from those who have

rejected the divinity of its Founder, and perhaps their testimony, as being impartial, may have some weight with Secularists. Mr. Owen writes,

“The life and character of Jesus Christ, as they have been handed down to us, appear, according to the light of the period in which he lived, to have been irreproachable. Judging from the popular documents which we possess respecting him, he was a sincere reformer of the abuses of his time ; he was benevolent and kind-hearted, and desirous to relieve the poor in their distress ; he was opposed to hypocrisy, and sternly recommended what was just, and that all men should love one another.

This was going a great way for the time in which he lived ; and that he was sincere in his desire to ameliorate the condition of mankind no one can doubt, if the testimony regarding him be true, for he was willing to sacrifice himself for the sins of the world, according to the phrase then used ; that is, he felt so great a love for mankind, that, to relieve them from sin and misery, or, which is the same thing, ignorance and poverty, he was willing so far to oppose the popular prejudices of the day as to run the risk of life by teaching doctrines, which he thought were true, in opposition to the generally received notions of the people.

He knew what was injurious in the effects, and desired to remove these, and to introduce better. He perceived that the world was selfish or individualised ; that it was full of envy, hatred, strife, covetousness, and all uncharitableness ; that these could not exist with real virtue and happiness : and that before this change could be made in their character, they must be taught to acquire new thoughts and new feelings, to love one another in all sincerity ; that, in fact, the whole human system must be renewed, in which the purest charity and affection should pervade the whole man.

The great remedy of Jesus Christ for all the evils of hu-

man life was in the precept, 'Love thy neighbour as thyself.' And whenever this precept can be applied to practice, the remedy thus proposed will be, indeed, all-powerful ; for man will then know no evil, and the earth will be in peace ; its inhabitants will be full of intelligence ; and happiness, continually increasing as real knowledge advances, will pervade all parts of the world."

Mr. Paine wrote, "Though similar systems (to Christianity) have been preached by many good men in all ages, it has not been exceeded by any."

The following is from Rousseau :—

"I will confess that the majesty of the Scriptures strikes me with admiration. Peruse the works of any philosopher ; how mean, how contemptible are they compared with the Scriptures ! Is it possible that a book so simple and yet so sublime should be merely the work of a man ? What prepossession, what blindness must it be to compare Socrates to the son of Mary ! What an infinite disproportion is there between them ! Socrates dying without pain or ignominy, easily supported his character to the last ; and, if his death had not crowned his life, it might have been doubted whether, with all his wisdom, he was anything more than a vain sophist. He invented, it is said, the theory of morals : others, however, had before put them into practice ; *he* had therefore only to reduce examples into precepts. But *where* could Jesus learn that pure and sublime morality, of which he has given us both precept and example ? The death of Socrates, peaceably conversing with his friends, appears the most agreeable that could be wished for ; that of Jesus expiring in the midst of agonising pains, abused, insulted, and accused by a whole nation, is the most horrible that could be feared. Socrates in receiving the cup of poison, blessed the weeping executioner who administered it ; but Jesus, in the midst of excruciating tortures, *prayed for his merciless tormentors*. Yes, if the life and death of Socrates were those of a sage, the life and death of Jesus were those of a GOD !"

Mr. Greg, the author of "The Creed of Christendom" says :—

"I value the Religion of Jesus, not as being absolute and perfect truth, but as containing more truth, purer truth, higher truth, stronger truth, than has ever yet been given to man. Much of his teaching I unhesitatingly receive as, to the best of my judgment, unimprovable and unsurpassable—fitted, if obeyed, to make earth a Paradise indeed, and man only a little lower than the angels. *The worthlessness of ceremonial observances, and the necessity of active virtue*—'Not every one that saith unto me, Lord ! Lord ! but he that doeth the will of my Father which is in Heaven ;' 'By their fruits ye shall know them ;' 'I will have mercy, and not sacrifice ;' 'Be not a slothful hearer only, but a doer of the word ;' 'Woe unto ye, Scribes and Pharisees, for ye pay tithes of mint and anise and cummin, and neglect the weightier matters of the Law, justice, mercy, and temperance : '—*The enforcement of purity of heart as the security for purity of life, and of the government of the thoughts, as the originators and forerunners of action*—'He that looketh on a woman, to lust after her, hath committed adultery with her already in his heart ;' 'Out of the heart proceed murders, adulteries, thefts, false witness, blasphemies : these are the things which defile a man : '—*Universal philanthropy*—'Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself ;' 'Whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, that do ye also unto them, for this is the Law and the Prophets : '—*Forgiveness of injuries*—'Love your enemies ; do good to them that hate you ; pray for them which despitefully use you and persecute you ;' 'Forgive us our trespasses, as we forgive those that trespass against us ;' 'I say not unto thee, until seven times, but until seventy times seven ;' 'If ye love them only that love you, what reward have ye ? do not even publicans the same ? '—*The necessity of self-sacrifice in the cause of duty*—'Blessed are they which are persecuted for righteousness' sake ;' 'If any man will be my disciple, let him deny him-

self, and take up his cross daily and follow me ;' ' If thy right hand offend thee, cut it off and cast it from thee ;' ' No man, having put his hand to the plough and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of God : '—*Humility*—' Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth ;' ' He that humbleth himself shall be exalted ;' ' He that is greatest among you, let him be your servant : '—*Genuine sincerity ; being, not seeming*—' Take heed that ye do not your alms before men, to be seen of them ;' ' When thou prayest, enter into thy closet and shut thy door ;' ' When thou fastest, anoint thine head, and wash thy face, that thou appear not unto men to fast : '—all these sublime precepts need no miracle, no voice from the clouds, to recommend them to our allegiance, or to assure us of their divinity ; they command obedience by virtue of their inherent rectitude and beauty, and vindicate their author as himself the one towering perpetual miracle of history."



NOTES.

LECTURE I.

I THINK it only right that those who have these Lectures, and not the debate on them, should be informed of the objections urged against any portion of them by Mr. Bradlaugh. I shall, therefore, now state those objections in substance. All the remainder he has passed either without any notice, or any requiring comment. I shall also add whatever I may think well for the illustration of the text.

1—p. 1. *Crediting my opponents with sincerity.* When I began this controversy I did this fully, and wish to do so still; but really I find it now very difficult when I read the false and ignorant effusions of so many Securalist writers; who, wholly ignoring *all* that has been said in reply to them, continue repeating their irrelevancies, their blasphemies, and their stale objections, in as cool a manner, as though they had not been again and again proved utterly worthless. That some are honest I do not doubt; I am happy to say that I have seen nothing to shake my confidence in the sincerity of such as Mr. Holyoake; but how can we believe in the sincerity of those who, without attempting to fairly reply to opposing arguments, persist in reckless assertion in distorting declamation, and in calumny? How can we accept the honesty of such, except on the ground of mental imbecility, or monomaniac infatuation? I am sorry to have to charge Mr. Bradlaugh with as barefaced and *dishonest* a trick as ever disgraced the pages of controversy. A trick which, had I noticed it at the time, would have compelled me to decline all argument

with him, till he had made ample apology. He, in his opening words stated, "The reverend gentleman says, that he will give this credit to those who differ from him, that they hold their views for sufficient reasons, and he expects the same credit from us." I never said anything so suicidal. If I believed that the Secularist reasons were sufficient, then I must believe the Christian reasons to be *insufficient*—both cannot be sufficient. If I believed the Secularist had sufficient reasons, why should I argue with him, my duty then would clearly be to become a Secularist. What I said was this, "I will give you credit for holding yours *on what you believe to be* sufficient reasons,—and I shall expect you to give me credit for the same." The words in italics are omitted by Mr. Bradlaugh, but they make all the difference in the sense. And then to make bad worse, he actually proceeded to reason as though I *should* have used some such saving clause.—The whole procedure was simply disgraceful.

2—p. 2. *Christianity*. Mr. Bradlaugh objects that I do not define Christianity, and asks whether I mean Romanism, or Protestantism? Neither, I mean the precepts taught by Christ: the scheme of salvation having Christ for its corner stone, with all that this involves.

3—p. 3. *What is Secularism?* I define its meaning, as it is not so well understood. To my definition Mr. Bradlaugh made no objection, so that I may conclude I have his approval in asserting that, Secularism is a larger and more comprehensive designation of Atheism.

4—p. 4. *Non-theist*. This name is adopted by Mr. Holyoake, on the ground that "denying implies infinite knowledge as the ground of disproof," but Mr. Bradlaugh rejects it, and claims Atheist as his designation, and *denies* the possibility of a God as a separate existence from himself. That is, he claims to know *all* possibilities! He *claims* "*infinite knowledge!*" Modest Mr. Bradlaugh. And the *only* disproofs of Deity he offers are, "I deny." But indeed a man with infinite knowledge need not do more.

5—p. 7. *Unknown and unknowable beyond us.* Mr. Bradlaugh holds that only the *unknown* is beyond us, and that this may in time become the *known*. This may be true of Mr. Bradlaugh who can know the infinite ; but we, poor weaklings, whose knowledge is confined to the finite, must, I am afraid, be content to leave infinite time, space, etc., for ever in the region of the unknowable. Here is a specimen of his knowledge of the infinite. “We, [he must mean I] can only cognise the everlasting phenomena of existence, as a line in continuous, and eternal evolution” ! Clever man to “cognise” “the everlasting and the eternal.” I had thought that infinity could not be grasped by the finite, but it seems I was mistaken ; and that, consequently, the part is greater than the whole.

6—p. 13. *Causation, the expression of the Conviction, etc.,* is objected to as inexplicable. The word causation, does not always mean causing, it also sometimes means the *theory* of causation, and then it is the expression of a particular conviction of the mind, according to the theory we adopt. The connexion must decide which signification it has, and in my lecture it would have been quite evident to any,—but a “practised debater.”

8—p. 10. *What becomes of the majesty of self-existence of matter while there is no consciousness of it, nor intelligence in it ?* Mr. Bradlaugh answers this by asking, “Is God conscious ? Is God intelligent ? Has God feeling ?” Suppose he could prove that God had none of these, would that demonstrate self-existence to be majestic ? Exactly the reverse, it would shew that self-existence even in God had not majesty. He then attempts to answer his own questions in the negative, which is a specimen of the fallacy called *ignorantio elenchi*, or an arguing of the wrong question. Because the question here was not, what are the attributes of God, but, what are the qualities necessary to majesty of self-existence. Still his reason for this denial of these attributes may be here examined, lest it should have had any influence on any mind. It arises from a misappre-

hension of the nature of the infinite. I define the infinite as—the utmost possible ; * the absolute as that which is not *necessarily* conditioned by anything beyond itself. He says, “our first difficulty is that all consciousness involves the subject as contradistinguished from the object.” Supposing this were true, which however it is not, it would not form a difficulty, inasmuch as Deity is conscious of the object which he has *voluntarily* willed to be distinct from himself. His next difficulty is that, a change in the consciousness of God proves mutability. I reply that, a change in consciousness only proves mutability of consciousness, and not mutability of the conscious subject. He further argues that God cannot be intelligent, because “immutability and intelligence are antagonistic.” That is, no one can be intelligent without thinking, and thinking is a change in thought. No doubt it is ; it is a change *in thinking*, but not a change *of* the thinker.

9—p. 10 *Nature is non-intelligent*. On this Mr. Bradlaugh observes, “By nature I presume he means existence. If by nature he dont mean existence, I dont know what nature is.” He had no right to presume anything of the kind ; had he read Mr. Holyoake’s words, he would have seen that Mr. Holyoake, from whom I have quoted them, did not mean existence ; and Mr. Bradlaugh knows full well that it was a pretence, unworthy even of a platform tactician, to assume that by nature I could possibly mean existence. Did Mr. Bradlaugh not know that I believe in a God ? Is he not an existence ? Is he nature ? If he do not know what nature is, or whether it includes Deity, I can only pity his ignorance and advise him to learn. But, my own words on the same page would have shown him that by nature I did not mean existence, had it suited his purpose to see them. And now, having condescended to the assumption that, by nature I

* Infinite knowledge is knowledge of all that is possible to be known ; infinite power and wisdom, the power to do all that is possible to be done ; and wisdom, without any taint of folly.

mean existence, he proceeds to spin a very filmy cobweb on the word existence, which is blown to the winds, by the simple statement that, in the mind of the Theist, nature and existence are *not* synonymous terms. But, Mr. Bradlaugh himself must have known it was a *false* assumption when he made it, for he said himself a few minutes later. "In this lecture itself you have affirmed two existences. I attack your affirmation and you have to make it good." How then dare he (I thank him for the word "dare") say, "by nature I presume he means existence," *one* existence! If it is by such fantastic tricks that Secularism is to be supported, it requires no other condemnation. There is however, another delicious morsel in this last quotation. "I attack your affirmation." Attack the *affirmation* forsooth! He should have attacked the *arguments* by which the affirmation was supported; which is wholly distinct, and much more difficult. But this he studiously avoided, confining his attention all through the debate to my affirmations, offering his own affirmations against them, and generally proceeding as though I had never given one argument in their support. I can account for such behaviour only on the supposition that, he is himself so much in the habit of affirming, and so seldom of reasoning, that he unconsciously confounds the two.

7—p. 13. *Every being*, "assumes," says Mr. Bradlaugh, "that there are several beings. This is not so, there are several modes of being, but only one being. Many phenomena, but only one noumenon." Again, there is assertion, but not a tittle of argument. I, of course, hold there are *more* beings than one. Not only one, but several noumena, three at *least*, Deity, soul, and matter. I have given my reasons for my belief, those *reasons* should have been met by something more convincing than bare assertion. I say three noumena at *least*, because in the present state of science, I do not see that we are not justified in calling every distinct chemical element a distinct noumenon of its own special phenomena. Oxygen is not a mode of being of the same substance as Hydrogen. No earthly power can, so

far as we at present know, change one into the other. But, inasmuch as all chemical elements resemble each other in certain properties, we class them all together under the generic term, matter. These substances may, probably, be ultimately shown to be one: but at *present* it is not so, and therefore, science justifies me in holding the existence of *many* beings.

10—p. 13. *Matter, substance, existence*, are held by Mr. Bradlaugh, to be synonymous terms. And substance he defines “as that which is in itself, and is conceived *per se*, that is, the conception of which does not require the conception of anything else as antecedent to it.” How very cool. He adopts from Spinoza a definition, which if permitted, would render all further controversy on the question useless. His right to the definition, is included in the words “*with me* the word matter,” “substance,” “existence,” are synonymous terms.” Not a syllable to indicate where I am in error, in showing that with *me* they could not be synonymous terms. Really it is too much to assume that, because Secularists may bow to the unsupported dictum of their President, Anti-secularists will do the same. If any one wishes to find illustrations of the logical fallacy called *petitio principii*, or begging the question, he may find them in the harangues of Mr. Bradlaugh, scattered thickly as daisies on the sward in spring.

11—p. 13. *Observation of change leads to the conviction of an agent, who produced it, and back to a Creator.* On this Mr. Bradlaugh says, “How this leading process is produced my opponent has not thought it necessary to explain.” I refer to page 15, where the process *is* explained. Again, he states, “I deny that constant change compels the conception of a changeless Deity ever busy in promoting mutation.” He may deny it as much as he wishes, but I appeal to the common convictions of mankind, whether change does not force them to believe that it had a cause, and that the cause must be powerful enough to produce the effect? If so, the remainder *necessarily* follows as

everyone must acknowledge. *There is no logical alternative between the doctrine of chance, and that of Deity.* He also "denies that from any observation of the phenomena of existence, you can fairly acquire the idea of a Deity such as Mr. M'Cann is endeavouring to affirm." The idea I am here endeavouring to affirm is that of a *Creator*. For this denial, however, Mr. Bradlaugh condescends to give a reason, and here it is in substance,—fire burns, and water drowns, and there is no miraculous interposition to save all who may be in the one or the other! What this has to do with the existence, or non-existence of a *Creator*, I cannot conceive. But in the very same sentence he gives up his own nonsense, and says that, you may even with this, not only believe in a Creator, but believe also in his all-power, and all-wisdom; but you would be obliged to doubt his mercy and goodness. Now, I should like to know how we are to believe in his wisdom and power, and deny his goodness and mercy unless we hold cruelty to be wiser than goodness; and if so, what, right has Mr. Bradlaugh to complain? He would not have Deity to be *unwisely* good?

12—p. 15. *Deity in whose being there has been no change.* This Mr. Bradlaugh asserts, is to deny that God is the Creator of anything, because creation "involves the idea of change in the existence of the Creator." That is, to say that God existed at one time as a non-Creator, and subsequently as a Creator, is equal to saying that his own existence changed. This is a very strange objection from one who speaks so frequently of one noumenon having many phenomena, of one existence having many modes. Does the noumenon change when the phenomena change? Does the existence change when the modes change? Mr. Bradlaugh must answer—no. In like manner, the *being* of God does not change, when his actions change:

13—p. 15 *First-cause.* To this Mr. Bradlaugh objects, that by these words I must mean something entirely different by "cause" than when I speak of going back from cause to cause,

as the word first is a negation of the word cause. Why must I? Cause is the producer of change. I go back from the cause which is an effect, to the cause which is not an effect.—from the producer, which is itself a production, to the producer which is not a production—and this is called the first cause or first producer, because [there was no cause or producer prior to it. How first, can be a negation of the word cause, is to me, incomprehensible. Again, he says, “It is utterly impossible to conceive existence as a line terminated by some primal or initial cause.” Who ever asked him? Put the word *created*, before the word existence, and the impossibility vanishes. Mr. Bradlaugh does not say how far the mind is compelled to recede, so that my *argument* is allowed by him to be a sound one; only I suppose he would hold infinite regression backwards, this *infinity* being one of the unknowns that our descendents shall know in time to come—that is if Mr. Bradlaugh be correct in his denial of the unknowable!

14—p. 17. *First cause must be eternal.* No, says Mr. Bradlaugh, because “if the eternal cause was always sufficient for the universe, it would be impossible to imagine a period when the universe did not exist.” But why? Could not the Absolute please himself *when* he would put forth the power he always possessed, and create? If not, why not?

15—p. 17. *First cause must be competent to the production of all effects.* On this Mr. Bradlaugh remarks, “To prove the omnipotence of what Mr. M'Cann calls first-cause, he first attributes to it all effects, and then declares that the cause must be at least as extensive as the effect. Such a style of dealing with the matter is not worthy the name of reason.” What a remarkably easy way of evading a point. If there be a first cause—and that there is I had already shown—I presume I am compelled to attribute *all* effects to it, for if there be any effects not of its causing, then there would be *two* first causes! Or, perhaps he fancies that I am not justified in saying that “the cause must be at least as extensive as the effect!” I wonder which

will be considered the irrational style. I am afraid my opponent has been studying so very closely some burlesque on reasoning, that he has unconsciously treated us to the burlesque, instead of the real thing.

16—p. 18. *The possession of consciousness and will are self-evident in first cause.* Here Mr. Bradlaugh says, "To support his assumptions and declarations, my reverend friend gives us an occasional text in lieu of logic." This, I am sorry to say, must be a deliberate and wilful misstatement. I *argue* them from the adjustments, adaptations, and contrivances in nature. And then—logic having done its work, and proved their necessity in First Causes—I quote texts to show that the Deity of the Theist and the first cause of the Philosopher are identical. But how does Mr. Bradlaugh proceed? he declines, most judiciously I grant, to say one word on the philosophical part of the subject; he it is who gives the texts in lieu of logic. He answers *the whole design argument* by asking, if God is "conscious of the existence of the Devil?" And if so, why he does not suppress him? For the replies to this, I refer to the Lecture on Evil. But, as any refutation of my reasoning it is, I believe, the most contemptible parody on argument that was ever spoken by man.

17—p. 20. *First Cause exists in relation to all space and duration.* Mr. Bradlaugh asks, "do they both (God and the universe) fill the same point of space, at the same moment of time, and all points of space during all duration? If yes, they cannot be distinct and different existences; and if no, there must be some point at some moment from which God or the universe is absent," Mr. Bradlaugh's confusion here arises from speaking of spirit (God) as though it were extended, as matter is. It is a contradiction to the fundamental conception of spirit, to speak of it as filling or occupying a point of space, in the same manner as we would speak of a stone filling it. This confusion he persisted in through the debate, although I fre-

quently pointed it out to him. And what folly is it to ask, whether the universe fills *all* points of space during all duration? As astronomical research has not yet penetrated to the most distant point of space, I really cannot answer him, but, perhaps, with his "infinite knowledge" he will kindly tell us.

18—p. 32. *Secularist powers are insufficient.* This I have shown by the arguments contained between pages 20 and 32; on all of which Mr. Bradlaugh only casually remarks, "Having told us that Secularism fails with man," etc. Not one syllable to show that I had told that which was not true, my arguments against the Secularist powers were passed over without note or comment; and never during the debate would Mr. Bradlaugh pretend to defend his own system; I must, therefore, conclude that, the President of the Secularists has acknowledged that Secularism has been a failure. A good practical illustration of the fact is found in his own conduct, when he passed unnoticed the arguments of twelve pages, in direct and deliberate violation of the agreement signed by himself. But why should we blame him, he holds himself responsible to no man for anything he does.

19—p. 33. *The Christian believes that God is love, which belief is a great power for good.* Mr. Bradlaugh asks, "How has God loved man?" I have already spoken of this in the former part of this appendix. But again, Mr. Bradlaugh will argue the wrong question. It is not, in this place, whether God has or has not loved man, but, what would be the effect on a man's life of the *belief* that he has. That belief may be true or false, but if it be present, I hold that it must have effect. My argument is that, Christian belief is a power for good, my antagonist should have tried to show that it is not. This, however, he has not attempted, and consequently my argument remains untouched.

20—p. 37. *What has Secularism done for our own country?* Mr. Bradlaugh replies, that emancipation of the slaves held by Englishmen was not the result of Christianity, because "infidel

and anarchic France" had set her's free. Mr. Bradlaugh knows full well it was not love to the slave as a fellow-man, that caused her to liberate them ; whereas, it was nothing else but the principle of brotherly love so strongly inculcated by Christianity which caused our own country to break their chains. On Christian principles the measure was advocated, and on Christian principles it was carried. Secularist principles would rivet their chains for ever, or so long as it had the power ; for Secularism and irresponsible selfishness are synonymous. He also asserts that, England has gained her place in the vanguard of nations in spite of her Christianity. In this assertion I believe Mr. Bradlaugh will stand almost alone, for even those who may not believe in the divinity of Christ, will allow that the Christianity of England, has been one source of her strength, if not the very basis of it. It is a historical fact that, as her Christianity has waxed or waned, her power has waxed and waned also. Let Atheism, selfishness, and discord,—the unity of the French revolution—reign among her people, and in her council chamber, and where would, or could be, her power then ? But let the Christian unity—love of country, of altar, and of home—be found in the hearts of her citizens, and her soldiers, and she must be great, glorious, and free. He also brings forward his senseless and musty cavil on the text "blessed be ye poor," and says it is hostile to greatness. He would have us believe that, it teaches the absurdity of a special blessing being attached to poverty *per se*. That a man is beloved of God, because he has not money enough with which to buy his dinner. His poverty may be the result of vice, or of idleness, it matters not, if he be only poor, from whatever cause, he holds an honoured place in heaven. Mr. Bradlaugh knows as well as I do that, this *cannot* be the meaning of the passage ; that it is, as expressed elsewhere, "blessed are the poor in spirit." And such are blessed by the absence of vanity, conceit, superciliousness, and kindred emotions with all their resultant evils. It is "blessed are they which do hunger and thirst *after righteousness*." The Christian precepts which are illustrated by England's "forges and anvils,"

by the "shrill shriek of her railway engines," by "her richly freighted sailing vessels," etc., are "be diligent in busines," "whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with all thy might," "provide things honest in the sight of all men." "He that provideth not for his own household, hath denied the faith and is worse than an infidel." He asks, "did Christianity give to England her liberties? Christianity, which says, 'that the powers that be are ordained of God,' and which would have damned Hampden, and Cromwell for their resistance to Charles Stuart, and which would have cursed Washington for his resistance to George Geulph." Not so, Mr. Bradlaugh. If I mistake not, Hampden, Cromwell, and Washington were all Christians; and holding truth as higher than loyalty, and fidelity to their countrymen as of more importance than personal ease and safety, as Christian patriots, they opposed unchristian practices. He also states that, "hospitals are the children of science and civilisation, erected in spite of Christian theory, and which Christianity claims as its own fruit in dispair at the rottenness which really burdens its branches." Hospitals the children of science! This is certainly news. Improved modes of treating disease or injury, are the children of science. But, how buildings supported by voluntary contributions, for the reception of the poor, who cannot afford to pay for medical advice and remedies, can be the children of *science*, I am at a loss to conceive. They are rather the children of that spirit of benevolence, and sympathy, which are the necessary results of a belief in the Christian doctrine; that we all, rich and poor, are brethren. Of that Christianity which says, "whoso hath this world's goods, and seeth his brother have need, and shutteth up his compassion from him, how dwelleth the love of God in him?" "Blessed be the man that provideth for the sick and needy." They are erected in spite of the Secularist's theory of non-responsibility and selfishness; but in accordance with the Christian theory, "Pure religion and undefiled before God and the Father is this, To visit the fatherless and widows in their affliction, and to keep himself unspotted from the world."

LECTURE II.

21—p. 43. (3)* “*We are not to introduce more causes than are sufficient to explain appearances.*”—to this Mr. Bradlaugh assents, and stops; he makes no attempt to show that the laws of the phenomena of what we call matter are sufficient to explain thought, remembrance, conscience, etc.

22—p. 50. (10) *Mental functions exercised with injured brain.* The following are some cases in proof: Dr. Ferrier mentions a man who died of an affection of the brain, and who retained his faculties entire till death. On examining his head, the *whole right hemisphere* of the brain was found destroyed by suppuration. M. Billot relates an instance in which the patient retained his faculties until a few hours before death. On examining his head, no more than the bulk of an egg was found to remain of the proper substance of the brain.

23—p. 57. (17) *I hold for the same reasons, the existence of two substances called soul and matter.* Mr. Bradlaugh asks, “as my friend is a dualist which of his two substances is God?” I answer, neither. Natural Dualism, as Mr. Bradlaugh should know, has reference to *created* substances only. Again he says, “as my friend contends for two existences, he cannot contend for one infinite existence, for there cannot be one infinite existence, *plus* a second, either finite or infinite.” If the finite were independent of, and *necessarily* conditioned the infinite, the objection would hold; but as it exists by the will of the infinite, and is dependent on it, there is no reason whatever why the infinite should not exist *plus* the finite (see notes 8, and 30). He further, asks, how we can *decide* the question, whether there be two substances—soul and matter,—or only one; and adds “*my friend provides the means.*” That “means” is an appeal to consciousness. He therefore grants that it *can* be thus decided, and that if con-

* The second number refers to the page in the single pamphlets.

consciousness be trustworthy, the dispute is at an end, being decided in favour of the duality of substance. He does not deny that we are conscious of a duality. This is very important, as it narrows the question to the single point of, the truth of consciousness. In that case my opponent had no alternative but to agree with me and give up the discussion; or else, deny the truth of consciousness. He chose the latter course, saying, "I do not admit the entire accuracy of consciousness!" and in evidence of its unreliability, brings forward some illustrations, which are not illustrations, because they are not of facts of consciousness. One is that a man in *delirium tremens* is conscious of devils. These, devils having no existence, the man is consequently *conscious* of the non-existent! Well done Mr. Bradlaugh! You try to overturn the duality of substance by trying to overturn your right to reason, by committing philosophical suicide; by advocating a system, that is, to use the words of Sir W. Hamilton (see page 55) *ab initio* null, not worthy of consideration. Mr. Bradlaugh has consequently this alternative, either to accept the existence of the soul, or to accept a system that is "not worthy of consideration." Proceeding, as usual, upon the fallacy of the extension of spirit, he tries, by a mystifying juggle of words, to make it appear that soul could not be caused either by anything the same as itself, or by anything differing from itself; *i.e.* could not be caused at all. And, as moreover, it cannot be limited by anything either the same as itself, or differing from itself, it is quite inconceivable. Quite,—as thus talked about,—and so would be anything else in the universe.

24—p. 65. (25) *I am not my body.* On this Mr. Bradlaugh remarks, "If I cut off his head what becomes of the *me*? If I cut off his leg, is it the body or the *me* which feels the pain? Is it the body or the *me* which gets hungry for want of food? Is it the body or the *me* which is pleased with a good dinner?" etc. The *me* is the soul, that which remains while the body changes; if my head be cut off then my soul is liberated. If my body be injured, it is the soul which feels the pain, for matter does not

possess consciousness. Hunger being a desire and an emotion, pleasure being also an emotion, they are faculties of soul; the stomach is not usually held to be very emotional in its nature. Mr. Bradlaugh's may be so, but if so, it must be unique. Does he seriously intend us to believe that, he holds the coatings of the stomach to be *pleased* when they enfold a good dinner. If this be not his meaning, then his words have none; not unusual with him; but if this be their meaning, then they are an insult.

25—p. 69. (29) *Creator could will the ending of the soul as he willed the beginning.* Mr. Bradlaugh says that, I have not given a particle of evidence that he willed its beginning. Most certainly I have not, *in this* lecture. The existence of a Creator was proved in the first, and therefore, would have been out of place in this. *The soul is not composed of parts.* Mr. Bradlaugh asks me how I know this, how, if the soul be finite, you can have a limited quantity incapable of division into parts? I reply, that the soul not being extended has no relation to parts, or subdivision of any kind; which Mr. Bradlaugh very well knows.

26—p. 71. (31) *I find a law supreme within my mind, that of right and wrong.* Mr. Bradlaugh says, that I give this as an evidence of the soul's *existence*. I do not, I give it as a presumption for the soul's *immortality*. But he objects that, the words right and wrong have different values amongst different races, and at different periods. That there are different standards of what is supposed to be right or wrong, has nothing to do with the fact that, there is a belief of a right or wrong of some kind. Men may differ about the best methods of doing the right, but none ever thought that it could be wrong to intend doing right. Nay, if any one purposed to injure his friend, and inadvertently benefited him, he would still be blamed, because his *intention* was wrong, and with this blame, all men would coincide.

27—p. 72 (32) *We recoil from the thought of annihilation.*

Mr. Bradlaugh here says, "I deny that men desire to live after they are dead." I have read many a calumny against man, many a statement the reverse of true, but I have never read anything comparable to this, anything so diametrically opposed to fact, anything so blasphemous to humanity. Man not wish to live hereafter! Why, whatever may have been their beliefs, men would loathe the thought that they never wished to live on in a brighter and happier sphere; that they coveted annihilation. It is a foul lie against every noble aspiration, against every warm affection, against every buoyant hope, against all that is manly in man. It is an utterance so unutterably despicable, so unutterably degrading, as to brand the man who was so lost to all self-respect as to utter it.

LECTURE III.

28—p. 82. (6) *Moral evil much more important than bodily pain.* Of course Mr. Bradlaugh objects to this statement, as with him there can be no such thing as moral evil; pain or privation are the only evils possible to an atheist. Consequently he passes by all I have said about moral evil being *more* important than physical, and argues that poverty, etc., is evil; that it is so sometimes, I have never denied, but, it is no less certain that it has been frequently the greatest good which could have happened to a man. He, however, asks "is it not true that poverty compels crime?" I answer no, because if it did, *every* poor man *must* be criminal. But every poor man is not criminal, and therefore, although poverty may *suggest* crime, it does not *compel* it. If a poor man be a Secularist, there is no reason, that I can discover, why he should not be a criminal. He owes no responsibility to God or man, he has no conscience (so he is taught) to offend, he has no soul to lower; vice and virtue, right and wrong, are all fictitious. Hunger and discomfort are the

greatest evils he can endure, why should he not take his neighbour's purse? Why should he not take his neighbour's life, as he would take the life of a cow, for his own profit, they are both on the same level? And this is Secularism! Perhaps, Mr. Bradlaugh, thinking of the natural results of his own teachings, feels justified in saying that "poverty compels crime." The Christian teacher would not say so, because he teaches that an honest and true man though penniless, is nobler far than he who is dishonest and untrue, though possessed of millions. He teaches that what a man *is*, is of more importance than what a man *has*; and that the man is culpable, no matter what his penury, who degrades himself into the cheat, the liar, or the thief. Mr. Bradlaugh also demurs to my statement that, hunger may have far more of good than of evil in it, because it is an inducement to the hungry man to supply himself with food. He asks whether in a famine "hunger is a pleasant means of inducing us to supply ourselves with the required nourishment"? I never said it was a *pleasant* means, unless indeed pain and pleasure be supposed synonymous. But that it is a means of inducing those who are starving, to do their *best* to obtain food, would be acknowledged by any but "a practised debater" like Mr. Bradlaugh. Were it not for the pain of hunger, men would lie down in listless lethargy and die, but the pain stimulates them to seek for nourishment, and eat that which at other times, and now, but for this pain, would be loathed; and thus I am perfectly correct in saying that "hunger is one means of preserving health."

29—p. 85. (9) *The creation is outside of God.* On this Mr. Bradlaugh remarks, that I must mean "either that God never did exist in the space which the universe now occupies, or that he ceased to exist in that space in order to make room for the universe." I pity Mr. Bradlaugh if he did not know that I meant neither one nor other; and I pity him still more if he did know it. He should have been aware that when Theists speak of "in God" or "out of God" their thought does not involve extension as a quality of Deity. But Mr.

Bradlaugh has no excuse for his blunder, if I may charitably call it such, I explain my own words when I say that, the created universe "is not a *part* of God." (see note 17.)

30. *Infinite means the utmost possible* (see notes 8 and 23). On this Mr. Bradlaugh says, "Infinite, Mr. M'Cann declares, is the utmost possible; to man the universe is the utmost possible—*ergo*, the universe is infinite. Outside the utmost possible is the impossible, in which Mr. M'Cann declares he does not believe, but the universe to man is the utmost possible, and God being "outside" is an impossibility, in which Mr. M'Cann does not believe. According to his own logic Mr. M'Cann is an Atheist." Can any one think that Mr. Bradlaugh really believes such clap-trap as this, to be genuine argument? Where have I defined the infinite to be the utmost possible, *to man*? What does he mean by the words "the universe to man is the utmost possible"? To me they are void of all meaning. How is the universe possible to man? I should much like to know. But suppose it were possible to man, and the utmost possible, does it follow that nothing more than present creation can be possible to the Creator? That nothing can be possible to God, which is not also possible to man? Most assuredly very much of what he says appears to ordinary reasoners as utter nonsense; but it is no doubt the result of his infinite knowledge that cannot condescend to reason, as do ordinary mortals. Had he not better give up the attempt till he descends to the platform of finite beings.

31—p. 88. (12) *I am a free agent and therefore I am responsible.* Mr. Bradlaugh here remarks, that I choose any given course either from some cause, or without cause, if from cause the volition is determined by the cause and is not free, and he asks me to supply him with an example of uncaused volition. An example of uncaused volition would be an example of uncaused change, which I have been throughout protesting against the possibility of. There is no such thing. It is Mr. Bradlaugh

who holds the possibility of uncaused change, when he holds the inherent power of unconscious motion. The facts with regard to what is called free-will seem to me very simple. Man is conscious that he is an *agent*, that he can originate, or determine the existence of certain results, which, but for the exercise of his power, would have had no existence. He is conscious that he has the power to will one action, rather than another; when that power is exercised he becomes a voluntary cause. This point of *voluntary* causation should be clearly apprehended, to distinguish it from involuntary causation; such as the explosion of gunpowder by a spark. The spark has no power of choice as to whether or not it shall explode the powder. Not so with man, he can choose the alternative of applying the spark, or of casting it away. His creator has willed, or caused him, to be himself a free cause. All volition, or will, is consequently caused by the willer; who is himself uncaused in his willing of this or that. He has, no doubt, *reasons* why he prefers one action before another, but reason is not compulsion. It would perhaps remedy much confusion of thought, if we used the term free-agency instead of free-will, inasmuch as, the latter produces in some minds the idea that it is the will *per se* which is free from the control of the willer; whereas it is the man that is free to use his will. Mr. Bradlaugh further argues that God's foreknowledge is inconsistent with this free-agency. I do not hold myself competent to reason on this point till I know *how* God foreknows; as all reasoning on foreknowledge must be based on the understanding of its nature, and as we do not understand its nature, reasoning about it is clearly impossible. And I may as well here reply to his statement that God decreed all the evil and misery in the world, because he foreknew it. He insists that foreknowledge and predestination are synonymous; that it is the same thing to *know* that a certain event will happen, and to be the *cause* of its happening. However, we may explain God's foreknowledge, one thing is clear, that it is not the same as fore-determining. The two terms convey wholly distinct ideas to the mind. The Bible tells us most distinctly that God has not

decreed all that is. Has he decreed sin, vice, impenitence, when the whole Bible warns against them, when God entreats men to repent, to turn from their evil ways, to be saved? Predestination of evil by God, is unthinkable by man, and may therefore be dismissed without further comment. One point however, is beyond all controversy. Man if he is a free agent is responsible for his choice,—man if he be not a free-agent is not responsible, because he has no choice. This is theoretically conceded by Secularists; but their attempts to justify the punishment of a criminal are sometimes very original; they feel the awkwardness of punishing a man for doing what he had no power to avoid doing. One reason stated in the *National Reformer* is that, punishment is corrective by associating the idea of pain with the idea of crime; and the criminal dreading the pain, will, I presume, remain honest. But, surely this is a confession of the power of preference, that he *prefers* honesty to convict life; and so voluntarily remains honest. Were the judge convinced that theft would always be dearer to the man than honesty, in other words that no imprisonment would correct the thief, then on Secularist's principles he would be bound to let him go free to prey upon society. I am sadly afraid that, if the criminal population were ruled by Secularist legislation, they would, one and all, at once pronounce themselves utterly unimprovable. Frequently I pressed the responsibility of man on the attention of my opponent, but he, to the last, declined to say anything about it, and by doing so, showed his manly instinct. The *man* proved too much for the *Secularist*. He could not bring himself to tell the audience before him, that they might be adulterers, thieves, murderers, and be blameless; be as worthy of love and esteem, and honour as the noblest, the bravest, and the truest.

32—p. 90. (14) *To demand then why God did not, if he was all powerful, prevent the birth of evil into the family of man; is tantamount to demanding why he did not produce a circle without the properties of a circle,* This, “says Mr. Bradlaugh, is as much as to declare that evil is as necessary to

man as all the properties of a circle are to a circle." "This" is nothing of the kind. It is declaring that the *possibility* of evil is as necessary to a *moral* agent, as the properties of a circle are to a circle. But perhaps Mr. Bradlaugh is not aware that there is a difference between evil that is possible, and evil that is actual. It would have been best had he tried to meet my argument, instead of introducing the unworthy quibble I have quoted.

33—p. 94. (18) *God did not damn the world, the world did that most effectually for itself.* Mr. Bradlaugh replies (?) to this by asking, "Surely Adam's children yet unborn were no parties to the eating the forbidden fruit?" No one shall be ever punished by God for what they did not do. One has sins enough of their own to answer for, without going back to the fall. "The soul that sinneth, it shall die." "death passed upon all men, for all have sinned."

34—p. 95 (19) *It was not some peculiar quality in the tree that imparted knowledge.* I am asked where I find chapter and verse for this. It requires none; the whole story carries on its surface the explanation I have given; as I illustrated in the case of the child being tested by its father. But Mr. Bradlaugh says, the two cases are not analagous, because God produced all the circumstances in the one case, but the father did not produce them in the other. What matter who made the tree? The test is in obedience to a command, and does not depend in any degree upon the producer of the tree, which is used as the test. Mr. Bradlaugh also objected, that evil existed against the will of God, in which case he was not all-powerful; or he had no wish on the subject, in which case he was not all-loving. This objection was fully brought forward and replied to in the Lecture, which replies however were not noticed, and the objections again urged as though I had never heard of them before.

35—p. 100. (24) *Secularism would, if received, flood the world with evil in its worst forms.* This, I fancied a tolerably strong assertion, and distinct charge; and one which I thought

would have insured me a terrible castigation at the hands of the President of the Secularists. So I prepared myself accordingly, that I might bear it as well as possible. I might, however, have spared myself the trouble, and the trembling. It was passed without a word of protest, or of refutation; not even a denial! Mr. Bradlaugh has tacitly acknowledged that in all I have said against Secularism, I have said nothing too severe—nothing that was false. If I have, why did he not reply to it at some time—he had frequently opportunities. He was not short of time, for even here he passed it,—passed all I said against the Secular powers, that he might fritter away the time in trifling on the word “law.” If Secularists believe their system to be all that I characterised it, they ought to be thoroughly ashamed of it. If they do not believe it this, why do they not demand its defence by their leader? Why do they allow him to come forward for six successive nights,—challenged as he was, night after night; hearing it denounced in the strongest language I could truly use;—without attempting to disprove my statements. Mr. Bradlaugh’s persistent silence is, to my mind, the strongest condemnation Secularism has ever received.

36—p. 110 (34). *Secularism discards such words as ought, etc.* It seems that I was wrong here; Secularists do sometimes use the words ought and should. Mr. Bradlaugh says—“When we speak of the words ought and should, we speak in just the same way, as when we say that, if flame is applied under a piece of paper, the paper ought to burn. We dont mean the paper has any volition itself as to whether it should burn or not, and it dont fulfil a duty if it dont burn.” Exactly, paper *ought* to burn, and men *ought* to be—well I am not certain that Secularists would say they ought to be anything; but for courtesy I will add—honest. But they are no more responsible for the absence of honesty, than is the paper for the absence of burning. We do not *blame* the paper if it do not burn, nor can we, according to this theory, blame the man if he be not honest. Such is the meaning Secularists attach to the words “ought”

and "should"! I was accused of being too severe when I said that, they discarded all moral notions, and allowed no distinction between virtue and vice, right and wrong. It is well therefore that Secularism should be manifested in its true character, by the words of its own President.

37—p. 110 (34). *Secularism is synonymous with the veriest selfishness.* Hobbes teaches on this point, that even a mother's love for her child is nothing but the expectation of future benefit from her child! That pity for the misfortunes of another means only, that you may be in misfortune and require aid yourself. That every affection and emotion has relation to self only; that the world might rot for all you need care, if you are quite sure it will not any time affect yourself. A pretty result all this leads to. In Hobbe's own words, "nature is a state of war." Yes, every man's hand would be against his fellow, might would become right, the only right allowed. And all this—anarchic and despicable as it is—is endorsed in principle by Mr. Bradlaugh. Am I then too severe in saying that, the evils which now corrupt humanity, would not be eradicated, but confirmed by Secularism,—that is by teaching the doctrines of necessity, irresponsibility, and selfishness.

LECTURE IV.

38—p. 120, (5) *At present there is no complete scientific system.*—Mr. Bradlaugh says, "If by complete is meant finished, that is that no more can be learned in any given system, then Mr. M'Cann is probably correct; but if it is meant that there are no scientific truths fairly ascertained and reasonably verified, by which the Bible may be challenged, then Mr. M'Cann is utterly wrong." Quite right, and had Mr. Bradlaugh seen my next lecture he would have found the Bible challenged by many well ascertained facts.

39—p. 121, (6) *Sir Isaac Newton may teach error and yet not be antagonistic to Science.*—On this Mr. Bradlaugh argues that his theories were only speculations, and that we are at liberty to examine them, which is not the case as regards the Bible; and therefore “if the Bible allege that which science contradicts, then the Bible and science are antagonistic, because the Bible is put forward as an infallible book.” We are not forbidden, but exhorted to examine the Bible statements, and to search them diligently. Mr. Bradlaugh has also, no doubt, inadvertently, overlooked my own words that, the Bible would be antagonistic to science, if it contained principles incompatible with the fixed principles of science.

40—p. 122 (7) *The Christian observes all with the earnest contemplation of a future inheritor.* To this statement Mr. Bradlaugh opposes several texts that there is no hereafter for man. They are Psalms xlix, 10-12, Eccles ix, 4-6, and iii, 18, 19. Now, as not one of these passages has any reference whatever to a *future* state, as they all point to death alone, they can have no bearing on my statement.

41—p. 123. (8) *Christian's recognition of the care of God, for his own creation.* Mr. Bradlaugh here brings forward the oft repeated objection that care is not shown in the production of animals that live upon each other. I cannot go into the detail of this subject now, nor is it necessary. We know that animals of prey are needed to prevent too great a multiplication of others. God could, no doubt, have prevented their increasing so rapidly, but by the present arrangement, the enjoyment of life is possessed by myriads of creatures, which by the other arrangement would never have had existence. Some, may doubtless have momentary terror when in presence of their foes, but what is this compared with their whole bliss of life? Again, however, Mr. Bradlaugh avoids the question, and wishes to discuss something else.

42—p. 126. (11) *Secularism is antagonistic to the study of Science for its own sake.* Mr. Bradlaugh grants that I am right here.

43—p. 126. (11) *Causation is one of the basic principles of Science.* The only attempt made by Mr. Bradlaugh to show that Secularism was not opposed to the principles of physical causation was, by asking, "Will my friend show me in the Bible that God made the devil, or, how otherwise the devil is stated to have been caused?" And this is the *whole* of his reply to my entire argument on the subject of causation in the physical world. Can absurdity further go? Can a man more clearly acknowledge the weakness of his own position? All he had to say about miracles, I have replied to in a former part of this appendix. The notes on this lecture are very few, because my opponent would not face the subject, either directly or indirectly; he scarcely even alluded to any portions of the lecture beyond the few opening remarks, which were the least important of the whole, but perhaps, they gave greater scope for popular harangue than did the remainder. I was anticipating a close discussion on the atonement, repentance, punishments, belief, etc., but he preferred an excursion over things in general, and said not a word about one of them.

LECTURE V.

44—p. 166. (4) *Inspiration is the action of the Spirit of God on the spirit of Man.* Mr. Bradlaugh asks "how this is consistent with the doctrine of free-will?" All influence is action, but it is not *compulsion*. My spirit may act on the spirit of a friend so as to induce him to a certain line of action, but it does not compel him to that line.

45—p. 181. (19) *In the beginning*—the meaning I have given to these words has not been objected to, so I may presume that it could not be cavilled at: *Created*.—Mr. Bradlaugh says, this word **בָּרָא** *bara*, means to hew out. This doubtless is a primary meaning of the root; but in the Old Testament it is used thirty-five times in *Kal*, and every time it is applied to God, and nowhere means to hew out. Indeed the only passage where it has anything like the signification of hewing out is in Josh. xvii. 15, 18, translated “cut down,” and there it is in the *Piel* form. It is never joined with an accusative of the material. My explanation of the difficulties attached to the account of the production of light, the sun, moon, and stars, has been also passed unnoticed, although I called Mr. Bradlaugh’s attention to it; so that, I hope this also is satisfactory.

46—p. 184. (22) *Day*. To my statement that day may mean a lengthened period, as in Gen. ii. 4, Mr. Bradlaugh opposes an extract from Kalish, “the word **בַּיּוֹם** *b’yom* ‘in the day’ is sometimes used as a conjunction of time in the general sense of *when*; but, **יוֹם**, *yom*, alone is in no prosaical part of the Scriptures applied in a similar signification.” I do not care to examine whether the latter part of the assertion be correct or not, as it is of little consequence; *yom* means day, *b* means, in the; and if the two combined signify when, it is all I ask, for the “when” is assuredly more than twenty-four hours. In the first chapter it means a period of time, in the second it means the same, and nothing is said in either chapter to define the *length* of the period. He also objects to my reference to Daniel viii. 14, because I have given the translation as 2,300 *days*, whereas the original is 2,300 *evening, morning*. Granted, but each evening and morning of the 2,300, marked one day, so that, rendering it “days” is quite correct, and in verse 26, these 2,300 evening morning, are spoken of as one evening and morning. Mr. Bradlaugh also asks, “if the ‘day’ means the sixth long period, was Adam created just at the termination of the period, or when? And what text do you quote to prove it? If the six

days were six periods, each of many thousands of years, then is the seventh day a like indefinite epoch?" I presume Adam and Eve were created about the close of the sixth day, but have no text to *prove* what is only a *supposition*. Had Mr. Bradlaugh read the lecture he professed to answer, he would have seen that, I hold the days to be periods of indefinite and varying length, no two of them, perhaps, having the same duration. While therefore one may have lasted for many thousand years, another may not have lasted for more than twenty-four hours.

47—p. 188. (26) *The birds fly in the firmament*. Mr. Bradlaugh here remarks, "But, if Mr. M'Cann had told the whole truth, he would have told you that the Hebrew speaks of the fowl that fly "towards" this firmament." Mr. M'Cann in speaking the whole truth would have told nothing of the kind. The Hebrew word is *gal*, and not *once* in the whole Bible is it translated "towards"; *upon*, or *in*, the firmament is the correct rendering. It is consequently Mr. Bradlaugh, and not Mr. M'Cann, who lies—under a mistake.

48—p. 189. (27) *"Let fowl fly."* Mr. Bradlaugh says "the Hebrew is "vOvPh JOUPhePh, so that my friend in the word he gives (*y'gopheph*) in his lecture has just left out half the Hebrew phrase, which Cahen translates 'of flying things flying,' " True, I gave only as much Hebrew as was required, the word I omitted was *v'goph*, which literally means—and flying things. If any one prefer the translation "flying things," rather than "fowl," I see no objection to it, nor do I see any reason why I should have given the word, as I do not remember any dispute about its meaning. The other word *y'gopheph*, is translated by Cahen "flying" which translation Mr. Bradlaugh adopts. It is however, both incorrect and senseless. The word is a verb in the Piel form, and *future* tense, and is not a participle; so that flying cannot be the accurate rendering. Nor is it sense, at least to my mind the phrase "of flying things flying" conveys no meaning. While the literal and correct rendering is perfectly intelligible "and flying things, let fly."

49—p. 190. (28) *Geologists know nothing about the succession of life on the earth.* “Surely something is already known,” says Mr. Bradlaugh, “and in the geological museums my friend may find a gradual progression from the least organised to the more complete.” In the first place, our museums contain specimens from those rocks alone which are accessible to the geologist, and these are a very small portion of all the rocks in existence. And even of those rocks which are accessible, how little a part has ever been explored? And in the second place, the specimens in our museums do *not* show a gradual progression. I find the crustaceans, such as the trilobite, as well organised in Silurian strata, as they are in the present day. I find the most highly organised fishes far more abundant in the earlier rocks, than those having a lower organisation, but, in the present day, the case is exactly the reverse, the lower are the more numerous. I find the reptiles of the secondary period were far finer specimens than those of the tertiary, or of the present; the reptiles of to-day are as pigmies compared with the giants of the Wealden. I find the mammals of the early tertiary, also vastly superior in size, strength, etc., to those of the present. Compare the mammoth with the present elephant; the megatherium, dinotherium, etc., etc., with living specimens, and see how great has been, not progression, but retrogression. For the rocks to prove progression, they must show us first the least organised of the lowest class, and then a regular advance through these classes into the higher, culminating in the highest. I know that no traces of mammals have *as yet* been found in the lower fossiliferous rocks, and I know it is very unreasonable to expect them, I care not how numerous they were on the earth when these rocks were formed. How often would a diver have to descend before he would, in all probability, find the skeleton of a horse, cow, lion, or tiger, lying on the bed of the Pacific ocean? Why then should the geologist expect to find the remains of land animals in the upheaved bed of the Silurian ocean, any more than the diver on the submerged bed of the Pacific ocean? We can tell

that certain animals did live on the earth at a certain time, but we are in complete ignorance as to what animals did *not* live on the earth at the same time. The *facts* of geology are not in the remotest degree, either directly or indirectly, in antagonism to the Inspiration of the Scriptures. I know that Secularist lecturers will still rant about the antagonism between "Geology and Genesis," ignoring fact, ignoring argument, ignoring opposition, ignoring everything, but what serves their purpose. But few men of mind much care what they say, as most believe that if it were necessary for them to declaim on the exceeding blackness of whiteness, they would do so, although some benevolent individual had given "himself the trouble of proving to them that black is black, and white is white, and not both the same thing.

50—p. 193. (31) *Did all mankind spring from the one pair?* I may give an additional illustration of change of type, under change of condition, as it is found in the Hungarian nobles, who are a Magyar race, and were originally Mongolian, but are now Caucasian in type. "True," says Mr. Bradlaugh, "but they intermarried with Caucasians." This is the very thing they did not, their pride of blood, etc., having kept them distinctly aloof, and separate. And as for change of colour, we have many evidences of its happening. How many hues are presented by the Arabs, who are of Caucasian origin? In the valleys of the Nile and Jordan they are black, while in Arabia they show many gradations from the sickly-yellow hue of the vicinity of Muscat, to the yellowish-brown of the natives of Mecca. Look again, at the Hindoo and see him vary with his altitude. On the Himalayas, tribes are found of a fairness of skin that has startled strangers, a white Hindoo being scarcely conceivable. Even among the Ethiopian or African races the same variations are found. In the tribes bordering the Red sea may be observed all the shades intervening between light brown and black. M. D'Abbadie has shown that the light tribes are not Mulattoes, but a pure African race. How long it may require to change the colour of a people, we do not at present know, as

no trustworthy observations are recorded. It is objected that the fellah of Egypt of the present day is similar to the fellah of 3,000 years ago. The inference being, that there was not time between the flood and that date for the change of colour. But, before this can be urged with any degree of plausibility, we must know the length of time necessary, and also *the exact hue of Noah and his family*. But, as we do not know either of these points, the objection is of no force. I have been much surprised to find Mr. Bradlaugh bring forward Messrs Nott and Gliddon as allies; but, I suppose he acts on the principle of "any port in a storm." About their reasonings I need not say anything, they have been pretty well stamped by the neglect into which they have fallen; but I find the following in their work, "If, then, the teachings of science be true, there must have been many centres of creation, even for the Caucasian races, instead of one centre for all the types of humanity." (p. 88.) Many centres of *Creation*! What a very peculiar intellectual digestion Mr. Bradlaugh must have. One creation, if recorded by the Bible, is quite too much for him; but if recorded by Messrs. Nott and Gliddon he will swallow any number. This is his mode of searching for truth; a most admirable one no doubt, if truth mean—that which I wish.

51—p. 198. (36) *The readings affect no doctrine.* Mr. Bradlaugh in reply points to 1 John v. 7, and says, "whether that verse is not disputed, and if so, whether it affects the doctrine of the Trinity?" This verse is now, I think generally acknowledged to be an interpolation. In the received text it stands thus, ὅτι τρεῖς εἰσιν οἱ μαρτυροῦντες (ἐν τῇ οὐρανῷ, ὁ Πατήρ, ὁ Λόγος, καὶ τὸ Ἅγιον Πνεῦμα· καὶ οὗτοι οἱ τρεῖς εἰσιν οἱ μαρτυροῦντες ἐν τῇ γῇ) τὸ πνεῦμα, καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ, καὶ τὸ αἷμα οἱ καὶ οἱ τρεῖς εἰς τὸ ἓν εἰσιν, translated "For there are three that bear record (in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost; and these three are one. And there are three that bear witness on earth,) the spirit, the water, and the blood; and these three agree in one." I believe that all within parenthesis is not

genuine ; it is not inserted in the best critical editions of the Greek Testament. In the old English Bibles of Henry VIII., Edward VI., and Elizabeth, it was printed in small type, or included in brackets ; but between the years 1566 and 1580, it began to be printed in the form which it has at present. Its insertion or omission, however, has no effect on the doctrine of the Trinity, inasmuch as it is not a passage I would ever quote in favour of that doctrine, referring, as I think it does, not to oneness of substance, but to oneness in action. There is, in this very passage, an illustration of Dr. Stanley's words, that the various readings are the delight of the Christian scholar. For these interpolated words encumbered the original passage with new and irrelevant matter, breaking the train of thought, and introducing a new style. But, so soon as the addition is rejected, all is plain, clear, and precise. This is the most important reading in the Bible, and it is of little consequence ; for the most part readings are, I have shown in the lecture, of little importance, being confined to different spellings of words, or the insertion or omission of trivial words. Rarely do they alter the meaning of a sentence, still less of a paragraph.

52—p. 205. (43) *A single passage in Syncellus, is the basis of Bunsen's system.* Mr. Bradlaugh says, "surely my reverend friend knew better than this ; he ought to have been well aware that Lepsius, as the chief of a Prussian scientific mission, personally inspected many of those mighty records of the reigns of Egyptian monarchs, those pyramids covering an extent of more than twenty miles of ground, and making the veritable history of the Egyptian monarchy precede, by centuries, the babyhood of Adam." Softly Mr. Bradlaugh—your "reverend friend" knows better than to let this pass without exposure. The following is the passage from Syncellus : "The period of the hundred and thirteen generations described by Manetho in his three volumes, comprises a total of 3,555 years." Bunsen bases his whole scheme on this ; because the dynasties of Manetho as preserved by Africanus and Eusebius, amounting to 5,300 years, do not agree

with the list of thirty-eight Theban kings in Eratosthenes. In this passage he finds the means of reducing the amount, and preserving the authority of Manetho unimpaired. My assertion was consequently perfectly accurate. But who was the true Manetho, and are his dynasties correct? because, if so, they do not harmonise with the Mosiac chronology. He is said to have been the high-priest of Heliopolis during the reign of Ptolemy Philadelphus. He, himself declares that he wrote from certain documents, which were carefully laid up in the adyta of the Egyptian temples, by Agathodemon, or the second Hermes, the father of Tat. This may be all true, but we have only the word of Manetho for it. I do not wish to detract from the value of his lists, I believe them to be, on the whole, accurate. But then, those lists are nothing more than an enumeration of certain dynasties, with a statement of the length of each dynasty, this latter being obtained by adding together the years of each reign in that dynasty. Now suppose, for the sake of illustration, there were thirty dynasties, having an average of ten kings each, each king reigning on the average ten years, and that all the dynasties and kings were successive, it would give 3,000 years for the whole. But, on the other hand, suppose that during the whole period, there were two dynasties *contemporary*; that in one dynasty reigning over one part of the country, and another dynasty at the same time reigning over another part, it would cut down the time to 1,500 years. The dynasties of Manetho have by Lepsius and Bunsen been computed on the longer, or consecutive principle; and thus calculating Lepsius has placed Menes, B.C. 3,892 and Bunsen B.C. 3,623. It has been frequently thought that the consecutive principle was false, and that several of the dynasties were contemporary; as was once the case in England. This opinion had taken firm hold of Egyptologists, when the discoveries of Mariette on the site of the ancient Memphis, confirmed it. However interesting their record by Brugsch, I cannot now enter more fully into them. Suffice it for the present, he has shown that the sixth dynasty of Manetho is

immediately followed by the eleventh and the twelfth ; by the eighteenth, those intermediate being subordinate or temporary. And what is the result of this discovery ? That the time from Menes must be shortened by upwards of 1,500 years ! Take 1,500 from 3,892 and we have B.C. 2,392 as the date of the accession of Menes, the first historical king of Egypt. I of course exclude from consideration here the reign of the sun, of time, of spirits, etc., all of which are included in Manetho's 30,000 years ; which are in truth the supposed age of the earth, and not of the Egyptian monarchy. The date of Noah's escape from the deluge is, according to Usher, B.C. 2,348, rather a close approximation to the other date (2392). Many suppose Menes and Noah to be one and the same individual ; and there certainly seems some ground for the supposition, given by Lepsius and Bunsen. But Mr. Bradlaugh seems to think that, however powerless Manetho may be against the Bible, the arguments from the monuments are unanswerable. So perhaps they might be, if there were any, only unfortunately for him, the history of the dynasties preceding the eighteenth (the time of the Exodus of Israel) is not told by any continuous series of monuments. Except those of the fourth and twelfth dynasties (which immediately preceded the eighteenth) there are scarcely any records left to the present day. And even Bunsen says of the monuments "Such documents cannot compensate for the want of written history. Even Chronology, its framework cannot be elicited from them."* I am afraid that, although the monuments of Egypt will not tell us much of the "babyhood of Adam," they do tell us that we must still speak of the babyhood of Mr. Bradlaugh in the present tense ; or he would never have penned the sentence I have quoted. Egyptian chronology, in common with that of every country that has a chronology, is in accordance with that of the Bible. There is another objection of a different kind urged. It is said that, between the time of Noah and that of Abraham, there was not a sufficient interval to allow of the cultivation and popula-

* Egypt, vol. i., p. 32.

tion of Egypt, as described in the Bible. We must remember that Noah represented the highest culture of his age, that he and his family were well skilled in the arts of the time, and that he would no doubt preserve in the ark, all such treasures, tools, etc., as were necessary for their successful prosecution. In the 500 years that—in round numbers—elapsed, there would be ample time for all the facts described. And as for the population, we know that, even in these days, when placed under favourable circumstances, it has doubled itself in less than 25 years. Fifteen years would have sufficed in the days of Noah, with all the advantages of that period, but suppose we say twenty years for the multiplication, it could produce in 500 years, 365,024,320 persons! I hope this number will be thought sufficient for all reasonable purposes.

In conclusion I would say, “if advice from me be permissible,” I would advise all sceptics to study, honestly and fairly, the facts of nature, of philosophy, of history, and of self; with these to study also, as honestly and fairly, the facts of the Scriptures. Bring the one to bear upon the other, that they may be convinced “that all Scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness; that the man of God may be perfect, throughly furnished unto all good works.”



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